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The thesis contributes to understanding of how the tension between social and 
financial performance in microfinance is assessed and managed. The dominant view 
at the global level favours prioritising financial performance and organizational self-
reliance on the grounds that these are necessary if not sufficient for achieving 
sustained social impact over time. This has led to a focus in research on 
microfinance organizations (MFOs) that have sought transformation into registered 
financial institutions. In contrast, there has been less research into performance 
management of MFOs with strong NGO roots (referred to here as NGO-MFOs) who 
have prioritized social impact over growth and transformation. The thesis explores 
these issues for microfinance in India, starting with a systematic literature review of 
secondary evidence on its social impact. Two case studies of NGO-MFOs located in 
Tamil Nadu (ASSEFA and CRUSADE) then provide a more ethnographic perspective 
on social performance management and assessment. Case study data consists of 
participant observation, staff semi-structured interviews and organizational 
documents collected primarily during fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2013.  
 
These case studies document how NGO-MFOs view the ‘best practices’ of 
mainstream microfinance models (including financial performance) pragmatically 
while conceptualizing social performance according to their core values and social 
movement roots. They also illustrate how the mainstream view of social performance 
assessment (reflected by the review of impact evaluations) fails to capture the 
informal, flexible, and process-oriented approaches to social performance 
management pursued by some NGO-MFOs. 
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The modern microfinance movement attracted the attention of institutional donors in 
an era favouring privatization and the market as the preeminent driver of 
development. The support of institutional donors contributed to microfinance’s 
explosive growth in 1990s and into the 2000s and to its evolution from a movement 
primarily led by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into one populated by a set 
of structurally and ideologically diverse organizations.1 Throughout this evolution, the 
tension between microfinance’s dual goals of social impact and organizational self-
reliance has been a theme in the global discussion on microfinance management 
and performance assessment. The dominant view at the global level favours 
prioritizing financial performance and organizational self-reliance on the grounds that 
these are necessary if not sufficient for achieving sustained social impact over time.  
 
The dominant view reinforced the trend towards rapid growth and transformation of 
microfinance organizations (MFOs) into registered financial institutions and has 
arguably led in a number of cases to the neglect of social impact or borrower self-
reliance. These issues have been particularly pertinent in the last decade in South 
India, where NGO engagement in microfinance has ranged from headlong pursuit of 
for-profit status to patient voluntarism. Commercialization of microfinance has 
brought rapid growth and increased outreach, but also political conflict.  This 
culminated in 2010 in Andhra Pradesh where MFOs were accused of unethical 
behaviour and as a result subjected to potentially crippling regulation by the state 
government. 
 
The prioritization of organizational self-reliance has also led a focus in research on 
those MFOs that have sought transformation into registered financial institutions. In 
contrast, there has been less research into performance management of MFOs with 
strong NGO roots (referred to here as NGO-MFOs) who have prioritized social 
impact over growth and transformation.2 The motivation for this research is to 
contribute to understanding how NGO-MFOs manage the tension between borrower 
self-reliance (social) and organizational self-reliance (financial performance) in 
practice, getting beyond any organizational rhetoric and externally-imposed 
prescriptives to understand the nature, quality and quantity of social performance 
management and assessment from the perspective of the NGO-MFO.  
 
The thesis contributes to empirical literature through a two-stage research design. 
The first stage presents a systematic review of literature of impact assessments of 
microfinance in India. The second stage presents two case studies of Tamil Nadu 
based NGO-MFOs. The systematic review represents a body of evidence on the 
nature and process of performance assessment based on an approach to social 
performance assessment often preferred by donors and governments and used to 
guide policy-making. The case studies provide a broader and ethnographic 
                                            
1 This research relies on (Vakil 1997) definition of NGOs as self-governing, private, not-for-
profit organizations that are geared toward improving the quality of life of disadvantaged 
people. In any discussion of NGOs this dissertation further refers to the subset of NGOs 
whose pursuits include development strategies (as opposed to only advocacy or emergency 
relief). 
2 NGO-MFO is used to refer to NGO microfinance organizations (or NGOs for whom provision 
of microfinance services is central to their operation or strategy). 
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perspective on NGO-MFO social performance management and assessment. 
Comparisons between these empirical sources provide material for reflection on the 
nature, limitations and constraints on performance management and assessment 
and implications for development management more generally. 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. Section 1.2 presents the thesis’ 
conceptual framework and describes its key concepts. Section 1.3 then provides a 
brief introduction to the Indian context both in terms of the NGO and microfinance 
sectors. The following two sections detail the research questions (1.4) and briefly 
summarize research methodology (1.5). Finally, the last two sections address the 
scope and limitations of the research (1.6) and then provide an outline of the thesis 
(1.7).  
 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework presented in Figure 1.1 orients the discussion of the 
social/financial performance tension faced by NGO-MFOs within a set of larger 
debates. Each row highlights an ideological tension NGO-MFOs face as represented 
in a relevant body of literature. The figure should primarily be read across rows; 
unqualified relationships or correspondence down the columns should not be inferred 
from the figure. However, when viewed in its entirety the conceptual framework 
succinctly summarizes two views or models of microfinance provision, referred to 
here as the mainstream model(s) and the alternative (or NGO) model. This section 
briefly introduces the key issues and concepts in each sub-area (row) and the nature 
of their interrelationships.  
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
Field or sub-field Mainstream view Alternative view 
 
[Management studies] Scientific management ‘Romantic’ management 
(emerging from criticisms 
of CDM) 
 
Development management Management of and in 
development 
(Implies the means 
(tasks) and ends 




(Implies the means and 
ends of development are 
the same) 
 
NGOs in development Service delivery Empowerment 
 
NGOs and microfinance Financial performance 
first 
Social performance first 
 
Performance assessment of 







The first row of the framework juxtaposes scientific management with Romantic 
management. Early development administration theories (a precursor to 
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development management) focus on reforming developing-country states to improve 
central planning for modernization and economic growth. A split or “deadlock” 
emerged in development management, however, between “reformers” and the 
“radicals” who questioned the relevance and effectiveness of these reforms, which 
transferred Western management principles and skills to poor-country contexts 
(Schaffer 1969). The current manifestation of the radical view is found in Critical 
Development Management (CDM). While reformers assert the desirability and 
feasibility of planning for development and focus on improving the means, tools, 
values, and processes of development management, CDM criticizes the very idea of 
management and its application in international development. CDM assumes all 
development management is “managerial”. Managerialism is characterized by a faith 
in the science of management in which the principles of management are 
homogenous, abstract and neutral. In its application of technocratic ‘fixes’ it 
downplays complexity, local knowledge, and social and political context and fails to 
address the structural causes of underdevelopment (Gulrajani, 2010). However, 
Gulrajani (2010) argues that CDM unnecessarily characterizes all development 
management as inevitably managerial and neglects discussion within the critical 
management literature from which it draws of an alternate social ideology, 
understanding of modernity and set of values that serves as a source of non-
managerialist development management. Referred to by Gulrajani (2010) as 
“Romantic” development management, it recognizes complexity and inter-
connectedness.  
 
Thomas’ (2000) distinguishes between three types of development management—
management in development, management of development, and management for 
development—that can be usefully applied to understanding the divide between the 
traditional (scientific) and alternate (Romantic) views. Each of Thomas’ types implies 
a different view of development. The traditional view spans management in 
development, which sees development as an immanent and inevitable process that 
cannot be ‘caused’ and can only be indirectly managed, and management of 
development, the view that specific projects, programs or tasks can be undertaken to 
direct development and the management of these efforts constitutes the 
management of development. The alternative view reflects management for 
development—a view that development requires a particular (value-driven) 
orientation.  Management for development denotes a particular style of management, 
which is applied not only to the management of tasks with development objectives, 
but also to all activities. 
 
When development administration first emerged as a field of study, dominant 
theories of development focused on the state as the driver of development. By the 
1980s aid orthodoxies shifted to a decidedly anti-state stance. The market rather 
than the state was the solution for development. Development management 
gradually replaced the term development administration. But while development 
management theory shifted away from the state to a more market-based orientation 
it was no less managerial (Brinkerhoff 2008). It was during this period and in this 
context that NGOs, including MFOs, became increasingly prominent as managers of 
development activities. NGOs faced cooption by a development ideology based on a 
view of development management that was arguably in conflict with the values-
based identity of NGOs. The NGO and microfinance literature reflect tensions that 
can be understood within this wider debate over scientific development management 
versus development management based on alternative sets of values. 
 
As representatives of civil society, NGOs are traditionally conceptualized as value-
driven organizations whose purpose is to facilitate social change. Values, such as 
participation, capacity building and empowerment, drive NGOs and describe the 
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nature and process of development. This means that the means and end of 
development activities can be the same or can, at least, be of equal importance. 
Hence, process becomes central. The centrality of process suggests a particular 
management style. NGO scholars criticize past development efforts and 
organizations for a management style that does not adequately reflect the unique 
nature of development (Fowler 1997, Rondinelli 1993).  An alternative style of 
management is suggested that is characterized by a focus on process, flexibility, and 
participation. This style of management is often contrasted with a conventional style 
of management that is top down, hierarchical, linear and inflexible (Lewis 2007).  
 
The NGO management literature generally identifies a lack of attention to NGO 
assessment (Lewis 2007). Critics trace the problem back to the risks and dynamics 
created by increasing dependence on official funds. They argue that as NGOs have 
become integrated into the aid chain, it has led to an incentive structure that 
undermines NGO values of accountability (particularly ‘down’ to program 
participants) and institutional learning. Integration into the aid system also contributes 
to a decline in NGO performance, particularly in terms of their mission to promote 
social change through the empowerment and self-reliance of program participants. A 
development strategy dominated by scientific management and a market-led 
approach sees NGOs largely as vehicles for the delivery of development products 
and services. As such accountability is upwards to donors. Efficient service delivery 
is prioritized (and managed for) at the expense of broader empowerment goals and 
values.  
 
Not by coincidence, the microfinance movement also rose to prominence during the 
1990s. The logic and operation of microfinance itself were consistent with neoliberal 
ideology. By providing small loans to poor households to support income-generating 
activities, microfinance supported the market as the primary development 
mechanism. The movement distinguished itself from many previous efforts to provide 
financial services to the poor through new organizational forms and contractual 
structures, including its use of joint liability groups to address the informational 
asymmetries that challenge financial service provision to poor households (Morduch 
1999). By doing so, the microfinance movement hypothesized that it could 
simultaneously achieve social impact and the financial sustainability of its 
organizations—another feature contributing to its compatibility with neoliberal 
ideology. 
 
Microfinance’s joint goals fuel much of the debate around microfinance performance 
management and assessment. Hulme (2000) identifies two perspectives on which 
point in the impact chain performance indicators should be selected and monitoring 
and evaluation performed. The first perspective advocates assessing impact at the 
end of the impact chain—at the level of the intended beneficiaries. The second view 
measures impact at the beginning of the impact chain—at the level of the 
microfinance institution and its operation (specifically institutional outreach and 
sustainability). These two perspectives reflect divergent views on the role, 
relationship and relative priority of social versus financial performance. Measuring 
microfinance impact based on institutional outreach and sustainability represents a 
‘financial performance first’ perspective, prioritizing the financial performance of 
microfinance organizations.3 Measuring microfinance impact at the beneficiary level 
                                            
3 It does so based on both theoretical and practical grounds. Proponents argue that 
institutional performance is a necessary and sufficient metric on which to base social impact. 
First, building a sustainable model of microfinance provision is a prerequisite for significant 
growth. Creating a scalable and replicable model for increasing outreach is necessary if 
microfinance is to impact large numbers of poor households. Second, proponents argue that 
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prioritizes social impact and represents a ‘social performance first’ perspective. While 
not necessarily opposed to measuring institutional performance, the social 
performance first school warns that prioritization of financial performance ultimately 
contributes to mission drift and compromises the social impact of microfinance.  
 
These two approaches toward performance assessment also represent divergent 
views on the primary outcomes through which microfinance contributes to 
development. Financial performance first emphasizes sustainable service delivery. It 
emphasizes management of and in development through its reliance on a 
contextually-neutral ‘technical fix’ (financial inclusion). Recent trends in microfinance 
management, including the push towards commercialization in India and elsewhere, 
largely reflect the favoured position of the financial performance first perspective 
(consistent with mainstream scientific development management) (Augsburg & 
Fouillet 2010). Social performance first has the capacity to incorporate management 
for development and prioritize the empowerment and self-reliance of clients through 
its focus on the changes in the lives of beneficiaries. However, it must be noted that 
the relationship between both financial and social performance and social 
performance and an alternative view of development management, which underlies 
empowerment of clients, is not straightforward. Social performance can be managed 
in a technocratic and scientific fashion. Additionally, social performance and financial 
performance have a mutually reinforcing relationship (Copestake et al. 2005). Trade-
off exists, but the choice is not between financial or social performance but between 
social performance now and social performance capacity for the future to the extent 
that financial performance builds capacity for future social performance. These 
nuances add to the complexity of negotiating between the social performance and 
financial performance bottom lines.  
 
The final row of the conceptual framework represents divergent approaches to social 
performance assessment. Early efforts towards assessing the social performance of 
NGO-MFOs were primarily donor-driven impact studies conducted by external 
experts. The impetus for an expanded discourse on assessment of social goals in 
microfinance emerged from concerns over the effect of rapid growth on the 
achievement of social goals. A number of initiatives responded to the lack of 
attention to social goals and attempted to refocus attention on both social goals and 
monitoring and evaluation activities, including the USAID-supported AIMS project 
and the Ford Foundation’s Imp-Act initiative. Imp-Act broadened the assessment 
agenda by focusing on social performance, reflecting a larger shift away from impact 
assessment in the late 1990s.  
 
Social performance assessment (SPA) “refers to any activity intended to clarify how 
far an organization is achieving social goals” (Copestake et al. 2005, p.178). It 
includes information on the breadth, depth, and quality of outreach. Imp-Act also 
argued the importance of a focus on the institutionalization of SPA as part a social 
performance management (SPM) system. SPM implies an organization recognizes 
the value of information about clients beyond loan repayment, collecting the data and 
learning and making changes based on the data collected. SPM means the activity 
becomes an integral, routine or normal activity of the organization driven by the 
practitioner, rather than a periodic exercise primarily driven (and often performed) by 
                                                                                                                             
increasing outreach (financial inclusion) in a sustainable fashion is itself evidence of positive 
impact. This argument relies on the assumption that sustainable extension of financial 
services and improved choices ultimately leads to enhanced well-being as borrowers through 
a more efficient market are able to improve microenterprise performance (Hulme 2000). 
Social impact in effect is achieved through financial performance. This has also underpinned 
the trend toward commercialization of microfinance. 
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external parties. SPM also highlights the feedback mechanisms that facilitate 
learning and decision-making based on SPA results. 
 
Perhaps the most distinct tension represented within the discussion on assessment 
of microfinance’s social goals surrounds the possibility and necessity of overcoming 
methodological difficulties, in particular solving the problem of attribution. Hulme 
(2000) discusses three approaches for dealing with the issue of attribution. The first 
approach is the conventional scientific method based in the natural sciences (as 
represented by traditional views on impact assessment). The second approach has 
its roots in the humanities. Mixed methods are often used and attribution is inferred 
but not proven according to the standards of scientific inquiry. Much of the literature 
arguing for practitioner-based impact assessment and social performance 
management reflects this approach. This approach views development as a linear 
process, favours quantifiable metrics and short-term impacts and attempts to 
address attribution to some degree. The technocratic approach also favours 
accountability to funders and is primarily about control (Lewis 2007).  
 
The third and newest approach described by Hulme (2000) features less prominently 
in the microfinance assessment literature. It is based on a participatory approach to 
development management and does not deal directly with attribution. The 
participatory approach does not accept one objective reality and sees the scientific 
approach as fundamentally flawed. Assessment is subjective and interpretative and 
in practice should prioritize the views of program beneficiaries consistent with 
development goals of empowerment. The second trend is reflected in arguments for 
a more interpretative approach to performance assessment. Lewis (2007) 
characterizes this trend as emerging from the wider participatory development 
approaches most associated with Robert Chambers. It incorporates the values of 
participation, negotiation, learning, and flexibility. Fowler (1997) suggests an 
interpretative approach to assessment that stresses participatory techniques, the 
importance of learning as an objective of assessment and incorporating the views of 
multiple stakeholders (particularly the views of local beneficiaries). The focus is on a 
judgment rather than an objective assessment of achievement or failure (Edwards & 
Fowler 2002, Fowler 1997, Lewis 2007).  
 
The evolution of the discourse on NGO-MFO social performance assessment 
references the debate over the financial or social performance first approach. It also 
reflects a series of debates and tensions faced by NGO-MFOs within the assessment 
of social performance and between approaches and systems that strike different 
balances between their empowering mission (in means as well as ends) and 
sustainable service delivery, as well as the demands of the development system in 
which they are embedded. Positioning with regards to these tensions and debates 
reflect and reinforce the organization’s position not only with respect to performance 
but also organizational identity and development management more generally. 
 
1.3 India Context  
 
NGOs have a long history in India. Under British rule Christian missionaries 
influenced the emergence of mostly welfare-oriented NGOs characterized by a 
concern for rural credit and self-help groups (SHGs). Over time NGOs increasingly 
concerned themselves with political rights and social reform. The Indian National 
Congress, which was at the forefront of the Indian nationalist movement, formed as 
an NGO in 1885. NGOs inspired by the Gandhian tradition in particular gained 
prominence as part of the nationalist movement. Their close ties with the nationalist 
movement translated into close ties with the post-independence Indian state and a 
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period following independence characterized by close cooperation between NGOs 
and the state (Kilby 2010). 
 
In the years following independence, NGOs’ relationship with the state evolved—at 
times characterized by cooperation and partnership and at other times by distrust 
and even harassment by the state—but the nature and work of NGOs was 
consistently and significantly impacted by this relationship. Whether in periods of 
cooperation or antagonism, however, NGOs have been treated by the state primarily 
as a useful means of service delivery at the village level. The 1990s were an era of 
cooperation as the state continued to fund NGOs to deliver village-level services. 
Indian NGOs trended toward a service-orientation, local-level focus, promotion of 
non-violence, and a general avoidance of party political processes. Sen (1999) 
characterizes modern Indian NGOs as non-representative organizations that 
primarily play an intermediation role (as opposed to being grassroots organizations 
themselves) in which NGOs see their role as helping disadvantaged groups assert 
their own rights. 
 
The microfinance movement in India stepped into a vacuum created in the 1990s by 
a state withdrawal from rural finance provision that was part of the broader set of 
economic reforms favouring liberalization. The liberalizing bank reforms led by the 
Narashimham Committee contributed to a decline in the number of rural bank 
branches and credit (Shah et al. 2007). For 20 years prior to the 1991 reforms, 
working with SHGs, groups of usually 10 to 20 women typically organized around 
savings and credit services, had been evolving into the dominant NGO strategy 
(Kilby 2010). NGOs, notably MYRADA, initiated the forming and promoting of SHGs 
and their linkage to formal microfinance services beginning in the 1980s (Fisher & 
Sriram 2002). The SHG model in theory is seen as an entry point for social change 
and “less about the delivery of services and more about the empowerment of group 
members to be able to make and act on expanded choices, and so advance their 
interests” (Kilby 2010, p. 25). The strategy was adopted by the government in the 
1990s as a means for addressing the continuing need for poverty alleviation 
measures and the need for new and effective approaches to rural credit provision 
that would be consistent with the neoliberal reforms of the era. The SHG model of 
savings and credit provision is now widely supported by the government through the 
National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) self-help bank 
linkage program (SBLP) and has become the primary model of microfinance delivery 
in India (Basu 2006).4  An NGO typically acts as the self-help promoting institution 
(SHPI). The NGO assists in promotion, formation, and training of new SHGs. The 
NGO SHPI introduces the SHG to the bank after a qualifying period and acts as an 
intermediary between the financial institution and the SHG.  
 
In the 2000s, microfinance expanded rapidly in India due primarily to NABARD’s 
promotion of SBLP. In April 2001, 285,000 SHGs had taken loans from Indian 
commercial banks, regional rural banks and cooperative banks through SBLP.  With 
an estimated average of 17 members per group, SBLP provided 4.5 million people 
access to formal credit and savings services through SHG group membership (Fisher 
& Sriram 2002).  By 2009, Sa-Dhan estimated the number of people accessing 
formal credit and savings through SBLP had increased more than tenfold to 63.3 
million with an outstanding loan portfolio of Rs. 23,400 crore (Sa-Dhan 2009). 
 
                                            
4 The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) was established as an 
apex bank in 1982.  
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In the last few years the dominant model of microfinance provision outside of India 
has been rapidly expanding within India as well—wherein MFIs work through joint 
liability groups. While the SBLP model is uniquely Indian, the MFI model is well 
established internationally (Shah et al. 2007). MFIs are often more commercially 
oriented than the SBLP and focused on financially sustainable (or even profitable) 
microfinance provision.  Clients of both SBLP and MFIs are primarily women (over 90 
percent for MFIs reporting to Sa-Dhan in 2009); however, only the SBLP model 
explicitly includes mechanisms intended to empower women (through the self-
governing SHGs).  
 
In 2009 MFIs served 22.6 million clients (based on data reported for 2008-2009 by 
over 200 MFIs) and reported an outstanding portfolio of nearly Rs. 12,000 crore. 
Together the MFI and SBLP models reported an estimated 86.2 million Indians in 
2009 as clients (Sa-Dhan 2009). Despite an outreach of only one-third that of the 
SBLP program, the MFI model’s growth eclipsed that of the SBLP model in recent 
years. MFI outreach grew by 60 percent and its outstanding portfolio by 97 percent 
as of 2009. For the same year, SBLP grew its outreach to clients by 25 percent and 
its portfolio by 38 percent.  
 
Growth in MFI outreach was driven by the transformation of NGO-MFOs to for-profit 
legal forms (specifically non-banking finance companies or NBFCs) and the greater 
access to financing the transformation facilitates (Sa-Dhan 2009, Srinivasan 2010).  
Only 15 percent of MFIs are for-profit but those MFIs represent 62 percent of MFI 
clients and 75 percent of the MFI outstanding portfolio. Not-for-profit MFOs (85 
percent) hold the remaining 38 percent of clients and only 25 percent of the 
outstanding loan portfolio (Sa-Dhan 2009). The overall trend toward microfinance 
provision through for-profit MFIs is reflected in the large number of NGO-MFOs 
planning to transform to NBFCs. The trend toward a more commercial focus also 
impacts NGO-SHPIs (who are not MFOs). There was a trend among NGO SHPIs 
toward transformation to NGO-MFOs as more funding had become available for MFI 
operations than SHG-NGO arrangements (Srinivasan 2010).5 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
The overarching research question is how do NGO-MFOs manage the tension 
between promoting the self-reliance of clients (social performance) and of their own 
organization (financial performance)? The research takes a particular focus on social 
performance management systems based on assertion that an adequate flow of 
information on performance is a necessary input for any effective management of 
either social or financial goals. The sub-questions are therefore both descriptive and 
explanatory. They intend to first describe social performance assessment and 
management systems. They then aim to explain those systems or understand the 
underlying drivers and constraints influencing the design of those systems. 
 
The research sub-questions include the following:  
 
1. How are social goals translated into performance assessment and 
management systems? 
2. What are the tools and systems for information collection and the feedback 
mechanisms to decision makers? 
                                            
5 The 2010 crisis in Andhra Pradesh ended or slowed many of these trends and will be 
discussed further in detail in Section 3.4. 
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3. What internal and external factors drive or constrain social performance 
management? 
4. How and to what extent do decision makers retain and enhance room for 
manoeuvre?  
5. To what extent did approaches to social performance management play a 
role in protecting MFOs in Tamil Nadu from experiencing the level of crisis 




The research design involves two stages, incorporating a systematic review and 
case studies. In the first stage, the systematic review provides a broad survey of 
impact studies of microfinance in India. The review examines what studies conclude 
about the impact of rural microfinance in India on its users and provides a means of 
evaluating the nature, quantity and quality of information supplied through this 
approach including the types of indicators used and how they are assessed. 
 
The question guiding the systematic review is: What is the evidence of the impact of 
rural finance in India on socio-economic indicators?6 The objectives of the review are 
to 1) examine what available literature suggests about the nature of social and 
economic impacts of rural microfinance in India on its users and 2) what the studies’ 
design and implementation suggest about the practice of performance assessment 
through impact studies (including the nature, quantity and quality of information 
supplied). 
 
The methodology of the systematic review was adapted from the EPPI-Centre 
guidelines. Stages of a systematic review include setting the research question, 
establishing the review protocols (including scope and methods for the review), and 
conducting the review (searching for studies, screening studies, and synthesizing 
studies) (EPPI Centre 2009). The majority of the systematic review was undertaken 
between May and December 2010. The review’s question and protocols were 
developed during May and June 2010; searching and screening of studies was 
conducted during July and August 2010; the majority of study synthesis was 
completed between September and December 2010. The review limited itself to 
studies available in English and only considered studies from 1991 to 2010, when the 
review was conducted. The 1991 cut-off limits the review to studies of rural financial 
services since the financial sector reforms of the Narasimham Committee. 
 
The second stage of the research includes case studies of two NGO-MFOs operating 
in Tamil Nadu, India. In this research, the case studies are used to provide an in-
depth and more ethnographic perspective into NGO-MFO performance management 
and assessment systems. 
 
Case study organizations were selected from NGO-MFOs operating and 
headquartered in the state of Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu was chosen for three reasons. 
It has a well-established microfinance sector. The state is second only to Andhra 
Pradesh in terms of the outreach of the SBLP and the number of operating MFIs. A 
state with a sizable and mature microfinance sector was appropriate for the research. 
A sufficient number of existing NGO-MFOs was necessary to find organizations that 
both met the criteria (discussed below) for case selection and were willing to be the 
subject of a case study. Second, Tamil Nadu provides an opportunity to examine the 
                                            
6 The broader term “rural finance” is chosen over “microfinance” in recognition that not all 
studies will self-identify with the term microfinance. 
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potential role of social performance assessment and management in avoiding or 
mitigating the crises seen recently in a number of locales, including in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2010 (Marr & Tubaro 2011). Finally, Tamil Nadu was also chosen based 
on contacts available to the researcher in the state, which also facilitate the 
identification of appropriate and accessible NGO-MFOs.  
 
Case study selection focused on “potential for learning” rather than 
representativeness (Stake 2000, p. 446). At the outset of the systematic review my 
intent was to look at formal impact evaluation within the wider performance 
management literature. The systematic review would be used to identify interesting 
case studies. It was clear from the systematic review however that available impact 
assessment literature represented a very small minority of MFOs. Thus rather than 
selecting case study organizations from those represented by set-piece impact 
evaluation, consistent with the potential for learning selection criteria it became more 
appropriate to select case study organizations from those that had not featured 
prominently in the literature. This would also represent a shift in focus from the 
influence of externally motivated impact evaluations (to which the case study 
organizations may not have subjected themselves) to internal systems of social 
performance management and assessment.  
 
Data collection methods for the case study include semi-structured interviews (both 
individuals and in groups), document review and observation. The case study data 
collection methods and types of evidence are largely qualitative. Data collection 
involved spending substantial time on site with each NGO-MFO to facilitate contact 
with the personnel, activities and operations (Stake 2000). Data was primarily 
collected during fieldwork in India between November 2012 and April 2013. Raw data 
included interview recordings, field notes (from informal interviews, discussions, 
observations and notes on some documents available for review only) and 
documents (organizational and sectorial) including some very limited tabular data. 
The broad analytic strategy was to use a descriptive framework to organize the 
collected case study data. 
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
 
My case study research intends to provide insight into how NGO-MFOs negotiate 
between managing for client and organizational self-reliance. However, the focus of 
the research was developing an in-depth understanding of the issues from the point 
of view of the NGO-MFOs. As such the research focuses on depth rather than 
breadth, an approach that necessitated a case study approach. I was only able to 
include two case studies and therefore cannot assert that the case studies are 
representative of NGO-MFOs generally or in Tamil Nadu specifically. The case study 
organizations provide interesting examples of NGO-MFOs who have strong social 
orientations and do not conform to the dominant microfinance model.  
 
There are also limitations to the systematic review. The process of defining inclusion 
and exclusion criteria is critical to creating a clear and manageable scope for a 
systematic review that explicitly surveys a broad range of studies, but the process of 
a systematic review also reduces the review’s flexibility to include potentially high-





1.7 Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. It elaborates on the conceptual framework and 
reviews three relevant bodies of literature with reference to the tensions described in 
the conceptual framework: development management (2.2), NGO (2.3) and 
microfinance (2.4).  Chapter 3 is a contextual chapter. It provides background on 
development models and policies in India (3.1) and then describes the NGO (3.2) 
and microfinance (3.3) sectors in India and Tamil Nadu (3.4). Chapter 4 presents the 
research methodology for the systematic review (4.2) and case study research (4.3), 
including a discussion of how the research design evolved through negotiation 
between myself and case study organizations. The chapter also includes a 
discussion of ethical issues presented by the fieldwork and my reflections on how my 
own preferences and social identities impacted the work (4.4).  
 
Chapters 5 through 7 present my empirical findings. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
findings of the systematic review. The findings of the case studies are presented in 
two chapters. Chapter 6 focuses on the internal characteristics of the organizations 
while Chapter 7 focuses on external relations and social performance assessment.  
Finally Chapter 8 is a discussion of some key findings from the research. It also 






Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
After briefly reintroducing the conceptual framework, the relevant literature is 
discussed in three sections. Section 2.2 discusses literature on development 
management, which provides the backdrop for some of the fundamental debates 
around social performance management and assessment for NGO-MFOs. The 
following two sections look more narrowly, first at management of NGOs in 
development (Section 2.3) and then the microfinance management literature (Section 
2.4). Both sections emphasize issues related to social performance management 
and assessment. 
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
The conceptual framework is used to frame the research questions, understand 
performance assessment systems, and discuss implications for development 
management As described in Chapter 1, the conceptual framework contextualizes 
tensions found in the literature on NGO and microfinance performance management 
and assessment within contrasting views of development management (see Section 
1.2). This chapter presents the conceptual framework below for reference and then 
discusses the key issues and concepts represented in each sub-area (row) and the 
nature of their interrelationships in three sections. 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
Field or sub-field Mainstream view Alternative view 
 
[Management studies] Scientific management ‘Romantic’ management 
(emerging from criticisms 
of CDM) 
 
Development management Management of and in 
development 
(Implies the means 
(tasks) and ends 




(Implies the means and 
ends of development are 
the same) 
 
NGOs in development Service delivery first Empowerment first 
 
NGOs and microfinance Financial performance 
first 
Social performance first 
 
Performance assessment of 






2.2 Development Management 
 
In an early discussion of development administration, Bernard Schaffer (1969) 
described the development administration movement (a precursor to development 
management) as motivated by the idea that administration in the context of a poor 
country is significantly and sufficiently different from administration in a rich country 
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as to warrant a separate sub-field or focus of study. According to Schaffer (1969, p. 
184) the context, comprised of  “extensive needs, low capacities, and severe 
obstacles” requires substantially different decisions and behaviours from 
administrators and therefore requires a dedicated field of inquiry. Thirty years later, 
Brinkerhoff also identified context as central to the identity and justification of 
development management as an area of study. He defines the term development 
management as encompassing “the set of ICA [international and comparative public 
administration] theory and practice that concentrates on organizational and 
managerial problems, issues, and practices in the developing countries of Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America, and in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union” (Brinkerhoff & Coston 1999, p. 346). Implicit in both 
Brinkerhoff’s and Schaffer’s definitions is a focus on the public sector as the manager 
of development. This reflects the place and time of development management’s 
origin. Development management originated as a sub-field of public administration in 
a period (during the late 1950s and early 1960s) when prominent development 
theories and aid orthodoxies focused on the state as the driver of development.  
 
Both in theory and practice development management has continued to be closely 
linked to the prominent development theories and aid orthodoxies of the day 
(Hirschmann 1999). Like public administration, development management has also 
been an applied discipline, largely concerned with action and reform (Brinkerhoff & 
Coston 1999, Schaffer 1969). Its history is reflected in two of the four “facets” of the 
field as identified by Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999, p. 349). In its first facet, 
development management has an “explicitly interventionist orientation that derives 
from its instrumental affiliation with international assistance agencies and programs” 
(ibid.). Development management is a means of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of aid programs and furthering the policy agendas of the agencies 
promoting them. The second facet suggests how it does so: portraying development 
management as a set of management and analytical tools derived from a range of 
social science disciplines.  
 
As described by its first two facets, development management is instrumental and 
applies a set of tools to further an externally-defined notion of development, its 
nature and objectives. The third facet of the field contemplates a value dimension to 
development management. It acknowledges the value-laden nature of interventions 
and takes a normative stance in support of participation and empowerment of the 
poor through development interventions. The final facet of development management 
is closely related to the third. It focuses on development management as a process, 
arguing development management requires an explicit focus on process such that it 
acts on and reflects its values. The third and fourth facets of development 
management can also be instrumental to the extent they are seen as a means to the 
effective and efficient achievement of externally-defined development objectives. 
However, the final two facets in particular relate to a central tension within 
development management theory in which an emphasis on context and politics in 
development are set against an instrumentalist view of development management 
maintained in large part by the aid system. The following two sections (Sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2) elaborate on this tension by discussing mainstream views of development 
management (as formed and represented by its relationship with aid orthodoxies) 
and the emergence and evolution of alternative views of development management. 
2.2.1 Mainstream view of development management 
When development administration first emerged as a field of study, dominant 
theories of development focused on state-led macroeconomic growth. Development 
strategies focused on building modern states with strong central planning for 
economic growth.  During this period, development administration literature 
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concentrated on reforms to the public sector to facilitate central planning activities, 
technology transfer around core administrative functions and planning and 
management of the project cycle (Brinkerhoff 2008). Development strategies and 
goals shifted in the 1970s as evidence grew that a focus on macroeconomic growth 
had not effectively reduced poverty in most poor countries. Development strategies 
focused more explicitly on poverty alleviation through promotion of rural 
development, greater economic participation and social development projects 
(Rondinelli 1993).  
 
By the 1980s aid orthodoxies shifted to a decidedly anti-state stance. The market 
rather than the state was the solution for development. Liberalization, stabilization 
and privatization characterized the structural adjustment era of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The public sector contracted as institutional donors leveraged poor countries’ large 
debt loads to elicit agreement on a range of reforms. Changes in development 
administration literature reflected broader transitions in development theory and aid 
orthodoxy. As the state fell out of favour so to did the term development 
administration, which was gradually replaced by the term development management. 
New Public Management encouraged applying principles of the private sector to the 
management of the public sector. In the context of development management 
literature, this translated into calls for decentralization, results-based management, 
performance metrics and structural changes to facilitate contracting out or 
privatization of previously public sector-led activities or functions (Brinkerhoff 2008). 
It was during this period and in this context that NGOs, including microfinance 
organizations, became increasingly prominent as managers of development 
activities. 
 
Brinkerhoff (2008) argues that since the late 1990s, aid orthodoxy has rethought the 
role of the state again in light of the failure of many structural adjustment efforts. The 
state is now part of the answer to development, Brinkerhoff argues, illustrated by a 
recent focus on good governance. Private sector principles and skills are still seen as 
critical for the public (and non-profit) sector, demonstrated by the continued influence 
of New Public Management, but the focus is on a well-managed, effective, 
accountable, transparent and responsive state, rather than primarily on a small state.  
 
While the focus of mainstream development management theory and practice 
evolved alongside aid orthodoxies it consistently promoted reform in developing 
countries through the transfer and application of Western principles of development 
and management. A split or “deadlock” emerged in development management 
literature, however, between “reformers” and “radicals” who questioned the relevance 
and effectiveness of these reforms and principles in poor-country contexts (Schaffer 
1969). Doubt surrounding the appropriateness of technical assistance divided the 
field and contributed to calls for a new development management. Some scholars 
questioning aspects of technical assistance called for reforms. Others, notably Fred 
Riggs, argued a more radical position. Riggs argued that before offering advice, 
scholars needed to better understand developing societies and cultures. He warned 
that technical assistance would create an over-powerful bureaucracy without an 
equally well-developed political structure to hold its power in check, resulting in 
“negative development” (Hirschmann 1981). 
 
Since identified by Schaffer (1969), the split between reformers and radicals has 
continued and deepened in development management. According to Hirschman 
(1981), during the 1970s the “Underdevelopment-Dependency Movement” 
represented a school of thought with important implications for development 
administration. Adherents argue that the state simply represents the interests of a 
political and economic elite within poor countries. The civil service has a preferential 
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position in society because members receive a regular salary and have access to 
additional resources by virtue of their position. Underdevelopment-Dependency 
arguments further suggest bureaucratic interests determine organizational structure, 
rather than the structure influencing bureaucratic behaviour. Aid agencies’ efforts to 
strengthen the capacity of poor-country bureaucracies, therefore, simply reinforce the 
bureaucracy’s position of power and prosperity relative to the majority of people 
rather than improving its ability to serve the interests of the majority through 
bureaucratic reform. 
 
In more recent literature on development management, Critical Development 
Management (CDM) takes the radical view on the role of development management. 
CDM extends the criticisms of the Underdevelopment-Dependency Movement in a 
way that more explicitly bears relevance to Northern NGOs in addition to the public 
sector as development managers. It also challenges the very idea of development 
management. CDM argues all attempts by rich countries to manage development are 
essentially a means of defining and ultimately creating the developing world and 
thereby suggesting the reforms necessary. Reforms still focus on modernizing and 
industrializing poor countries or replicating the developmental path of rich countries. 
Therefore, proponents of CDM see development management as a tool of class 
oppression. But, unlike the Underdevelopment-Dependency Movement, the focus of 
CDM is not on class oppression within poor countries, but by the developed world (in 
partnership with developing world elites) over the developing world generally. CDM 
calls for no development management, but rather a “post-development era” in which 
new ways of thinking can be entertained (Escobar 2005). 
 
While reformers assert the desirability and feasibility of planning for development and 
focus on improving the means, tools, values and processes of development 
management, CDM criticizes the very idea of management and its application in 
international development. CDM assumes all development management is 
“managerial.” Managerialism is characterized by a faith in the science of 
management in which the principles (and tools) of management are homogenous, 
abstract and neutral. In its application of technocratic fixes it downplays complexity, 
local knowledge and social and political context and fails to address the structural 
causes of underdevelopment. 
2.2.2 Alternative view of development management  
CDM is primarily deconstructionist. It calls for no development management, but 
rather a “post-development era” (Escobar 2005). However, Gulrajani (2010) argues 
that CDM unnecessarily characterizes all development management as inevitably 
managerial and neglects discussion within the critical management studies literature 
from which it draws of an alternative social ideology, understanding of modernity and 
set of values that can serve as a source of non-managerialist development 
management. While Enlightenment understandings of rational science and 
modernity, she argues, are the basis of managerial (or scientific) development 
management, a Romantic social ideology provides an alternative foundation for 
development management theory and practice. An alternative development 
management moves beyond the nihilist position of CDM, ending the deadlock 
between reformist and radical positions and providing a basis for moving forward. 
 
A Romantic social ideology is characterized by an understanding of the social world 
focused on “social wholes” rather than “atomistic individual units.” Social wholes are 
“not mere collections of atomistic individual units but the result of local conditions and 
contexts that cannot be aggregated” (Gulrajani 2010, p. 142). As such a Romantic 
social ideology privileges contextually-based local variation of responses. Underlying 
this construction of the social world is a fragmented social reality that requires in-
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depth understandings of facts “informed by pluralistic values and subjective 
descriptions” (Ibid.). Modernity then becomes a contested goal that cannot be 
achieved through linear processes and universalist solutions. 
 
Managerialism, constructed on the principles of Enlightment social ideology and a 
model of scientific management, relies on discovering, refining and applying “abstract 
and universalist tools and techniques” (Gulrajani 2010, p. 143). Romantic 
management moves away from managerialism by rejecting such fidelity to abstract 
principles and instruments and rather acts on a practical reason. Practical reason 
means resolving problems and working towards goals in the context of uncertainties, 
contextualities and conflict and doing so requires “judgment, experience, intuition and 
common sense” (Townley 2008, p. 215 cited in Gulrajani 2010, p. 143). Put another 
way, practical reason combines working theories and goals with embedded 
knowledge and experience creating what Gulranjani calls a “practical science of 
muddling through” (ibid.). Romantic social ideology also moves away from 
managerialism through an acknowledgement that management is inherently political. 
Its understanding of the political nature of management extends beyond an 
understanding of the local political contexts influencing the implementation and 
success of interventions. Rather it sees the structures, systems and tools of the 
“modernisation project” as themselves political products that can sustain the status 
quo and contribute to failures of reform (ibid.). 
Gulrajani (2010) discusses three characteristics required from development 
management informed by Romantic social ideology. First, Romanticism requires a 
development management that prioritizes experienced realities. Planning cannot be 
a technical task left in the hands of professionals and experts but must involve 
multiple stakeholders. This suggests reducing the “physical and psychological space” 
between development managers and those whom they are seeking to develop and 
creating organisations that are “deconcentrated, decentralised, smaller, democratic, 
more responsible and less bureaucratic” (Gulrajani 2010, p. 143). Second, 
Romanticism recognizes complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. As such 
development management becomes an “act of improvised political steering rather 
than planned social engineering.” (Ibid.). In practical terms then development 
management is an “improvised, flexible, contingent, intuitive and sensitive practice” 
(Escobar 2008 as cited in Gulrajani 2010, p. 143). Finally, a Romantic construction of 
development management requires the reflexivity of development managers. It 
requires managers acknowledge the limitations of their own technologies and 
organisations and the ways in which even they can reinforce or reproduce the 
structural conditions underlying underdevelopment. 
 
Thomas (2000) distinguishes between three types of development management: 
management in development, management of development and management for 
development. The mainstream (Enlightenment/scientific) view of development 
management concentrates on management in development and management of 
development. The former sees development as an immanent and inevitable process 
that cannot be caused and can only be indirectly managed; management of 
development equates development management with the management of specific 
projects, programs or tasks undertaken to direct development. By contrast, 
management for development requires a particular type of management that 
prioritizes values and process that is applied not only to the management of tasks 
with development objectives but to all activities. Management for development can 
describe value-driven and primarily reformist views of development management but 
also is consistent with the more radical and pluralist view articulated by Gulrajani. 
Gulranjani’s alternative development management is not fully described by the idea 
of management for development, but the typology usefully highlights key differences 
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between the mainstream (Enlightenment/scientific) and alternative (Romantic) views 
while illustrating how the latter bridges reformist with radical criticisms of 
development management.  
 
The debate between mainstream and alternative development management provides 
context in which to understand tensions found in the NGO and microfinance 
literature, particularly with regard to social performance management and 
assessment. When development administration first emerged as a field of study, 
dominant theories of development focused on the state as the driver of development. 
By the 1980s aid orthodoxies shifted to a decidedly anti-state stance. The market 
rather than the state was the solution for development. But while development 
management shifted away from the state to a more market-based orientation it was 
no less managerial. It was during this period and in this context that NGOs, including 
microfinance organizations, became increasingly prominent as managers of 
development activities. NGOs faced cooption by a development strategy with an 
orientation towards development management that was arguably in conflict with 
NGOs’ values-based identity. The following section will elaborate on these dynamics 
as discussed in the literature on NGOs in development. 
 
2.3 NGOs in Development 
 
More recent development management literature explicitly discusses development 
management with reference to development organizations generally and NGOs in 
particular. Part of the newer discourse around development management 
emphasizes the role and impact of values and process in development management 
(two of the four facets identified by Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999)). The emphasis on 
values and process in the literature reflects in part the increased influence and role of 
NGOs as development managers (Lewis 2007). NGOs are part of a diverse group of 
organizations identified primarily by what they are not: not part of the market or for-
profit sector and not part of the government or public sector.7 Beginning in the 1980s 
official donors increasingly favoured NGOs as providers of development services and 
conduits of official development aid and as a result NGOs increased in quantity and 
influence within the development sector. The broader development ideology of the 
time fuelled this trend.  Neoliberalism took a relatively anti-state stance toward 
development. It favoured a smaller state through structural adjustment policies 
including privatization and an increased emphasis on the market as the best engine 
for socio-economic growth (Hirschmann 1999, Brinkeroff 2008). 
 
Organizations designated as NGOs vary in size, level of formalization, function, level 
of operation, structure, goals and membership (Fisher 1997). A common approach to 
categorizing the wide range of organizations falling under the NGO nomenclature is 
to distinguish them based on underlying development philosophy. NGOs are 
distinguished based on their relative emphasis on criticizing or petitioning the state 
for reforms (or revolution). Clark (1991, p. 37) calls NGOs to action along these lines, 
referring to NGOs that behave thus as “radical” NGOs. Others refer to “independent-
thinking” NGOs or “alternative” NGOs (Townsend et al. 2004, p. 873). These NGOs 
contend that development is political, that technical fixes can only address poverty 
and equality in limited ways and that altering power structures is necessary to 
                                            
7 This research relies on Vakil’s (1997) definition of NGOs as self-governing, private, not-for-
profit organizations that are geared toward improving the quality of life of disadvantaged 
people. In any discussion of NGOs this dissertation further refers to the subset of NGOs 
whose pursuits include development strategies (as opposed to only advocacy or 
emergency/relief). 
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achieve lasting and substantive change for the poor. Townsend et al. (ibid.) calls the 
contrasting category “compliant” and describes compliant NGOs as not having 
interest in questioning development agendas or advocating radical or reformist 
alternative visions. 
 
The contrast between alternative versus compliant NGOs is nearly always discussed 
in the context of the rising numbers and prominence of NGOs since the 1970s due to 
the increased support they received through official channels of development aid. 
The argument positions compliant NGOs as evidence of NGO mission drift as 
increased official support creates new incentives (discussed further below) and 
spawns a new generation of NGOs with varying degrees of commitment to authentic 
(and alternative) “NGO values.”8 Thus the range of NGOs, in terms of missions and 
roles, represents the degree of cooption by managerialism and neoliberal values 
resulting from integration into the aid system.   
 
Microfinance provides an example of this process of cooption. Microfinance was first 
promoted by NGOs for purposes of self-help and empowerment. It began as a “small 
idea” and was transformed into a “big idea” by official aid agencies (Townsend et al. 
2004, p. 873). Official aid agencies were drawn by microfinance’s potential for 
financial sustainability and ability to integrate poor households more effectively into 
the market. Support for microfinance resulted in many new NGO entrants specifically 
created for the purpose of microfinance provision. Consequently microfinance is 
provided by the full spectrum of NGOs, from alternative to compliant. As such, 
aspects of microfinance such as women’s groups can be viewed instrumentally to 
serve the delivery of microfinance (and hegemonic development agendas) or to 
serve broader goals of empowerment and social change.   
 
As the previous discussion implies NGO identity cannot be separated from origin. 
Townsend et al. (2004, p. 873) argues that alternative NGOs often emerged from 
earlier social groups based on contesting state power or social inequality (that is they 
may have emerged from social movements). Fowler (1997) likewise argues identity 
cannot be separated from NGO history and context. He further argues NGOs suffer 
an identity crisis when trying to integrate different sets of principles, such as market-
based principles with the principles of the voluntary sector. “Beliefs, values, and 
development philosophy” are the foundation of retaining voluntary sector identity 
(Fowler 1997, p. 33-34).  
 
A second and related way NGOs are distinguished is by the role they play. Broadly 
speaking NGOs prioritize service delivery (associated with compliant NGOs) or 
empowerment (associated with alternative NGOs) although the roles overlap, as will 
be discussed further below. Lewis (2014) describes three overlapping roles played 
by NGOs: implementer, partners and catalysts. The implementer is the service 
provider, mobilizing resources to provide goods and services. The partner NGO is 
associated with the growing integration of NGOs in the aid chain. Partner NGOs work 
with aid agencies, governments or with other NGOs in capacity building or 
intermediary roles. As a catalyst, an NGO engages in empowerment but also 
innovation, campaigning and advocacy.9 The alternative NGO operating in a catalytic 
role is associated with ‘authentic’ NGO values and is the primary focus of the 
                                            
8 Compliant NGOs are often contractors in the aid system and too closely tied to the state to 
take to effectively advocate for reform. 
9 Lewis (2014) describes empowerment as the process of becoming aware of power 
dynamics and developing skills for greater control. A further discussion of definitions of 
empowerment is found in Section 5.2.3. 
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remainder of this discussion, although Lewis (2014) argues many catalytic NGOs are 
moving toward a less radical, more market-based version of empowerment, that is 
empowerment through economic activity and personal improvement. By contrast 
alternative development promotes empowerment of households or individuals by 
impacting social, political and psychological power (Lewis 2014, p. 115).  
 
Mainstream management focuses on top-down control, results, hierarchy and 
instrumentality. This is contrasted with an alternative NGO management style that is 
more process-oriented, flexible and participatory. This latter set of guiding 
management principles reflects NGO values and the argument that the means and 
ends should not be separated in the management of development (Fowler 1997, 
Rondinelli 1993). Not all agree however that NGO management requires a distinctive 
management style (Ditcher 1989). Lewis (2014) identifies three basic schools of 
thought on NGO management and ultimately argues for a composite model of 
management based on all three. The generic view sees management as a set of 
technocratic tools and not sector-specific. In this view appropriate management style 
depends on the task, thus separating the means of development from the ends. Top-
down management is not always inappropriate to NGOs in this view (Ditcher 1989). 
The other two views assert the distinctiveness of NGO management and necessity of 
an alternative management style to varying degrees. The adaptive view advocates 
adopting and adapting mainstream management ideas in light of the distinctiveness 
of NGO work (Fowler 1997, Korten 1990). A slightly more radical view, the distinctive 
view, sees NGO management as unique, requiring the innovation of new 
management tools and concepts based on NGO manager experiences (Billis & 
MacKeith 1992, Harris 1996). Chambers (1997) proposes such alternative 
management practices, emphasizing self-assessment and self-correction rather than 
control and more inclusive decision-making and planning. His approach rejects the 
abstractions and prescriptions (of scientific management) in favour of a more 
blended and contextually-sensitive articulation of values and facts as suggested by a 
more Romantic development management (Gulrajani 2010). 
 
A key question for NGOs in the context of growing prominence is how to increase 
impact (or scale up impact). Edwards and Hulme (1992, p. 14) pose this question 
and discuss the particular challenges of doing so without losing their “traditional 
flexibility, value-base and effectiveness at the local level”. Four strategies are 
elaborated upon including working with the government, linking grassroots with 
lobbying and advocacy, advocacy in the North and organization growth. The latter is 
an additive strategy while the remainder are multiplicative strategies in which impact 
is increased through influence, networking, policy or legal reform or training rather 
than directly increasing the size of the NGO’s programs and projects. Organizational 
growth can involve adding horizontal functions (additional sectorial activities) or 
vertical functions (upstream or downstream activities) but in either case 
organizational growth presents challenges to the value orientation of NGOs. Growth 
often requires expanded hierarchies and increased functional specialization. The 
increased need to raise resources may require official funds encouraging upward 
accountability. The professionalism required to manage a larger organization can 
also subordinate mission values and commitment (Edwards & Hulme 1992). 
 
By contrast, NGOs that facilitate grassroots organizations strengthen, link 
(horizontally or vertically) and expand grassroots organizations. By doing so the 
NGO promotes the proliferation of networks that can impact the local situation and 
build a broad people’s movement that collectively can impact policies and political 
processes on a national level. Such NGOs focus on process, including 
conscientistation, formation and training rather than program implementation as 
groups are meant to identify the content of action. Their work engages with and 
 27 
scales impact by extending into and influencing informal groups also a part of civil 
society. However, given pressing short-term needs some NGOs bundle facilitating 
activities with other activities, such as credit provision, to address needs and aid in 
mobilizing communities. Such multiplicative strategies for scaling impact also have 
inherent tension. In the above example, a focus on building grassroots networks may 
avoid some of the complications of organizational expansion and strengthen 
downward rather than upward accountability, but the bundling strategy can dilute 
ideas of group autonomy and empowerment, highlighting how some NGOs 
experience mission drift (Edwards & Hulme 1992). 
 
The second multiplicative strategy involves work directly with (or from within) the 
government to influence policies and programs in a way that will benefit the poor and 
disadvantaged. The difficulties of working within the constraints of government 
systems and personalities are compounded by the cultural differences between the 
state and NGOs. Whereas governments are often rigid, hierarchical and autocratic, 
NGO values are non-hierarchical, flexibility, and innovation (Edwards & Hulme 1992).  
Difficulties are compounded by divergent interests and power, conflict of interest and 
new incentives created by collaboration with government, as will be discussed further 
in Section 2.3.1. Through the third multiplicative strategy, lobbying governments, 
particularly northern governments and aid agencies, NGOs seek to scale impact by 
influencing key players. The strategy can take an “incrementalist reform” or 
“abolitionist” approach (Edwards & Hulme 1992, p. 21). The above multiplicative 
strategies all seek to scale up impact through an explicit acknowledgement of the co-
production of development outcomes with the state. Regardless of chosen strategy, 
however, the key point is growth strategies have implications for and can impact 
NGO identity, mission and values. 
 
Leadership and governance structure play a major role in avoiding fragmentation of 
NGO identity. A leader/founder plays a pivotal role (Schein 2010). Leaders set 
missions, values and long-term strategies and influence organizational culture. 
Leaders also choose who to bring into the organization (ibid.). Identity resilience 
depends how consistently beliefs, values and philosophy are held between different 
groups within an organization. If not held widely, the balance of power, personal 
influence, communication and governing structure impact whether fracturing occurs 
(Fowler 1997).  
 
The NGO literature’s discussion on mission, identity, values and management 
identifies a similar dichotomy between a mainstream and alternative view as found in 
the broader development management literature. The tension between the two views 
is present in the literature particularly in the discussion of the risk and extent of 
cooption NGOs face as they became incorporated into an aid system dominated by a 
mainstream (and hegemonic) development ideology grounded in scientific 
management. The following sections discuss the tension as evident in criticisms of 
NGO (and their cooption) (Section 2.3.1) and performance assessment (Section 
2.3.2). 
2.3.1 Criticism of NGOs 
The NGO management literature generally identifies a lack of attention to NGO 
assessment as well as a lack of evidence of NGO effectiveness and impact (Lewis 
2007, Edwards & Hulme 2002).10 The lack of evaluation and accountability was the 
                                            
10 Critics note the uneven scope and quality (Sogge et al. 1996) and unflattering conclusions 
of the few evaluations of NGO impact that have been completed (Riddell 1997 cited in Roche 
1999, Lewis 2007). Riddell (1997 cited in Roche 1999) conducted an evaluation on behalf of 
the DAC/OECD Expert Group on Evaluation. Riddell reviewed 50 reports covering 240 
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source of significant criticism of NGOs, particularly in the mid- and late-1990s. De 
Waal (1997) examines and criticizes the poor performance of ‘humanitarian 
international’ in Africa, a designation that in large part consists of relief NGOs. He 
asserts that a lack of accountability in the form of enforceable professional standards 
of behaviour and an absence of formal barriers to entry led to a collapse in standards 
and poor performance by NGOs.  
 
De Waal (1997) suggests that lack of regulation allowed manipulation and cooption 
of the sector by donors and produced evaluations of NGO programs that were donor-
led, subjective and primarily a tool for donors to exercise power over NGOs. 
Carlsson et al. (1994) further analyses the political economy of evaluation within aid 
agencies and argue the lack of knowledge about impact (in this case the economic 
impact of aid generally) is a symptom of aid agency organizational processes and 
dynamics rather than a lack of intention and systems for assessing impact. Aid 
agency evaluations are used in the political games, power struggles, negotiations 
and compromises that result from this reality. What is evaluated, the method of 
evaluation and the conclusions of evaluation are all a result of this complex 
organizational process. Evaluations are ultimately treated as management tools and 
focus on intermediate outcomes and delivering and receiving aid better.  
 
Critics of NGO performance and performance assessment often trace the problem 
back to the incentives created by increasing dependence on official funds. They 
argue that as NGOs have become integrated into the aid system, it has led to an 
incentive structure that undermines NGO values of downward accountability and 
institutional learning. Accountability is upwards to donors and performance 
assessment focuses on ensuring continued funding or the survival of the NGO. 
Sogge et al. (1996) argues that it has long been acknowledged inside agencies that 
evaluations are primarily used to obtain and maintain funding and agencies are 
rewarded for spending money and completing activities rather than performance. 
Evaluations are viewed as imposed by donors and done to account to funders for the 
completion of activities (Lewis 2007).11 Roche (1999) repeats and expands on this 
analysis describing a vicious circle that emerged beginning in the 1980s wherein 
NGOs (referring primarily to NGOs headquartered in developed countries) faced 
increasing pressure to demonstrate results to donors at the same time competition 
among NGOs for official funds was intensifying. NGOs sought the high profile press 
coverage necessary for fund raising and neglected institutional learning, becoming 
characterized by weak accountability mechanisms and a lack of professional 
standards. Sogge et al. (1996) cites exaggerated claims of impact and more 
business-like structures and cultures as symptoms of this trend. De Waal (1997) also 
cites the rapid development of the “charitable market” in the 1980s, as NGOs 
became increasingly popular channels for official funds, and argues that the 
demands of fundraising and institutional survival discouraged NGOs from 
acknowledging failures.   
 
Integration into the aid system thus contributes to a decline in NGO performance, 
particularly in terms of their mission to promote social change through empowerment. 
The increased focus on fundraising, institutional survival and growth takes priority 
over the interests of NGO beneficiaries and staff (Maren 1997). Further, as a result of 
the aid system’s focus on scientific management and a market-led approach, NGOs 
                                                                                                                             
projects in 26 countries and 13 case studies and found the efforts of the NGO sector to 
promote institutional learning, impact assessment and accountability lacking. 
11 De Waal (1997) does note attempts by relief NGOs in the 1980s to improve performance 
by instituting codes of conduct but asserts they met with limited success in part because 
codes of conduct were insufficiently specific to be actionable and not enforceable.  
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are seen largely as vehicles for the delivery of development products and services. 
Efficient service delivery is prioritized (and managed for) at the expense of the 
broader goals and values of participation, empowerment and the self-reliance of 
beneficiaries.  
 
Critics of NGO performance attribute poor performance to the structures and 
incentives of the aid system, perceived to compete with the essential (values-driven) 
nature and mission (empowerment of beneficiaries) of NGOs. The criticism proved to 
be one source of pressure for improved NGO performance assessment that emerged 
in recent years (Lindenberg & Bryant 2001, Lewis 2007). The NGO management 
literature reflects the revived interest in NGO-driven performance assessment. The 
discussion of performance assessment asserts the importance of process and values 
(particularly empowerment through participation) in its characterization of NGO 
performance assessment (and its challenges) and contrasts it with the style of 
performance assessment promoted by the aid system. 
2.3.2 NGO performance assessment 
The NGO management literature includes overlapping discussions around NGO 
accountability, monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessment. Lindenberg and 
Bryant (2001) define NGO accountability as answering to stakeholders for the use of 
resources and the impact of performance. Evaluation is defined by Lewis (2007) as 
the assessment of NGO performance against its objectives; Fowler (1997) further 
defines evaluation as including an assessment of what caused the change identified. 
Roche (1999, p. 27) describes the relationship between monitoring, evaluation, and 
impact assessment based on what he refers to as the “classical view.”  The three 
activities are distinguished based on timing, analytical level and specificity. Impact 
assessment is a specific type of evaluation focused primarily on outcomes and 
impacts that occurs in the appraisal stage and/or near the end of after a project is 
completed. Roche elaborates on the distinctions based on his own experiences as 
summarized in Table 2.1 below. 
 
Table 2.1: Performance Assessment Activities* 
 
*Adapted from Roche (1999, p. 27) 
 
The NGO literature addresses the challenges NGOs face, as organizations with third 
sector or civil society characteristics, assessing performance. The most commonly 
discussed challenges include the lack of a clear bottom line, the lack of a single 
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established stakeholder to whom NGOs are accountable and the lack of an intrinsic 
feedback mechanism providing information as to success or failure of activities 
(Fowler 1997, Lindenberg & Bryant 2001). Private and public sector organizations (in 
democracies) have clear accountability to shareholders and voters respectively as 
well as clear mechanisms and indicators for assessing their success relative to 
objectives: through financial performance metrics and electoral results. Third sector 
organizations, including NGOs, in contrast have more abstract bottom lines and are 
accountable to multiple stakeholders (ibid.). 
 
Edwards and Fowler (2002) argue that the bottom line of development NGOs or the 
impact sought is generally qualitative. Social development generally implies a 
qualitative change for which there are few standards or benchmarks against which to 
measure NGO effectiveness.12 A degree of subjectivity always exists in performance 
assessment because judgments must be made about what is important (Roche 
1999); however, the qualitative nature of social development bottom lines contributes 
to the complexity of defining, constructing and conducting assessments of NGO 
performance. Edwards and Fowler (2002) further argue that since the bottom line 
sought by development NGOs is a qualitative change, the bottom line is not actually 
produced by the NGO but by poor people themselves. NGOs, therefore, do not 
control all of the factors that determine performance against objectives, suggesting 
practical as well as theoretical problems with pursuing performance assessment. The 
difficulty of finding outcomes and impacts to which NGOs can reasonably be held 
accountable is increased by two additional factors: the complexity of the change 
being sought by development NGOs (Sogge et al. 1996, Roche 1999) and the way in 
which development NGOs work in conjunction with not just program beneficiaries but 
within an aid chain that often includes multiple partner organizations.   
 
Roche (1999, p. 25) further suggests, “…development and change are never solely 
the product of a managed process undertaken by the development agencies and 
NGOs. Rather they are the result of wider processes that are the product of many 
social, economic, political, historical and environmental factors—including power 
struggles between different interest groups.” However, NGOs, as with other types of 
organizations, do not always make this transparent but have a tendency to blame 
others or the external environment when something goes wrong but do not always 
acknowledge other factors or actors when positive outcomes are observed. 
Additionally, traditional impact assessment focuses on linear change, but inputs and 
outputs can affect each other, outcomes can be different across time and place and 
change can be unpredictable (Roche 1999). 
 
A number of scholars discuss the additional complexity presented by multiple 
stakeholders. Edwards and Fowler (2002) suggest NGOs have accountability 
downwards to beneficiaries, partners, staff and supporters and upwards to donors, 
trustees and host governments. The bottom line as well as what constitutes 
accountability may be different for different stakeholders. Edwards and Fowler (ibid.) 
further point to the variable capacity among stakeholders to demand, appraise and 
respond to performance evaluation and its results. Donors have the highest capacity 
to demand accountability while NGO beneficiaries or members have the weakest 
capacity to do so.  Additionally, even among donors there is greater capacity to 
demand and respond to functional accountability, that is accountability in regards to 
the use of resources and short-term impacts, than strategic accountability, which 
addresses wider and longer-term impacts. 
                                            
12 Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) argue that NGOs actually have a double bottom line. 
Development NGOs are responsible to achieve their mission objectives as well as financial 
sustainability, creating potential for tension and contradiction in evaluation of performance. 
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The NGO management literature generally identifies two trends or perspectives on 
performance assessment, each responding differently to the conceptual and practical 
challenges of performance assessment for NGOs. In the literature the second 
perspective is more broadly favoured by NGO scholars and is presented as a more 
appropriate approach compared to the first perspective, which is more prevalent in 
practice.  
 
The first perspective on NGO performance assessment can be characterized as 
technocratic performance assessment. This approach views development as a linear 
process, favours quantifiable metrics and short-term impacts and attempts to 
address attribution to some degree. The technocratic approach is also hierarchical in 
its prioritization of accountability to funders (Lewis 2007). Fowler (1997) argues the 
technocratic approach is the approach supported by the aid system but is 
inconsistent with the realities of development. He elaborates on some of the specifics 
of the culture, instruments and assumptions of the aid system as evidence of this. 
Official donors favour a project cycle and therefore emphasize short-term impacts, 
whereas, he argues, development is a long-term process. At the same time, the 
instruments of the aid system, such as the logical framework analysis, conceptualize 
development as occurring linearly which Fowler argues it does not. The instruments 
of the aid system also focus on quantifiable metrics and establishing attribution, 
ideally through the construction of control groups, which Fowler argues can be 
expensive, time consuming and possibly unethical. Such approaches can also be 
practically and conceptually problematic given the qualitative nature of development 
NGO bottom lines and the factors external to NGOs that may impact the 
achievement of the development bottom lines as previously discussed. 
 
The second trend or perspective on NGO performance assessment argues for a 
more interpretative approach. Lewis (2007) characterizes this trend as emerging 
from the wider participatory development approaches most associated with Robert 
Chambers. Fowler (1997) suggests an interpretative approach to assessment that 
stresses participatory techniques, the importance of learning as an objective of 
assessment and incorporating the views of multiple stakeholders (particularly the 
views of local beneficiaries). Assessment is primarily a formative rather than 
evaluative activity. It is ultimately a judgment based on the perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders (with beneficiaries as the key stakeholder), rather than an objective 
assessment of achievement or failure (Edwards & Fowler 2002, Fowler 1997, Lewis 
2007). These represent fundamental differences from the principles of technocratic 
assessment. 
 
The discussion of NGO performance assessment reflects the tension between an 
approach to NGO (and development) management based on the principles and tools 
of scientific management and NGO (and development) management based on an 
alternative set of values. The tension is linked in the literature to NGO participation in 
the aid system. The aid system is associated with scientific management and 
presents the risk of cooption and mission drift by altering the means and ends of 
NGO action away from empowerment and social change and towards service 
delivery. Microfinance presents a specialized case of this broader tension within 
development management and NGO operation.  
 
2.4 NGOs and Microfinance 
 
The microfinance movement rose to prominence during the 1990s. Microfinance was 
an NGO-initiated and led movement in an era favouring NGOs over the state as a 
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more efficient provider of development products and services. Microfinance grew 
rapidly in the 1990s and into the 2000s.13 At the end of 1997, 618 institutions 
reporting to the Microcredit Summit provided microcredit to approximately 13.5 
million clients. By the end of 2007, 3,552 institutions reported providing microcredit to 
over 150 million clients.14 Approximately 84 percent of the clients were women and 
nearly 107 million were reported by the lending institutions to live on less than $1 per 
day (Daley-Harris 2009, p. 3). The rapid growth of microfinance can in part be 
attributed to the institutional support it has received from aid agencies. During the 
late 1990s a consortium of supporters including practitioners, policymakers and 
donors began an effort to raise $20 billion for microfinance start-ups over the next 10 
years (Microcredit Summit Report 1997 cited in Morduch 1999, p.1569). New funds 
and existing funds were directed towards the support of microfinance; new 
organizations emerged and existing organizations adapted poverty alleviation 
programming to include microfinance services.  
 
Muhammad Yunus articulated microfinance’s theory of change (or more precisely 
microcredit at the time) as “low income, credit, investment, more income, more credit, 
more investment, more income” (International Development Support Services 1994, 
p.6 cited in Hulme & Moseley 1996, p.108). The virtuous spiral initiated by small 
income-generating or promotional loans frees small entrepreneurs from dependence 
on usurious moneylenders, providing the capital needed to grow small enterprises on 
better terms. Microcredit, and subsequently microfinance, is not the first movement to 
recognize how limited access to financial services perpetuated poverty. It joins many 
previous efforts to provide financial services to the poor. Microfinance distinguishes 
itself from previous efforts in its use of an innovative combination of features 
intended to address the informational asymmetries challenging the viability of 
financial service provision to poor households (Morduch 1999).  
 
Microfinance’s promise is providing benefit to poor households normally excluded 
from formal financial institutions (notably poverty alleviation) through financially 
sustainable organizations. The key to achieving the second half of this promise is 
reducing costs. Costs are reduced by specializing in credit provision (and later 
financial services more broadly) and leaving aside costly social development 
strategies. Rather the focus is on achieving efficiencies of scale. The high and 
frequent repayment of a large number of small loans reduces transaction costs and 
provides the basis for financial sustainability.  
 
Microfinance’s most visible ‘innovation,’ group lending, further intends to reduce 
costs by addressing risks of adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement.15 
Group lending overcomes the poor’s lack of collateral. Loans are generally made 
individually to group members but with some degree of joint liability in the event of 
repayment difficulties to leverage the knowledge of group members to the lender’s 
                                            
13 Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to poor individuals and 
households. Microfinance organizations initially focused on providing small loans or 
microcredit to support the small enterprises of poor individuals. Microcredit later expanded to 
include the provision of additional financial services including savings, microinsurance, and 
money transfer and was thereafter commonly referred to as microfinance. 
14 The number of individuals receiving microfinance services was arguably higher, however, 
when microfinance programs promoted by national governments, such as India’s SHG-bank 
linkage program, are considered in their entirety. 
15 Prior to the microfinance movement, group lending methodology was prevelant in informal 
financial systems, such as in rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and chit 
funds, found in India and elsewhere in the world (Harper 2002). 
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advantage.16 Group members act in their own interest in group member selection 
and monitoring, reducing lender transaction costs and mitigating the lender’s 
problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, and enforcement to maintain high 
repayment rates (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch 2005). Empirical evidence is 
mixed, however, on the importance of group methodology for maintaining high 
repayment rates. Hulme and Mosley (1996) found other microfinance innovations 
contributed more significantly to high repayment rates including positive real interest 
rates, frequent (monthly or more) repayment, incentives to repay (including 
progressive lending) and provisions for voluntary savings or insurance. Robinson 
(2001) concluded borrowers repay mainly to secure future borrowing, although 
repayment incentives, collection activities by staff, loan methodology and social or 
peer pressure are also factors.  
 
The first half of the microfinance promise is serving poor households. Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) found examples of financially successful programs (as measured by 
high repayment rates) serving the poor (that is the average beneficiary income was 
below the given country’s poverty line). However, they additionally found the most 
financially successful MFIs did not have the depth of outreach of less financially 
successful MFIs. The most financially successful providers tend to concentrate on 
the upper and middle poor rather than the “core poor” (ibid., p. 132). 
 
The apparent trade-off between the dual goals of financial sustainability and depth of 
outreach generated an extended discussion over the reality, nature and implications 
of the trade-off. A relatively early point of discussion was around the differentiated 
needs of the poor and whether the poorest’s needs were met by a ‘credit-only’ 
model. The ‘credit plus’ approach resulted and led to the transition to the term 
microfinance rather than microcredit. The credit plus approach advocates for a 
“broader financial services” agenda which promotes a more complex set of financial 
services including insurance, savings and protectional (rather than promotional) 
credit (Wood & Sharif 1997, p. 31). By addressing the narrowly construed credit only 
model microfinance can better meet the varied needs of the poor. Protectional credit 
and savings programs in particular are better suited to the needs of the poorest. This 
broader set of financial services could be offered within a particular organization or 
through a set of specialized institutions, although the latter strategy sacrifices some 
opportunities for cross-subsidizing and mobilization of savings for financing loan 
portfolios, important strategies for many organizations working toward financial 
sustainability. Thus in the 1990s the term microfinance replaced microcredit in 
acknowledgement of the expanded financial services needed to meet the needs of all 
poor households.  
 
The financial sustainability/depth of outreach trade-off divided the mainstream 
microfinance model into two camps based on relative priorization of each goal. 
Although broad agreement on the need for credit plus exists between the two camps, 
proponents take different lessons from the problem of dual maximization. The 
dominant microfinance model prioritizes financial sustainability over depth of 
outreach. It refers to itself as the financial systems approach (Robinson 2001) but 
                                            
16 This section’s general characterization of group lending methodology applies most 
accurately to the group lending model that dominates globally—Grameen-style lending to 
solidarity groups. Tha larger village banks and SHGs (the prevalent model in India) offer a 
variation on the Grameen model. For instance, lenders loan funds in the name of the SHG, 
which then on-lends to individual group members while in Grameen-style groups the lender 
loans directly to the individual. In both cases the loan is utlized by an individual group 
member and a form of joint liability is employed although the mechanisms differ. Further 
distinctions will be explored in Section 3.3 in the discussion of the Indian microfinance sector. 
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has also been referred to as the sustainability camp (Rhyne 1998) and the finance 
school (Fisher & Sriram 2002). The financial systems approach focuses on 
deepening financial markets through the mainstreaming of microfinance or building 
sustainable (commercial) financial institutions. Proponents contend that only 
commercially-oriented institutions can access commercial finance required to scale 
sufficiently to meet the large unmet demand for financial services among poor 
households (Robinson 2001). Thus growth to expand the breadth of outreach and 
thereby the assumed benefits of financial inclusion is the central justification of the 
approach.  
 
Reaching poor households is central to the mainstream microfinance model 
generally, including the financial systems approach, but questions of how poor, in 
what numbers (relative to the overall set of clients) and with what services are at the 
heart of the disagreement between the financial systems and an opposing poverty–
oriented approach. On the question of how poor, the financial systems approach 
questions the relevance of credit for the poorest or very poor. Robinson (2001) 
asserts credit is suitable for the “economically active poor” but not the very poor 
(Robinson 2001, p. 20). Credit will only add to the debt burden of the very poor who 
require food, employment, shelter and other basic requirements most suitably 
provided by subsidies and charity from donors and government. This assertion fits 
conveniently with the financial systems approach’s overall prioritization of financial 
sustainability as the poorest households are the most costly to reach. “The poorest of 
the poor,” she asserts “should not be the responsibility of the financial sector” (Ibid.).   
 
The poverty-oriented camp agrees the very poor need more than credit but reject the 
idea that the very poor do not also require credit or do not have the ability to use it to 
their benefit and questions the idea of the economically active poor (Simanowitz & 
Walker 2002). The poverty-oriented approach asserts that a depth of outreach focus 
is essential to retaining the integrity and social benefit of microfinance. It assigns 
more “weight” to depth of outreach on moral and political grounds (Rhyne 1998, p. 
8). It asserts a moral imperative to address the needs of the very poor but also points 
to the likelihood that unless the focus is on the poorest, benefits will be diverted 
toward those slightly better off who are easier to serve (Rhyne 1998). Evidence 
supports the notion that the focus on financial sustainability pushes microfinance 
providers upmarket to larger average loan sizes. Additionally, unless explicitly 
targeted, the very poor may be screened out through group lending methodology 
(Hulme & Mosley 1996).  
 
The poverty-oriented approach asserts that the very poor can be served sustainably 
by microfinance. To do so is a question of the design and delivery of microfinance. 
Advocates of the poverty-oriented approach further promote the possibility of 
achieving financial sustainability while bundling financial services with other services 
(credit plus plus). Dunford (2001) asserts that the very poor can and should be 
served by microfinance organizations. He goes further to say that the very poor 
require an integrated and coordinated set of microfinance and other development 
services. Acknowledging the concerns of practitioners about bundling microfinance 
with other services based on the additional cost, he asserts that bundling can be 
achieved by financially sustainable organizations. He presents three models of 
bundling: linking, parallel and unified. Unified is the most limited in terms of services 
offered but also the model with the most potential to absorb the costs of additional 
activities while still achieving sustainability. He further argues that offering 
microfinance and other development services together can by synergistic. The 
additional development services may enhance the performance of microcredit clients 
by strengthening their loyalty to the organization as well as ability to productively use 
credit. At the same time, group-based microfinance presents an opportunity and 
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favourable atmosphere to offer low-cost educational activities in a supportive 
environment that may increase the effectiveness of those educational activities. 
 
Despite the insistence by the poverty-oriented approach that the very poor can be 
served sustainably, the debate between the two camps often resolves to position on 
subsidies (Robinson 2001, Rhyne 1998). The financial systems approach points to 
the high level of subsidy dependence among poverty-oriented microfinance 
organizations to assert the approach requires subsidies. At the heart of the question 
is whether the (very) poor can pay the full cost of their borrowing and whether 
interest rates should be subsidized. Although the microfinance movement overall has 
been characterized by high levels of subsidy dependence (Armendáriz de Aghion & 
Morduch 2005, Hulme & Mosley 1996), the financial systems’ position stands in 
principle against subsidies for microfinance and points to BancoSol, BRI, and 
Compartamos as evidence of the potential for commericially-based microfinance.17 
Some allowance is made for subsidies to cover start-up of microfinance 
organizations before they reach the benefits of scale, arguments akin to the infant 
industries arguments found in international trade (Helms 2006, Armendáriz de 
Aghion & Morduch 2005, Hulme & Mosley 1996). Generally however the financial 
systems approach eschews the idea of subsidy based on their association with 
inefficiency, mistargeting, low repayment rates and ultimately institutional failure.18 
Long-term financing for microfinance should be based on locally mobilized deposits, 
commercial credit and for-profit investment. 
 
The poverty-oriented approach however allows for the possibility of “smart subsidies” 
or carefully designed subsidies that maximize social benefit (in particular deepening 
outreach) while minimizing inefficiencies, distortions and mistargeting (Armendáriz de 
Aghion & Morduch 2005, p. 245). Smart subsidy arguments include subsidizing 
technical assistance such as building capacity that might not otherwise be funded 
(for instance MIS systems) or may result in positive externalities (such as impact 
studies) (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch 2005, p. 247).  BRAC’s collaboration with 
the World Food Programme in the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group 
Development (IGVGD) program suggests subsidies for outreach to very poor 
households not yet able to borrow at market rates. It provides them with food and 
training with the intent of ‘graduating’ them to BRAC’s credit program (Armendáriz de 
Aghion & Morduch 2005, p. 247-248). Subsidies may also be used to equalize 
interest rates on very small loans with slightly larger loans, an approach with both an 
equity and social benefit argument. Very small loans may require the same level of 
intermediation and therefore require higher interest rates than larger loans to cover 
costs, interest rates that may be prohibitively and unfairly high for the very poor 
borrowers demanding the small loan size.  
 
The logic and operation of the mainstream microfinance model (both the financial 
systems and poverty-oriented variants) is largely consistent with neoliberal ideology. 
                                            
17 The public listing of MFIs such as Compartamos in 2002 appeared to validate 
microfinance’s potential not only for financial sustainability but financial profitability.  
18 The position grew from criticism made by the “Ohio school” of the performance of state-
promoted subsidized credit programs. It expressed hostility towards any type of targeting and 
subsidy of rural finance citing the failure of these previous efforts (Hulme & Mosley 1996,139-
142).Criticism pointed to the tendancy for diversion of cheap credit, its perception as grant-
like by borrowers (reinforced by precedent of loan forgiveness by the state) and the little 
incentive for managers to improve efficiency. The dynamics of cheap credit mean poor 
repayment, erosion of capital base and institutional failure. The Ohio school came to 
dominate in the early 1980s. A primarily economistic theory it advocated deregulation and 
letting the market govern, coinciding well with the neoliberal philosophy dominating 
institutional donors at the time.  
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By providing small loans to poor households to support income-generating activities, 
microfinance supports the market as the primary development mechanism.  
The focus on doing so through financially sustainable (and possibly even 
commercially-oriented) organizations also maps to neoliberal ideology. Microfinance 
rose to prominence as neoliberalism came to dominate development theories 
following the election of conservative governments in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The shift in thinking was reflected in the policy of donors, such as 
USAID, DFID and the World Bank.  
 
Critiques of the mainstream model of microfinance extend beyond performance on its 
two-fold promise to the construction of the model itself. Critics suggest the 
mainstream model operates under a limited and “under-ambitious” set of objectives 
with regards to poverty alleviation (Wood & Sharif 1997, p. 32). Its intensive focus on 
lender sustainability reduces borrower sustainability (benefit) to “ability to repay” as 
measured by repayment rates. Further it relies on a narrow construction of poverty 
as an issue of income or financial liquidity and ignores the structural and political 
causes of poverty. Wood and Sharif (1997) argue even the broader set of financial 
services “over-fantasises the structural position and capacities of the poor to resolve 
their poverty through a more complex portfolio of financial services, while ignoring 
the realities of the political economy and culture” (ibid., p. 32). Such critiques of the 
mainstream microfinance model highlight its neoliberal underpinnings. Ultimately the 
mainstream view of microfinance (in both of its variants) generally reflects an 
individualistic, depoliticized view of poverty with its elimination focused on technical 
fixes. Groups are more often viewed instrumentally as efficient means for delivery of 
credit and perhaps other services rather than primarily for mobilization towards social 
change. Borrowers are more often viewed primarily as customers in a transactional 
relationship with microfinance providers. Such critiques also highlight mainstream 
microfinance’s managerialist culture and tendencies as evidenced by a proliferation 
of handbooks instructing microfinance organizations on corporate governance, 
professionalizing staff, improving administrative efficiency and measuring 
performance. 
 
Critics of mainstream microfinance argue from a different or alternative view of 
development and set of values (see Section 2.3).  An alternative view calls for credit 
with social development (Fisher & Sriram 2002). Credit with social development 
focuses attention on how microfinance can be applied within a broader set of 
development goals, including livelihood promotion, developing the local economy, 
empowerment, building people’s organizations and social change (ibid.). The 
mainstream microfinance model constrains NGOs from pursuing broader 
development goals or “more challenging social development” including “protection of 
the structural value of poor people’s financial assets” which requires “wider forms of 
mobilisation and intervention” (Wood & Sharif 1997, p. 32-33). Wider forms of 
mobilization require people to be more than customers and NGOs to be more than 
microfinance organizations.  
 
The debate over the proper prioritization of dual goals expectedly extends to 
discussions over how to understand and evaluate the social performance of 
microfinance. The tensions between managing for institutional self-reliance and client 
self-reliance is expressed in models of microfinance provision as discussed above 
but also reflected in theories of microfinance management and assessment. The 
following sections discuss relevant theories of microfinance management (Section 
2.4.1) and social performance management and assessment (Section 2.4.2).  
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2.4.1 Theories of microfinance management: financial or social performance 
first 
The impact chain refers to the theory of change at the heart of an intervention. It 
relates inputs and activities of an intervention to outputs, outcomes, and ultimately 
impacts through a series of assumed cause and effect linkages. Most impact 
assessments of microcredit rely on a relatively simple theory of impact in which 
financial services are linked to indicators of well-being through effects on household 
livelihoods and inter-personal relations (Duvendack et al. 2011, p.10). The most 
common measures of well-being involve income.19 Credit can also have impacts 
beyond material gains, including behaviour and intra-household relations (Copestake 
et al. 2005). Hulme (2000) identifies two perspectives on which point in the impact 
chain performance indicators should be selected and monitoring and evaluation 
performed. The first perspective advocates assessing impact at the end of the impact 
chain: at the level of the intended beneficiaries. The second view measures impact at 
the beginning of the impact chain: at the level of the microfinance institution and its 
operation (specifically institutional outreach and sustainability). 
 
These two perspectives reflect divergent views on the role, relationship and relative 
priority of social versus financial performance. Measuring microfinance impact based 
on institutional outreach and sustainability represents a ‘financial performance first’ 
perspective, prioritizing the financial performance of microfinance organizations (and 
consistent with the financial systems approach discussed above). It does so based 
on both theoretical and practical grounds. Proponents argue that institutional 
performance is a necessary and sufficient metric on which to base social impact. 
First, building a sustainable model of microfinance provision is a prerequisite for 
significant growth. Creating a scalable and replicable model for increasing outreach 
is necessary if microfinance is to impact large numbers of poor households. Second, 
proponents argue that increasing breadth of outreach (financial inclusion) in a 
sustainable fashion is itself evidence of positive impact. This argument relies on the 
assumption that sustainable extension of financial services, high repayment rates 
and improved choices ultimately leads to enhanced well-being as borrowers through 
a more efficient market are able to improve microenterprise performance (Hulme 
2000). Social impact in effect is achieved through financial performance. 
 
Measuring microfinance impact at the beneficiary level prioritizes social impact and 
represents a ‘social performance first’ perspective (and is more consistent with the 
poverty-oriented approach discussed above). While not necessarily opposed to 
measuring institutional performance, the social performance first school points to 
evidence demonstrating that social impact does not inevitably accompany high 
repayment rates and sustainable provision of financial services and therefore social 
impact must be explicitly managed and measured. It warns that prioritization of 
financial performance ultimately contributes to mission drift and compromises the 
social impact of microfinance.  
 
The types of impacts to be assessed are various in a social performance first 
perspective. Hulme (2000) distinguishes between conventional economic impacts 
and social impacts, which have more recently gained prominence. The most 
common economic indicator is income. Other indicators include expenditures, 
consumption and assets. Social impacts and their indicators, which became popular 
beginning in the early 1980s, include educational status, access to health services, 
                                            
19 Microfinance is conceived as an intervention into livelihoods; however, credit is fungible. 
Additionally, money is instrumental. The actual impact of microfinance depends on how 
borrower households decide to use the additional resources. As such, it is difficult to 
anticipate all the potential impacts and income measures can be useful proxies. 
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nutritional levels, anthropometric measures and contraceptive use. More recently 
social impacts have been extended to include the concept of empowerment 
(specifically the empowerment of women). Empowerment impact is inferred through 
more direct impacts of household control over resources, involvement in household 
and community decision-making, levels of participation in community activities and 
social networks and electoral participation. Hashemi et al. (1996) created a 
composite empowerment indicator based on eight components: mobility, economic 
security, ability to make small purchases, ability to make larger purchases, 
involvement in major household decisions, relative freedom from domination within 
the family, political and legal awareness and involvement in political campaigning 
and protests. 
 
The financial performance first and social performance first approaches toward 
assessment represent divergent views on the primary outcomes through which 
microfinance contributes to development. Financial performance first emphasizes 
sustainable service delivery. It emphasizes management of and in development 
through its reliance on a contextually-neutral technical fix: financial inclusion. Recent 
trends in microfinance management, including the push towards commercialization in 
India and elsewhere, largely reflect the favoured position of the financial performance 
first perspective (and the financial systems approach).  
 
Social performance first has the capacity to incorporate management for 
development and prioritize the empowerment and self-reliance of clients through its 
focus on the changes in the lives of beneficiaries. However, it must be noted that the 
relationship between both financial and social performance and social performance 
and an alternative view of development management is not straightforward. Social 
performance can be prioritized and managed in a technocratic and scientific fashion. 
Additionally, social performance and financial performance have a mutually 
reinforcing relationship (Copestake et al. 2005). Trade-offs exist, but the choice is not 
simply between financial or social performance but often between social performance 
now and social performance capacity for the future to the extent that financial 
performance builds capacity for future social performance. These nuances add to the 
complexity of negotiating between the social and financial performance.  
2.4.2 Social performance assessment of NGOs in microfinance: from impact 
assessment to social performance management 
Early efforts towards assessing the social performance of NGO-MFOs were primarily 
donor-driven impact studies conducted by external experts. 20 Cohen et al. (1996), in 
their review of microfinance impact studies, concluded donor agendas were reflected 
in the purpose, questions and methods of existing studies. Early studies (before 
1990) were generally case studies and before-after studies of borrowers, but as 
development agencies devoted more funds to microfinance programs impact studies 
trended toward more rigorous quasi-experimental designs. While the earlier studies 
were helpful for identifying ways programs could be improved, they were “considered 
insufficient by donors and policy makers concerned with impacts on broader 
development objectives and whether or not microfinance programs are good 
investments” (Cohen et al. 1996, p. 4).  
 
A frequently referenced dichotomy contrasts impact assessments with a ‘proving’ 
approach and those with an ‘improving’ approach (Hulme, 2000, Goldberg 2005). 
Donor agendas emphasized ‘proving’ impact assessments, which are primarily 
evaluative and seek to establish positive impact to validate the value of donor 
                                            
20 NGO-MFOs is used through this thesis to refer to NGO microfinance organizations or 
NGOs for whom provision of microfinance services is central to their operation or strategy. 
 39 
investments and guide future policy-making. In addition to different objectives and 
audiences, the two approaches are often associated with specific methods of 
assessment. The donors, policy makers, academics and researchers who are the 
primary audience for proving impact assessments focus on scientifically rigorous 
methodologies to prove the impacts of microfinance interventions. Rigorous impact 
assessments involve experimental (randomized treatment and control groups) and 
quasi-experimental (carefully selected control groups) research designs. Improving 
impact assessments are rather formative and designed for organizational learning. 
The primary goal is to understand the processes of impact so that products and 
services (and impact) can be enhanced. The primary audience for improving 
assessments includes donor and practitioner field staff and program beneficiaries. 
Improving assessments are often characterized as less concerned with large sample 
surveys and control groups, and as using more qualitative, interpretative methods 
that sometimes resemble market research done in the private sector. The distinction 
between motivations for assessment may be useful, but can also be overly simplistic 
particularly in its association of each objective with specific methods (Wright & 
Copestake 2004). As greater attention became directed toward assessment of social 
performance, approaches emerged that sought middle ground between the needs of 
external and internal audiences, combined proving and improving goals and 
balanced practical and methodological issues by drawing from the full spectrum of 
methodological tools. 
 
The impetus for an expanded discourse on assessment of social goals in 
microfinance emerged from concerns over the effect of rapid growth on the 
achievement of social goals. Rapid growth was accompanied by a preoccupation 
with improving institutional performance, increasing outreach and accessing the 
capital necessary to do so. This, in conjunction with a lack of attention to social goals 
within NGO-MFOs, created potential for mission drift. The financial performance first 
approach to NGO-MFO management contributed to, provided justification for and 
was reinforced by the focus on growth and institutional performance. A number of 
initiatives responded to the lack of attention to social goals and attempted to refocus 
attention on both social goals and monitoring and evaluation activities, including the 
USAID-supported AIMS project and the Ford Foundation’s Imp-Act initiative. 
Practitioners also joined the call for renewed focus on measuring impact (Cheston & 
Reed 1999).  The resulting literature focuses on practitioner-driven rather than donor-
driven impact assessment; calls into question the necessity, desirability, and 
feasibility of addressing attribution solely through rigorous scientifically-based impact 
assessment design; promotes approaches to impact assessment that combine 
proving and improving objectives and characteristics; and broadens the conception 
of social performance assessment from impact assessment to social performance 
management.  
 
The USAID-supported AIMS project sought to defend impact assessment and a 
renewed focus on clients (versus institutions) through assessment activities. The 
project is notable for its promotion of practitioner-driven impact assessment. 
Practitioners, it argues, have proving as well as improving objectives. They need and 
want to understand impact (proving)—benefits received and when and where they 
are received—and their clients (improving)—who their clients are and the extent to 
which products and services meet clients’ needs. This requires utilization of a 
conceptually broadened toolset spanning the tools of impact assessment to market 
research.21 AIMS also questioned the primacy of scientifically-rigorous impact 
                                            
21The set of tools developed by SEEP under the AIMS program demonstrate the directions in 
which data relevant to achievement of social goals was extended in conjunction with the 
movement from a strictly impact assessment to social performance management approach. 
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assessment. Traditional impact assessment requires too much time, cost and 
expertise to be routinely used by practitioners. Therefore, a practitioner-focused 
approach to assessment requires an approach using mid-range tools.  This 
represents a third school (between the proving and improving schools) based on 
balancing practical and methodological trade-offs and often using mixed methods 
(Wright & Copestake, 2004). AIMS accepted differences between scientific 
assessment and assessment that is practitioners-driven at least in part based on the 
assertion that proving is never entirely possible. Practitioner impact assessment 
asserts credible association, consistency and coherence and simple approaches in 
contrast to scientific assessment standards of attribution, rigor and complexity.  
 
The Imp-Act project echoed and usefully extended some of the AIMS themes and 
arguments. Imp-Act also prioritizes practitioner-led assessment, argues the value of 
both proving and improving goals, and promotes a renewed emphasis on 
assessment of social goals through monitoring and evaluation activities. Imp-Act, 
however, broadens the assessment agenda further by focusing on social 
performance assessment, reflecting a larger shift away from impact assessment in 
the late 1990s. Social performance assessment (SPA) “refers to any activity intended 
to clarify how far an organization is achieving social goals” (Copestake et al. 2005, 
p.178). It includes information on the breadth, depth, and quality of outreach. Imp-Act 
also argues the importance of a focus on the institutionalization of SPA as part a 
social performance management (SPM) system. SPM implies an organization 
recognizes the value of information about clients beyond loan repayment, collecting 
the data and learning and making changes based on the data collected. SPM means 
the activity becomes an integral, routine or normal activity of the organization driven 
by the practitioner, rather than a periodic exercise primarily driven (and often 
performed) by external parties. SPM also highlights the feedback mechanisms that 
facilitate learning and decision-making based on SPA results. 
 
The discussion around measuring microfinance’s performance on social goals has 
evolved and expanded from a narrow focus on impact assessment to social 
performance assessment and management. But perhaps the most distinct tension 
still represented within the discussion surrounds the possibility and necessity of 
overcoming methodological difficulties, in particular solving the problem of attribution. 
Establishing attribution means NGO-MFOs can attribute whatever impacts or 
changes are observed through assessment to their intervention. It establishes that 
the changes did not occur due to other factors and would not have occurred in the 
absence of the intervention. Establishing attribution is central to the concept of 
impact assessment but in practice is very difficult to accomplish due to technical and 
ethical issues.  Hulme (2000) discusses three approaches for dealing with the issue 
of attribution. The first approach is the conventional scientific method based in the 
natural sciences. This approach uses experimental design (in which the intervention 
is randomly assigned and the outcomes of those with the intervention are compared 
with a randomly assigned control group of individuals without the intervention) and 
quasi-experimental design (in which the intervention is not randomly assigned but 
those with the intervention are compared against a comparison group, carefully 
selected to control for differences). This approach is currently championed by the 
Financial Access Initiative, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-Pal), and the 
newly formed 3IE. 
 
The second approach has its roots in the humanities. Mixed methods are often used 
                                                                                                                             
Only one of the five tools explicitly addresses impact, covering individual, enterprise, and 
household level impacts. The other tools gather data on client exit, the use of loans, profits 
and savings over time, client satisfaction and empowerment (SEEP 2001). 
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and attribution is inferred but not proven according to the standards of scientific 
inquiry. Much of the literature arguing for practitioner-based impact assessment and 
social performance management reflects this approach. The third and newest 
approach features less prominently in the microfinance literature. It does not deal 
directly with attribution and most closely reflects the values of an alternative 
development management.  Referred to by Hulme (2000) as the participatory 
approach, it does not accept one objective reality and sees the scientific approach as 
fundamentally flawed. Assessment is subjective and interpretative and in practice 
should prioritize the views of program beneficiaries consistent with development 
goals of empowerment. Few impact assessments implement a purely participatory 
approach.  
 
As described in this chapter, the debates around the methodology, timing and 
purpose of performance assessment  in microfinance are embedded in a set of larger 
and more theoretical debates, including over the reality, nature and implications of 
the trade-offs between social and financial performance. Two camps—distinguished 
as social performance first and financial performance first—take different lessons 
from problems of dual maximization and come to divergent understandings of the 
meaning and pathway for social impact through microfinance. More fundamentally, 
the social and financial performance first debate reflect tensions faced by NGO-
MFOs as they balance their empowering missions with service delivery as well as 
NGO identity and values with the demands of the development industry and ideology 
within which they increasingly operate and interact. Avoiding the mission drift and 
diminishing social impact often associated with these tensions suggests an 
alternative approach to management in microfinance and development generally that 
is consistent with NGO values, referencing another tension with important 
implications for the social/financial performance debate: between a mainstream and 
alternative development management. Positioning with regards to these questions 
are in part a function of a particular NGO-MFO’s ideological and geographical origin. 
Chapter 3 will explore some aspects of the environmental context by discussing the 
Indian development models, NGO sector and microfinance sector. 
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Chapter 3: Indian Context 
 
The Indian state’s development model and the forces that shape it constitute one 
aspect of NGOs’ operating environment and shape NGOs in two ways. First, NGOs 
are embedded in and products of this operational environment. Second, their scope 
for manoeuvre is bounded by the norms and rules of their operational environment. 
The following section (Section 3.1) touches on models of development in India over 
time and some of the underlying dynamics that impact its policy and outcomes. 
Section 3.2 discusses the NGO sector in India. The final two sections discuss the 
microfinance sector in India (Section 3.3) and Tamil Nadu (Section 3.4). A theme 
throughout is the dynamics between NGO and NGO-MFOs and the state. 
 
3.1 India and Development 
 
In the immediate post-independence period India pursued a policy of state-led 
development. Later the Indian state’s approach to development evolved and 
ultimately radically shifted towards an approach focused on the market rather than 
the state as the driver of development. This transition represented a rethinking and 
realigning of the roles of the state, market and civil society in development and 
produced contrasting development policies. However there is continuity in the 
underlying social processes that produced the diverging development models and 
policies. The sharp divisions and inequalities which characterize Indian society and 
the struggles they produce have consistently and significantly impacted development 
policy and outcomes. The following section first discusses the evolution and nature of 
the Indian state’s model of development (Section 3.1.1) and then some of the key 
underlying dynamics that impact its policy and outcomes (Section 3.1.2). 
3.1.1 Development models and policies 
As India’s first Prime Minister, Nehru conceptualized an Indian state grounded on the 
ideals of democracy, socialism, secularism, and federalism. Corbridge and Harriss 
(2000, p. 22) refer to these ideals as “mythologies of rule” that have consistently 
affected India’s political and economic landscape since independence. Consistent 
with these ideals, Nehru charted a “third way” toward development between 
capitalism and communism. His model embraced modernization through state-led 
development. The National Planning Committee (NPC), established in 1938, and its 
five-year plans became central to a strategy of planned growth and industrialization 
(Corbridge & Harriss 2000). 
 
Addressing inequality and poverty was integral to Nehru’s vision for a democratic 
India and a critical goal of development policy. This goal was sought through pursuit 
of growth supplemented with fiscal redistribution, better regional balance and 
encouraging small-scale manufacturing. The 1950s and early 1960s saw average 
annual growth rates of 7 percent. Thereafter, however, growth fell and stagnated. 
The period following Nehru’s death in 1964 is portrayed as one of declining state 
effectiveness and increasing authoritarianism. Partially in response to reduced 
growth rates, in the mid-1960s growth promotion was supplemented by increased 
allocations towards programs directly targeting poor households’ minimum needs, 
such as employment and income generation (Guhan 2001).22 Policies for rural 
                                            
22 Guhan (2001) attributes the transition to programs targeting the poor directly to the reduced 
growth rate, as well as: growing disagreements within the Congress party, widening regional 
and class disparities resulting from the Green Revolution, confidence that higher growth 
would support greater allocation to poverty alleviation and international agencies’ policies 
emphasizing direct anti-poverty programs. 
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development also shifted in this period from a focus on community development to 
the Green Revolution (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). 
 
Explanations for stalling economic growth in the late 1960s through the 1980s blame 
the inefficiencies of state intervention, demand-side constraints and a downturn in 
public sector investments (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). By the late 1980s India was 
near bankruptcy.23 Some attempts were made during the 1980s to address the 
growing crisis through liberalizing reforms but reform attempts were limited by lack of 
political support followed by a return to increasing public expenditure. In response to 
the failures of state-led development and the escalating economic dysfunction, India 
initiated wide-spread economic reform through liberalization from 1989 to 1991. The 
reforms revived growth rates but arguably have favoured the business, agricultural 
and financial elite (ibid.). 
3.1.2 Role of identities in production of development policies and outcomes 
Bardhan (1988 as cited in Corbridge & Harriss 2000) suggests that underlying 
explanations for stalling economic growth beginning in the 1960s is an Indian political 
economy in which class structure (principally conflicts and compromises between the 
three dominant propertied classes) influences economic outcomes.24 He argues the 
Indian “public economy” has become “an elaborate network of patronage and 
subsidies” in which the “heterogeneous proprietary classes fight and bargain for their 
share of the spoils of the system…” (Bardhan 1988, p. 219 as cited in Corbridge & 
Harriss 2000, p. 80). 
 
Class, religious, regional and caste-based divisions are long-standing and have 
shaped Indian development policy and outcomes, both the liberalizing reforms of the 
1990s as well as reforms in previous decades. Sharp divisions in social relations are 
legacies of the pre-colonial and colonial period. Dharmic norms and values focus on 
the centrality of duty within village life as defined through a social and economic 
hierarchy of caste relations (Heginbotham 1975, Harriss-White & Janakarajan 2004). 
The British reinforced and hardened caste and religious differences during the 
colonial period through policies reinforcing distinctions between groups, such as 
providing for separate electorates and reservations (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). The 
British sought to disrupt the independence movement by providing new incentives to 
participate in local politics while controlling the terms by which different groups could 
participate, antagonizing tensions between Hindus and Muslims.  
 
The leadership of the newly independent Indian state was dominated by elites, 
despite its democratic rhetoric and aspirations. At independence the Congress Party 
won power based on a franchise representing less than 30 percent of India’s adult 
population (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). Some scholars argue the Indian state is 
essentially a means by which social and economic elites protect and further their 
interests. Bardhan (1984) by contrast characterizes the Indian state as autonomous, 
dominated by a “state elite,” which pursues “self-aggrandizement” as well as its own 
distinct vision of national interest, rather than dominated by social and economic 
elites. The state does however provide the material basis for new classes and is 
constrained by the agendas of dominant classes (ibid., p. 34). He argues that in the 
                                            
23 India’s credit rating had been downgraded. It suffered from problems caused by deficit 
spending, an unfavorable balance of payments and diminishing foreign reserves. At one point 
the state only held enough reserves to cover two weeks worth of imports. The fiscal deficit 
rose to 9 percent of GDP in 1990 from 6.4 in 1980 and inflation reached above 10 percent 
(Corbridge & Harriss 2000) 
24 The three dominant classes are defined as : 1) industrial capitalists, 2) rich farmers and 3) 
white-collar workers and public sector professionals (Bardhan 1984). 
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post-independence period, India’s state elite leveraged their prestige to pursue their 
vision of development, using state intervention in a process that exerted pressure on 
dominant classes rather than simply acting on behalf of those classes. However, as 
time passed the state elite found itself more constrained by the interests of social and 
economic elites and autonomy was reflected more in its regulatory than development 
role. 
 
The perceived failures of state-led development by the mid-1960s contributed to the 
weakening of the Congress Party, which created a vacuum into which new political 
parties moved and through which the tensions and struggles between Indian’s social 
groups have become more visible. New political parties represented regional 
interests and relied on the mobilization of lower castes. Corbridge and Harriss (2000) 
argue this has deepened a regionalism, which has long been a feature of Indian 
politics. It also marked a drift of power from the centre (national government) to state 
governments and from dominant classes and castes to lower castes. The latter trend 
may be taken as a sign of democratic progress (perhaps more fully realizing Nehru’s 
vision of a democratic India) however Bardhan (1998, p. 132-133 as cited in 
Corbridge & Harriss 2000, p.138) argues the trend has been accompanied by an 
erosion of the “institutional insulation” of the decision-making process in public 
administration and economic management. The more impactful outcome of 
increased political participation by lower castes has been worsening corruption, 
nepotism and patronage. Guhan (2001) echoes the concern that divisions between 
regions, castes and classes worsened beginning in the 1970s and through the 1980s 
and 1990s as competition between groups for scarce resources has intensified in an 
environment of rising expectations. 
 
The resurgence of Hindu nationalism during the 1990s, most notably represented by 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), gained momentum from the fracturing of Indian 
political power, forming alliances with regional political parties in its rise to 
prominence on a national level. Corbridge and Harriss (2000) refer to the rise of 
Hindu nationalism as one of the “elite revolts” occurring in the 1990s. The BJP first 
came to power on the national stage in 1999. Its base of support included a growing 
middle class and middle and higher caste groups that responded to BJP’s message 
of Hindu nationalism, specifically its promise of building India’s status in the world but 
in a distinctively Indian way (rather than through Westernization). The support of 
middle class and middle and higher caste groups for the BJP and Hindu nationalism 
was also motivated by their discomfort with the greater role lower caste and class 
groups were playing in political processes since the 1960s through participation in 
elections, social movements and party politics (Corbridge & Harriss 2000).25  
A second elite revolt occurred in the 1990s, which illustrates the impact of class and 
caste struggles on development policy (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). The Liberalizing 
reforms of the 1990s were not an inevitable response to the financial crisis. India’s 
financial problems provided an opportunity for dominant classes objecting to the 
earlier model of state-directed development to push for reforms based on their own 
                                            
25Hindu movements emerged from both above—upper caste efforts to purify/uplift lower 
castes—and below—the anti-Brahmin movement. They continue to draw support from both 
middle class and upper/middle caste groups as well as lower castes. By drawing attention 
toward establishing a unifying Hindu national identity and threats from the outside (initially 
British, but now Christians and particulalry Muslims) the Hindu movements deflect the 
attention away from anti-elite or anti-Brahmin aspects of their movement and support. 
However, the diversity of support for the Hindu nationalist movement remains problematic. 
Upper/middle caste and middle class interests are in authority, stability, order and affirmation 
of Indian nationalism. These conflict with demands of other supporters of Hindu nationalism 
who are in some senses anti-nationalist and cause disorder. 
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interests. The liberalizing agenda primarily benefited dominant classes as it 
prioritized “business and trading regimes” over a “social investment regime” more 
likely to benefit the majority. The argument is demonstrated by the partiality with 
which liberalizing reforms were applied in favour of elite interests. For instance, the 
failure to liberalize the Indian agricultural sector in the 1990s reflects the power of the 
elite to adapt and shape the agenda of liberalization (Corbridge & Harriss 2000). 
 
Despite the perceived failures of state-led development, poverty rates fell 
significantly beginning late 1970s and throughout 1980s, particularly rural poverty 
rates, although absolute numbers of those in poverty continue to rise (Corbridge & 
Harriss 2000). Gupta (1995) attributes poverty reduction to the transition in 
government spending in the mid-1960s to initiatives of the Green Revolution as well 
as some benefit from government spending on rural credit or employment guarantee 
schemes (which were 80 percent funded by the national government). More often, 
however, scholars note the failure of government schemes in this period to 
significantly or effectively address inequality and poverty. Guhan (2001) cites three 
sets of problems that plagued programs directed at the poor: 1) benefits were 
appropriated immediately or eventually to more well off, 2) resources allocated to 
programs were significant but not adequate and 3) programs depended on 
bureaucracies prone to inefficiencies, corruption and waste for implementation. 
These issues (particularly the first and third) illustrate how pathways of patronage 
and corruption reinforced by divisions in Indian society impact development 
outcomes. 
 
The impact of growth through liberalization on poverty rates has been widely 
debated. Over 300 million Indians are still classified as living in poverty. While there 
is no consensus the most frequent conclusion is that poverty fell during the 1990s, 
but official estimates are overly optimistic, particularly for rural areas (Deaton & Kozel 
2005).  Critics of recent economic reforms also point to evidence of increasing 
inequality (in income and gender) (Dreze & Sen 2002, Sengupta et al. 2008, Kilby 
2010). Persistent poverty and growing inequality highlight the limitations of recent 
macroeconomic development policies and the persistence of underlying problems of 
social division and discrimination (based on gender, caste, and religion) in India.  The 
Indian state has long looked to Indian NGOs and more recently microfinance as tools 
for addressing issues of social development and this trend intensified in the era of 
liberalized economic reforms. The following section discusses the role of NGOs 
(Section 3.2) with a focus on how they have interacted with and responded to the 
state and its development model. 
 
3.2 NGO Sector in India 
 
NGOs have a long history in India. Principles rooted in tradition and scripture, 
including dharma (personal obligation or duty), jeev daya (humanitarian concern for 
all living things), voluntarism and philanthropy underlie this long history (Sen 1999). 
During British rule Christian missionaries influenced the emergence of mostly 
welfare-oriented NGOs characterized by a concern for rural credit and SHGs. Over 
time NGOs increasingly concerned themselves with political rights and social reform. 
The Indian National Congress, which was at the forefront of the Indian nationalist 
movement, formed as an NGO in 1885. NGOs inspired by the Gandhian movement 
and Marxist NGOs (focused primarily on organizing trade unions) also populated the 
set of Indian NGOs focused on social action and political mobilization. NGOs’ 
relationship with the Indian state has evolved: at times characterized by cooperation 
and partnership and at other times by distrust and even harassment by the state. But 
at all stages NGOs have been significantly impacted by the state. The relationship 
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between the NGO sector and the state in India is a key element of the NGO 
operating environment and as such shapes to large degree the characteristics, 
missions, roles and outcomes of NGOs collectively and individually. The following 
sections review the changing state-NGO relationship by discussing: 
conceptualizations of civil society of which NGOs are a part (Section 3.2.1), 
processes of state coercion (Section 3.2.2), processes of state cooption and consent 
building (Section 3.2.3) through which the state asserts and inserts itself in the NGO 
sector, and finally, NGO responses to state influence (Section 3.2.4).  
3.2.1 Civil society and the state 
Civil society is generally conceptualized as a space in which social, economic and 
political justice is enhanced. It is an associational space separate from family, state 
and market (Ghosh 2009) or a “third sphere” distinct from the state and market 
(Chandhoke 2001, p. 3). Civil society organizations provide a counterbalance to state 
power by bringing people together in “meshes of solidarity” rather than through 
relationships of power as in the case of the state (Chandhoke 2001, p. 4). Kothari 
(1988 as cited in Ghosh 2009, p. 230) describes civil society organizations as 
mediators between citizens and the state. Other characterizations cast civil society 
organizations in a more radical mould as a space of resistance to the state (Kamat 
2002). More recently, civil society is seen as including organizations that mediate, 
resist and compensate for the failures of the market as well (Bebbington & Farrington 
1993). NGOs are one component of civil society and also sometimes characterized 
as collectively challenging to dominant political and economic models (Kothari 1998, 
p. 185 cited in Ghosh 2009, p. 233).  
 
The variety of organizations and formations that constitute civil society perhaps 
provide room for the full range of roles attributed to civil society. A common theme in 
discussions of civil society’s nature however is the reality and necessity of its 
independence from the state. A subset of the literature questions the autonomy of 
civil society from the state and discusses at length the implications of the state-civil 
society relationship on the theorized roles of civil society as described above. 
Chandhoke (2001, p. 4), for instance, argues that civil society does not possess a 
“distinct logic” from the state and argues in particular for the “collective existence” of 
state and civil society.  She, along with others, points to a number of processes by 
which this collective existence is forged in India and elsewhere and the nature, role 
and practices of civil society shaped through and by the state. They can usefully be 
thought of as processes of coercion, consent, and cooption.  
3.2.2 Processes of coercion 
The state utilizes its coercive powers to control NGOs through regulation, repression 
and harassment. In the case of regulation, the state provides the legal framework 
defining the types of activities NGOs may legally engage in and the processes 
through which objectives may be pursued (Chandhoke 2001). Regulation of NGOs 
began in India before independence. The first act to regulate Indian NGOs was 
established in 1860. In his study of social action groups in India, Kamat (2002) 
asserts the most fundamental implications of the Indian state’s regulatory power 
arises from the state’s defining of development as non-political. This excludes 
political activities (and radical or militant action) from development and 
simultaneously defines economic activities as both developmental and non-political. 
The economy is seen as fixed in nature; the state can mediate but not fundamentally 
alter or control the economy. The state constructs itself as separate from NGOs and 
civil society and concerned with promoting the general public interest. With this 
construction the state defines and contains development to economic programs that 
address the individual needs and deficiencies of the poor and do not challenge (or 
even admit to) the social relations represented by state or market configurations. 
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The Indian state also uses its regulatory powers to monitor and control NGOs on a 
more micro level through legislation such as the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act 
(FRCA). In the era of globalization, international actors are gaining power to define 
development and NGOs’ role in development; however, the FRCA demonstrates the 
Indian state’s continued ability to control the activities of NGOs as well as the 
influence of foreign and international actors on NGOs (Jalali 2008). The original 
FRCA was passed in 1976 and directed toward political parties. The law’s stated 
objective was to ensure foreign funds did not influence elections by barring 
organizations it defined as political from receiving foreign funds. A 1984 amendment 
of the FRCA broadened the scope of organizations barred from receipt of foreign 
funds by expanding the definition of political organizations.  
 
The FRCA emerged from a period of “estrangement” and conflict between NGOs and 
the state that existed during the 1960s and 1970s (Kilby 2010). During this period 
mainly middle class youths, dissatisfied with the centralized state-led model of 
development, established alternative and more radical NGOs favouring village-level 
development. The sarvodaya movement (led by Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinova 
Bhave), calling for radical revolution and voluntary redistribution of land based on 
Gandhian principles epitomized the period. Under the FRCA, NGOs that would like to 
be eligible to receive foreign assistance must register and receive approval through 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the same ministry dealing with internal law and order 
and security issues, a fact indicative of the adversarial posture of the FRCA and the 
state toward NGOs. 
 
The trend toward more state control and regulation of Indian NGOs that began in the 
1960s extended through the 1990s. (However, somewhat paradoxically, at the same 
time the 1990s were seen as an era of cooperation as the state continued to fund 
NGOs to deliver village-level services.) The FRCA continues to provide the state with 
substantial means to monitor, coerce and repress NGO activity it considers 
undesirable. Through the FRCA’s eligibility criteria the state can deny foreign funds 
to NGOs engaged in activity it deems political. The state can order searches, 
inspections and seizures of NGO property and can revoke registration of NGOs it 
considers in violation of FRCA rules. The FRCA also requires verification of the NGO 
and its activities by local authorities, suggesting that NGOs with a problematic 
relationship with local government may be unlikely to receive approval for receipt of 
foreign funds. The FRCA has allowed the Indian state to essentially set funding 
priorities and direct funds away from sensitive areas and towards geographic and 
topical arenas it deems non-threatening. Some groups (women for instance) 
dominate those receiving approval for foreign funds while others are poorly 
represented (Muslims and dalits). 
3.2.3 Processes of cooption and consent 
Despite NGOs’ vulnerability to close control and scrutiny by the state, apart from the 
antagonism of the1960s and 1970s, NGO-state relations have also been 
characterized by close cooperation. NGOs inspired by the Gandhian tradition in 
particular gained prominence as part of the nationalist movement. Their close ties 
with the nationalist movement translated into close cooperation post-independence. 
NGOs in this period have been characterized as a “shadow state” (with Gandhian 
organizations as the primary players), offering little opposition to the state and valued 
for their competency in service delivery at the village level (Kilby 2010, p. 9). In the 
absence of an openly adversarial relationship, the state influences the nature and 




Kamat (2002) conceptualizes the state’s primary rationality as legitimation. The state 
and elite classes exercise hegemony through processes of consent creation in which 
the interests of the elites are consented to by the broader population as representing 
the interests of all. These processes work through the institutions of civil society. 
Thus the primary function of the state is therefore legitimation of the interests of elite 
classes and the state is “immanent” in civil society rather than exterior to it. Kamat 
(ibid.) further argues that the state’s construction of development is reproduced in the 
discourses and practices of NGOs through “universalizing discourses” such as 
nationalism and secularism that are not challenged even in critiques of development. 
Hence the state exercises hegemony and builds consent for the state’s view of 
development through ideas of modernity (the free individual) and the liberal state (the 
citizen) (Kamat 2002, Chandhoke 2001). Through this process “subversion itself 
get[s] subverted” (Kamat 2002). 
 
Another body of literature looks critically at the processes and degree of cooption 
and consent building by the state of NGOs through another set of processes. This 
analysis is based on a fundamental realignment in the roles of civil society 
(specifically NGOs), the state, and market that have occurred in the era of the 
Washington Consensus and neoliberal reforms. This realignment is characterized by 
the withdrawal of the state from direct implementation in many areas of welfare 
provision, the assertion of the market as the primary mechanism for economic growth 
and development and the increased partnership between state and NGOs in service 
delivery. Multilateral, bilateral and national governments have increasingly looked 
towards NGOs for the implementation of development activities targeting the poor. 
NGOs have proliferated as official funding (both international and domestic in origin) 
has been increasingly routed to NGOs for this purpose. 
 
NGO dependence on official funds provides another basis for compromised 
autonomy. The trend toward increased official funds for NGOs generally has been 
discussed in previous sections (see Section 2.3.1). In India this trend has been 
followed by reductions in foreign funds to NGOs, which have primarily been replaced 
by national and state funds. In the early 2000s, the larger Indian NGOs were 
primarily supported with foreign funds. Ninety percent of formal funding for Indian 
development NGOs came from foreign sources, $1.85 billion in 2006 (Kilby 2010, p. 
5). Beginning around 2005 Indian government funding started to replace international 
funding (ibid.). Dependence on state dollars comes with new types of state 
supervision. NGOs are transformed from organizations designed to promote the 
interests of poor individuals and into instruments of the state. In the context of 
increasing regulation and increasing state funding, NGOs become more dependent 
on the state and more vulnerable to state scrutiny.  
 
Bebbington and Farrington (1993) suggest that cooption occurs in NGO—state 
partnerships as a result of their divergent objectives. NGOs may see value in 
collaborative relationships as a means of making development processes more 
participatory and transparent by gaining a role in the design and monitoring of 
development activities, while government agencies’ primary goal is to reduce the 
public sector’s role in these activities by using private sector (NGO) partners in 
program implementation. Government agencies may argue for the use of NGOs as 
implementers by citing their grassroots connection, but projects crowd out 
participation in favour of service delivery and program implementation. Any 
participation is strictly on terms dictated by the state (Sundar 2000). 
 
Randeria (2007) argues that though the Indian state is sometimes portrayed as weak 
(when compared with international actors) it actually plays a prominent role in setting 
the NGO operating environment. She characterizes the Indian state as a “cunning” 
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state (ibid., p. 4). Despite growing relevance of norms, rules and regulations 
established at the international level, cunning states (unlike weak states) retain the 
capacity to address the needs of citizens but play on perceived weakness to evade 
responsibility, justify the partial or selective implementation of policies and other 
devices. More particularly, the state uses not only funds but the terms of 
collaboration or partnership with NGOs to shift the responsibility for development 
(and its failures) onto NGOs. Therefore, it is not only through what the state does to 
gain greater supervision and control of NGOs but also through what it does not do (in 
the context of partnerships or contractual relationships) that the state coopts and 
redefines NGO activity. 
3.2.4 NGO responses to the state 
In their analysis of NGO-state collaboration in Latin America, Bebbington and 
Farrington (1993) assert the NGO responses to state—NGO collaboration is split 
between those that accept grants and contracts (and may even be organizations 
created for this purpose) and those that argue that through such partnerships NGOs 
become essentially consultancies and participate in privatization of services that 
should be the government responsibility. Hence partnerships represent cooption and 
undermine NGO identity. Sen (1999) observes a similar dichotomy in India. NGOs 
have responded to the tension between their identity and history as agents of social 
change and their new role as service provider for the state primarily in one of two 
ways. More radical NGOs respond to increasing regulation and instrumentalism by 
abandoning the NGO legal form in favour of informal networks. Remaining NGOs 
move toward a service-orientation, local-level focus, promotion of non-violence and a 
general avoidance of party political processes. 26 Sen (ibid.) characterizes modern 
Indian NGOs as primarily non-representative organizations that play an 
intermediation role (as opposed to being grassroots organizations themselves). As 
such NGOs see their role as helping disadvantaged groups assert their own rights. 
Ghosh (2009, p. 243) argues increased state funds has also contributed to a new 
generation of NGOs more concerned with program implementation than social 
change. New “Project NGOs” do not work to enhance space for civil society (ibid.).  
 
Bebbington (1997) argues divergent responses to new state-NGO relationships are 
indicative of a crisis of NGO legitimacy, identity and sustainability. The increased 
prominence of the NGO sector in recent decades has been driven to a large extent 
by the external political and economic shifts that made donors willing to channel 
funds through NGOs, and hence to a degree modern are an NGOs institutional forms 
induced by external relationships. As external relationships continue to evolve, 
Bebbington (ibid.) argues, rather than rethinking politics NGOs should rethink the 
roles of the state, civil society and market and experiment with new institutional 
structures and forms. He describes three emerging institutional forms with relevance 
to the Indian NGO sector: NGO transitioning to consulting groups, becoming social 
enterprises and returning to NGO ‘roots’ through building stronger relationships with 
grassroots organizations. He characterizes microfinance as a special case of the 
second alternative. Such institutional transformations may fundamentally change 
individual NGOs. New institutional configurations may no longer be NGOs in a 
traditional senses as they combine a social and commercial logic and derive their 
legitimacy from the efficacy with which they deliver services.  
                                            
26 The trend away from national-level political advocacy was reinforced by the emergence of 
fundamentalist movements such as the Hindutva, from whom NGOs are cautious about 
drawing any hostile attention. The Raj Act of 1992, which gave local Panchayats larger 
budgets and broader responsibilities and increased opportunities to combine local-level 




A potentially important factor to understanding how NGOs respond to state 
processes of coercion and cooption is their cultural and ideological origins. 
Heginbotham (1975, p. 10) discusses four cultural traditions relevant to bureaucratic 
behaviour in India. The traditions have relevance (though perhaps in different 
degrees and combinations) for NGO behaviour as cultural frameworks shaping 
orientations toward goals, motivations and relationships with communities. 
Heginbotham (ibid.) identifies three primary sources for organizational cognitive 
models: historical experience with formal organizations, ideological movements and 
the “broad nexus” of social institutions, values and attitudes that define cultural 
tradition. The four cultural traditions are described as dharmic, Gandhian, British 
colonial model and the community development model. The dharmic and Gandhian 
traditions are Indian in origin. The Gandhian model emerged from an ideological 
movement that attempted to modernize dharmic tradition. A similar relationship exists 
between the two cultural models of Western origin, the British colonial and 
community development models. The community development model applied 
modern values and behaviours to a bureaucratic model originating in the dynamics of 
British colonialism.  
 
The dharmic tradition derives from traditional village life in which fulfilment of duty (as 
defined particularly by caste) is central. In an organizational context some 
implications for work attitudes include a focus on completing assigned tasks rather 
than working for results. The dharmic tradition does not account for setting priorities, 
assessing cost versus benefit or weighing results whether good or bad. The 
Gandhian movement accepts the dharmic view of an ordered universe and the 
centrality of duty, but rejects the social and economic hierarchy of caste relations. It 
further places pursuit of truth (and hence a result) at the centre of duty fulfilment. 
Each individual has the responsibility and ability to pursue and discover truth sought 
through the performance of duty. But while fulfilment of duty is internally motivated 
and toward a particular end, it is not followed for personal gain but as an exercise of 
selfless service. The Gandhian tradition emphasizes self-restraint in material gain 
and maintaining a social order that keeps competitiveness and greed in check.  
 
Whereas the Gandhian model is built on engaging in selfless duty, the British colonial 
model is built on distrust and control. The model constructs a two-tiered system in 
which the lower tier is subject to elaborate controls, given limited responsibility, and 
completed routine tasks. The upper administrative tier (from which Indians were 
largely excluded) is self-regulating and holds most of the authority. The community 
development model in contrast gets people at all levels of bureaucracy 
psychologically, ideologically and intellectually involved through participation in 
planning, implementation and design of programs. Through participation that is both 
wide and deep, motivation is meant to be internalized and to empower. 
 
The Gandhian tradition in particular motivated the creation and action of a generation 
of Indian NGOs. The sarvodaya movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinova 
Bhave called for a radical and voluntary redistribution of land based on Gandhian 
principles (Kilby 2010). Mathiot (1998 as cited in Kamat 2002) identifies Gandhian 
ideology as one of three ideological bases for grassroots action in Southern India 
(the other two being secular and Christian). The values of the Gandhian tradition 
continue to have implications for the organizational behaviour and performance of 
NGOs, both positive and negative (Copestake 1996). In the case of one NGO-MFO, 
Copestake (1996) found Gandhian values appear important to staff recruitment and 
altruistic behaviour but undermine a more commercial orientation that may be 
necessary to reduce dependency on subsidies and improve financial sustainability. 
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3.3 NGOs and Microfinance in India 
 
The liberalising reforms of the 1990s contributed to a realignment of relationships 
between civil society, the state and the market in India and expanded the space for 
NGO action and state-NGO collaboration. Liberalizing bank reforms led by the 
Narashimham Committee contributed to a decline in the number of rural bank 
branches and credit (Shah et al. 2007). The NGO-led microfinance movement 
stepped into the vacuum created by state withdrawal from rural finance provision that 
was part of the broader set of economic reforms favouring liberalization. 
 
The Narashimham Committee reforms followed a long history of state action to 
support rural credit provision. The government encouraged cooperatives in the late 
colonial and post-independence period beginning with the Cooperative Credit 
Societies Act in India 1904. The state recognized the dominance of rural 
moneylenders—who often combined roles of banker, employer (of labour), land 
lessor and crop buyer—and supported cooperatives as an alternative source of credit 
and means of liberating the poor from these exploitative relationships. Cooperatives 
remained central to the state’s efforts to promote rural credit through the 1960s 
despite early and persistent problems. Often dominated by rural elites and 
characterized by conflicts of interest and poor financial performance, cooperatives 
failed to achieve significant outreach (Shah et al. 2007). According to the 1951 All 
India Rural Credit Survey (AIRCS), cooperatives and commercial banks combined 
held only 5.7 percent of rural household debt while moneylenders, traders and 
wealthy landlords accounted for approximately 75 percent (Shah et al. 2007, p. 14). 
By 1971 cooperatives and commercial banks combined held just under 25 percent of 
rural household debt (31.7 percent was held by all formal agencies), while informal 
agencies together still held nearly 70 percent (ibid.). In response to the failure of 
existing systems to meet rural credit needs, the Banking Companies Act of 1969 
privatized 14 of India’s largest commercial banks. The primary argument for 
commercialization conceived rural credit as a public good that profit-seeking banks 
would not provide and which was critical to the economic development of the country 
as a whole. 
 
Nationalization was followed by a number of measures to encourage rural credit 
provision by banks. Measures included interest rate caps, requirements for 
expansion into unbanked areas to increase the number of bank branches in rural 
areas (including creation of regional rural banks) and the formalization of priority 
sector lending in which (by 1979) 40 percent of bank lending must be lent to the 
priority sectors.27 In the 20 years following nationalization of banks, bank branches 
increased in rural areas and the share of rural debt held by moneylenders decreased 
to less than 20 percent (Shah et al. 2007, p. 14). By the end of the 1980s, however, 
the poor financial performance reported by public sector banks was a source of 
growing concern. The failed Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) 
contributed to the banks’ poor performance. IRDP was at the centre of the state’s 
anti-poverty efforts during the 1980s. It provided cheap credit through banks to the 
rural poor for the purchase of income-generating assets, but made bad loans and 
suffered from low repayment.28 It was in this context that the Narasimham Committee 
                                            
27 The definition of certain “priority” sectors was set in 1972. Priority sectors included 
agricultural and allied activities and small-scale and cottage industries. Sub-targets set in 
1980 specify 16 percent of lending to agriculture and 10 percent to “weaker sections”, which 
includes small farmers, landless laborers, tenants, and borrowers with credit limits of less 
than Rs. 10,000 (Shah et al. 2007, p. 13). 
28 Only 50 to 60 percent of IRDP loans owed were collected throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s. The IRDP accounted for 40 percent of losses to commercial banks in rural lending 
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convened. The Committee’s reforms improved the performance of public sector 
banks but also contributed to withdrawal of banks from rural areas and the vacuum in 
rural credit provision into which microfinance would step (led by NGOs and later 
supported by national and state government). 
 
Meanwhile, for the 20 years prior to the Narasimham reforms, working with SHGs, 
typically organized around savings and credit services, had become a dominant 
NGO strategy (Kilby 2010). NGOs saw SHGs as an entry point for social change and 
“less about the delivery of services and more about the empowerment of group 
members to be able to make and act on expanded choices, and so advance their 
interests” (Kilby 2010, p. 25). The strategy was adopted by the government in the 
1990s to address the continuing need for poverty alleviation measures and for new 
and effective approaches to rural credit provision that would be consistent with the 
neo-liberal reforms of the era. The SHG model of savings and credit provision is now 
widely supported by the national government through SBLP and has become the 
largest model of microfinance delivery in India. In recent years the dominant model of 
microfinance provision outside of India, MFIs working through smaller joint liability 
groups has been rapidly expanding within India. Section 3.3.1 will discuss provision 
of microfinance through SHGs and Section 3.3.2 will elaborate on MFIs in India. 
3.3.1 SHG-bank linkage programme  
As noted above, the main model of NGO operation in India that has evolved and 
expanded in the last 40 years is working through village-level SHGs. SHGs are 
groups of 10 to 20 people, usually women, organized for savings and credit 
purposes. NGOs in India, notably MYRADA, initiated the formation and promotion of 
SHGs and their linkage to formal credit services in the 1980s (Fisher & Sriram 2002). 
In the 2000s microfinance delivery through SHGs expanded rapidly and became the 
dominant model of NGO operation and microfinance provision in India due in large 
part to its promotion by the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development 
(NABARD) through its SHG-bank linkage program (SBLP) (Basu 2006).29 An NGO 
typically acts as the self-help promoting institution (SHPI), assisting in promotion, 
formation, and training of new SHGs. The NGO-SHPI introduces the SHG to the 
bank after a qualifying period (generally approximately six months) during which 
group members save and rotate their own funds. Bank linkage offers the group 
access to larger sums through bank loans for which they the group is liable. After 
bank linkage the SHPI acts as an intermediary between the financial institution and 
the SHG. Roughly three fourths of all SHGs in the SBLP program operate with an 
NGO as the SHPI. As the SBLP expanded government agencies and officials have 
also become SHPIs. In some cases banks form and directly finance SHGs.  
According to NABARD (2006) 20 percent of SHGs are linked directly to banks 
without the social or financial intermediation of an SHPI. In a third and least common 
linkage model an NGO-SHPI forms and then also directly finances the SHG. Direct 
financing occurs in approximately 5 percent of SHGs (Swain & Varghese 2009a). 
The push for rapid expansion of SBLP has included a push for additional SHG-
linkage models.  
 
In April 2001, 285,000 SHGs had taken loans from Indian commercial banks, 
regional rural banks and cooperative banks through SBLP. With an estimated 
average of 17 members per group, SBLP provided 4.5 million women access to 
formal credit and savings services through SHG group membership (Fisher & Sriram 
2002).  By 2009 the number of women accessing formal credit and savings through 
                                                                                                                             
during 1988 and ultimately an official loan waiver was granted in 1989 (Shah et al. 2007, p. 
16). 
29 NABARD was established as an apex bank in 1982.  
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SBLP had increased more than tenfold to 63.3 million with an outstanding loan 
portfolio of Rs. 23,400 crore (Sa-Dhan 2009). 
3.3.2 MFIs 
The second avenue of microfinance provision in India is through MFIs. While the 
SBLP model is uniquely Indian, the MFI model is well-established internationally 
(Shah et al. 2007).30 The MFI model most often delivers credit directly to individual 
women organized into joint liability groups of approximately five to seven members. 
Members save and borrow individually through the MFI. The function of the groups is 
primarily financial intermediation. Five to seven joint liability groups are organized 
into centres that meet regularly for the purpose of depositing savings and making 
repayment with the MFI worker. The group members are also jointly liable for 
repayment of each others’ loans (Harper 2002). MFIs are often more commercially-
oriented than the SBLP and focused on financially sustainable (or even profitable) 
microfinance provision. As with SBLP, MFI clients are primarily women (over 90 
percent for MFIs reporting to Sa-Dhan in 2009); however, only the SBLP model 
explicitly includes mechanisms intended to empower women, through members’ self-
governing of SHGs.  
 
In 2009 MFIs served 22.6 million clients (based on data reported for 2008-2009 by 
over 200 MFIs) and reported an outstanding portfolio of nearly Rs. 12,000 crore. 
Together the MFI and SBLP models reported an estimated 86.2 million Indians in 
2009 as clients (Sa-Dhan 2009). Despite an outreach of only one-third that of the 
SBLP program, the MFI model’s growth has eclipsed that of the SBLP model in 
recent years. MFI outreach grew by 60 percent and its outstanding portfolio by 97 
percent in 2009. For the same year, SBLP grew its outreach to clients by 25 percent 
and its portfolio by 38 percent (ibid.).  
 
Growth in MFI outreach was driven by the transformation of NGO-MFIs to for-profit 
legal forms (specifically for-profit non-banking finance companies or NBFCs) for the 
greater access to financing the transformation facilitates (Sa-Dhan 2009, Srinivasan 
2010). Only 15 percent of MFIs were for-profit in 2009 but those MFIs represented 62 
percent of MFI clients and 75 percent of the MFI outstanding portfolio. Not-for-profit 
MFIs (85 percent of MFIs) held the remaining 38 percent of clients and only 25 
percent of the outstanding loan portfolio (Sa-Dhan 2009). The overall trend toward 
microfinance provision through for-profit MFIs was reflected in a large number of 
NGO-MFIs planning to transform to NBFCs. The trend toward a more commercial 
focus also influenced NGO-SHPIs. There was a trend among NGO-SHPIs toward 
transformation to NGO-MFIs as more funding became available for MFI operations 
than through NGO-SHPI arrangements (Srinivasan 2010).  
 
3.4 Microfinance in Tamil Nadu  
 
Southern India has consistently accounted for over 50 percent of bank-linked SHGs 
and between 45 and 55 percent of MFI clients. Within the region, Andhra Pradesh 
was the stand-out leader with an estimated 27.64 million microfinance clients in 2011 
(comprising both bank-linked SHG members and MFI clients). Tamil Nadu’s 
estimated number of microfinance clients in 2011 ranked a distant second at just 
                                            
30 Although the SHG model is uniquely Indian in bears similarities with the village banking 
model prevalent in Latin America, which is also, for instance, based on a larger group size 
(compared with the Grameen style solidarity or joint liability groups). Like SHGs, village banks 
receive and manage loans as a group rather than sharing liability on loans borrowed on an 
individual basis (Westley 2004).  
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under 12 million. The number of microfinance clients in Tamil Nadu was not only high 
in proportion to client totals in most other states but also in proportion to the number 
of poor households within the state. There were 3.85 microfinance clients for every 
poor household (Srinivasan 2012). Tamil Nadu’s microfinance sector is characterized 
by high levels of penetration contributing to areas of saturation and significant 
competition. Tamil Nadu ranks among the top five states in terms of outreach 
through both avenues of microfinance provision. Consistent with trends in India 
overall, bank-linked SHGs contribute a greater proportion of the state’s microfinance 
clients (7.56 million in 2011 compared with 4.25 million MFI clients); however, MFI 
client outreach and loan portfolio have increased at a faster rate than bank-linked 
SHGs in the most recent years (Srinivasan 2012).  
 
As of 2011 the average loan size per SHG member was approximately 20 percent 
higher than the average MFI loan size (as indicated in Table 3.1 below). The bank-
linked SHGs are promoted by government agencies and offered low-interest 
(subsidized) loans for the purpose of reaching and improving the socio-economic 
status of vulnerable women. In contrast, the largest MFIs operating in the state, while 
maintaining a social aspect to their missions, are operated on a for-profit basis. The 
apparent disconnect is explored further below. Section 3.4.1 will discuss SHG-bank 
linkage in Tamil Nadu and Section 3.4.2 will discuss MFI operations in the state. The 
chapter’s final two sections describe growth and competition in Tamil Nadu’s 
microfinance sector (Section 3.4.3) and the Andhra Pradesh crisis that began in 2010 
with an emphasis on its impact in Tamil Nadu (Section 3.4.4). 
 
Table 3.1: Microfinance outreach 2011 
 
 MFIs SHGs* 
Client Outreach 4,250,000 7,563,114 
O/S Loans (Rs. 
Lakh) 
211700 462054 
Average Loan Size 
(Rs.) 
4981 6109 
*SHG outreach and average loan size per individual is calculated based on an 
estimated 13 members per SHG (consistent with the 2011 State of the Sector Report 
(Srinivasan 2012)) 
3.4.1 SHG-bank linkage programme 
Tamil Nadu has been a leader in the SHG movement in India. Two of the NGOs 
participating in NABARD’s pilot of SBLP—PRADAN and ASSEFA—operate out of 
Tamil Nadu (Satish 2005). In addition to early and sustained support from NABARD 
through SBLP, the success of bank-linked SHGs in Tamil Nadu can be attributed to 
strong promotion by the state government (Sriram & Kumar 2007). The organization 
at the centre of state-sponsored SHG promotion is the Tamil Nadu Corporation for 
Development of Women (TNCDW), a quasi-government organization formed in 
1983. Its objective is “promoting socio-economic development and empowerment of 
women” (TNCDW n.d.). The organization was under the administrative control of the 
Tamil Nadu Social Welfare Department until 2006 when it moved under the Rural 
Development and Panchayat Raj Department. 
 
The major thrust for state SHG promotion began in partnership with the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). IFAD initiated and supported the Tamil 
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Nadu Women’s Development Project (TNWDP) beginning in 1990 and until 1998. 
TNWDP focused on improving the welfare and status of women through formation of 
supported SHGs, mobilization of institutional and informal credit (through group 
savings) and promotion of income-generating activities. In 1996 the government of 
Tamil Nadu decided to use its own funds to maintain existing TNWDP groups and 
scale up SHG promotion efforts through its own project: Mahalir Thittam (IFAD n.d.). 
The TNCDW was the executing agency for TNWDP and provides leadership in the 
Mahalir Thittam project. NGOs are identified and trained to act as facilitators in the 
forming, training and supervising of SHGs. TNCDW works in partnership with the 
NGOs, providing financial and technical assistance. Mahalir Thittam has promoted 
the formation of over 440,000 SHGs and 12,000 Panchayat-level federations 
(Srinivasan 2010, p. 24). Estimates suggest that 70 percent of all SHGs in Tamil 
Nadu function within this state-NGO partnership (Kalpana 2008).31 
3.4.2 MFIs 
According to Sa-Dhan (2011), there are 39 MFIs operating in Tamil Nadu, 24 of 
which are headquartered in the state. MFIs operate in all 32 districts of the state. Out 
of the 10 largest MFIs in India (by outreach), 6 provide microfinance services in Tamil 
Nadu. Two of those are headquartered in the state—Equitas and Grama Vidiyal 
(Srinivasan 2011). In addition to the 39 MFIs known to operate within Tamil Nadu, 
other MFOs providing financial services on a smaller scale have been catalogued by 
a GTZ-commissioned study. This category of organization generally is NGOs that 
built a client base through earlier development projects and continue to interact with 
clients. Ninety-five percent operate in only one state and sixty-eight percent operate 
in just one district. More than half are less than five years old and the majority are 
registered as independent cooperatives. The most common mode of microfinance 
delivery was through SHGs with 432 of the 786 organizations documented operating 
in this fashion. The GTZ study found 102 such organizations operating within Tamil 
Nadu (Srinivasan 2010). 
3.4.3 Growth and competition 
The growth of bank-linked SHGs in Tamil Nadu has slowed in the most recent years. 
There is some indication this is due to bank fatigue, but SHGs also faced increased 
competition from the often younger and rapidly expanding MFIs (Srinivasan 2011). 
MFI growth was robust in Tamil Nadu until the aftermath of the Andhra Pradesh 
microfinance crisis that began in 2010. (The crisis will be discussed in further detail in 
the following section). The fall-out from the crisis contributed to a sharp contraction of 
growth in 2011.32  Tamil Nadu MFIs experienced setbacks in client outreach and loan 
portfolio. They recorded one of the steepest declines in client outreach (along with 
Orissa and Andhra Pradesh) and one of the most pronounced declines in loan 
portfolios of any state (Orissa experienced the steepest, followed by Tamil Nadu and 
Delhi) (Srinivasan 2011). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide detail on the growth of the 
microfinance sector in Tamil Nadu between 2008 and 2011. 
 
                                            
31 The remaining SHGs are generally facilitated by NGOs and other agencies not affiliated 
with Mahalir Thittam. Other agencies sponsoring SHGs include banks and other state 
government divisions. Groups promoted by earlier efforts of the Panchayati Raj still operate 
and SHG promotion is also a part of specific projects implemented by government agencies 
such as the Department of Agriculture and Department of Forests (Kalpana 2008). 
32 The Andhra Pradesh crisis also contributed to the sharp decline in MFIs reporting data to 
Sa-Dhan, the contributor of MFI data for the state of the sector reports. 
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Table 3.2 Bank-linked SHGs in Tamil Nadu & UTP33 
 
Year No. of SHGs % Change Loans  outstanding 
(Rs. Lakh) 
% Change 
2008 480,307  271,576  
2009 576,350 20 344,542 27 
2010 552,330 -4 421,274 22 
2011 581,778 5 462,054 10 
 




% Change Loan 
Portfolio    
(Rs Lakh) 




2008 1,705,721  57,829  NA 
2009 2,370,257 39 119,410 106 233 
2010 4,572,806 93 238,709 100 264 
2011 4,250,000 -7 211,700 -11 170 
 
 
Competition between the more established, state-sponsored program and the often 
younger and more commercially-oriented MFIs in Tamil Nadu is intensified by the 
dynamics between the two models. Competition from MFIs potentially threatens the 
viability of the state-sponsored program. There are also political and ideological 
reasons for stakeholders in the state-sponsored program to resist growing 
competition from MFIs. Evidence suggests that state-sponsored SHG promotion is 
perceived as a pro-poor, pro-women policy and SHG members a constituency that 
cannot be ignored. Both of Tamil Nadu’s main political parties (DMK and AIADMK) 
have claimed credit for instigating state support for SHG formation (Kalpana 2008). 
There is therefore incentive for the state to protect the SHG-bank linkage program 
from competition by MFIs. There is also incentive to respond to (and perhaps 
encourage) accusations of misdeeds by MFIs such as those leading up to the crisis 
in Andhra Pradesh. As in other states where MFI outreach has been grew quickly, 
the government of Tamil Nadu has acted to temper the expansion and influence of 
MFIs (Srinivasan 2010). In Tamil Nadu the state has attempted to exclude “MFIs 
from the mainstream financing space” (Srinivasan 2010, p. 87). 
 
The state-sponsored model centres on SHGs. SHGs are the vehicles for 
microfinance provision as well as for delivery of other state-sponsored efforts aimed 
at the broader goal of socio-economic improvement of vulnerable populations. Strong 
and stable SHGs are a means and end of this model. MFIs have been accused of 
breaking up SHGs into smaller groups to facilitate their preferred mode of lending 
                                            
33 Data on bank-linked SHGs and used in Table 3.3, Table 3.5, Chart 3.1 and Chart 3.2 are 
from NARBARD 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, the Status of Micro Finance reports published 
by NABARD annually. Data are as of March 31 of the year indicated. 
34 MFI data used in Table 3.4, Table 3.5, Chart 3.1 and Chart 3.2 are from the 2008, 2009, 
2010, and 2011 Microfinance India State of the Sector Reports published by ACCESS 
Development Services and are as of March 31 of the year indicated. (Srinivasan 2009, 2010, 
2011 and 2012) Data are self-reported by MFIs and as such are not time series data as all 
the same MFIs do not report in each year. However, they provide some indication of trends in 
MFI outreach and growth. 
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through individuals formed into joint liability groups (Fernandez 2006). This and other 
perceived interferences by MFIs with existing SHGs thus exacerbate tensions 
between the state and MFIs for reasons that extend beyond the viability of state-
sponsored microfinance.  
 
Finally complaints of usurious interest rates by MFIs in part reflect ideological discord 
regarding the interest rate the poor can and should pay for access to financial 
services. State-promoted SHGs offer low-interest subsidized loans while MFIs 
charge relatively higher commercially-based interest rates. Although membership in 
state-promoted SHGs is not restricted to the poor, small loan sizes are meant to 
target poor borrowers and the low interest rates reflect the rates deemed appropriate 
for poor borrowers.  
 
More commercially-based MFIs in contrast may not target the poorest borrowers. It 
would seem such MFIs could co-exist well with a subsidized program effectively 
targeting poor borrowers. Research suggests however that when new competitors 
enter a microfinance market dominated by a socially-orientated lender, they can 
adversely impact depth of outreach as well as the financial performance of the 
incumbent lender. The new lender can do so in several ways. The new lender 
competes for and wins better off clients away from the incumbent undermining the 
incumbent’s ability to cross-subsidize lending to poorer less productive clients. Credit 
contracts then become too expensive for poor borrowers reducing financial inclusion 
unless the incumbent can offer new products to retain better off clients.  In another 
potential scenario, increasing competition allows “impatient borrowers” to take 
multiple loans, leading to declining repayment rates for the incumbent lender and 
worsening credit contracts that ultimately exclude the poor (McIntosh & Wydick 2005, 
McIntosh et al. 2005).  
 
An estimate of the changing number of poor borrowers is not available but changes 
in average loan sizes provide some indication of the effect of increased competition 
on financial inclusion in Tamil Nadu. In recent years average loan sizes have 
increased for both MFI clients and SHGs members. Average MFI loan size increased 
in 2009 and then leveled off while the average loan per SHG member appears to 
have spiked in 2010. This may suggest a move upmarket by the state program, 
perhaps decreasing financial inclusion. Given the subsidized nature of state program, 
however, an alternate scenario could be conceived wherein larger subsidized loans 
are being offered to SHGs to compete with MFIs. Such a scenario suggests the 
possibility of increasing over indebtedness and eroding repayment rates. 
 
Table 3.4  Average loan size Tamil Nadu 
 









2008 3,390 - 56,542 4,349 - 
2009 5,038 49 59,780 4,598 6 
2010 5,220 4 76,272 5,867 28 
2011 4,981 -5 79,421 6,109 4 
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3.4.4 Andhra Pradesh crisis 
The data and analysis of the microfinance sector discussed in the previous sections 
span the years immediately preceding and following the microfinance crisis that 
began in Andhra Pradesh in 2010. The years leading up to the 2010 crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh were years of rapid growth in microfinance outreach both by government 
backed and privately-support microfinance organizations. Immediately prior to the 
crisis, growth was driven by private equity investment in MFIs that principally operate 
as NBFCs. Private equity investors demanded high and rapid returns on their 
investments, which further drove rapid growth by MFIs and ultimately contributed to 
the degradation of the relationship between MFIs and their clients and the recent 
crisis.  
 
The crisis began when the Task Force Committee began receiving complaints of 
unethical behaviour by microfinance institutions in Andhra Pradesh. Concerns were 
simultaneously being raised by other regulatory agencies leading to demands for 
tougher oversight of microfinance institutions. Concerns covered the use of coercive 
collection techniques, misleading and usurious interest rates and multiple lending by 
microfinance institutions, leading to the over indebtedness of poor clients.  Such 
behaviour was reported to have contributed to a series of suicides in Andhra 
Pradesh. In response to the growing concerns, the government of Andhra Pradesh 
passed the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance in October of 2010, which essentially 
prevented MFIs from collecting loan payments. The immediate effects of the 
ordinance were a dramatic decline in repayment (recoveries dropped to 
approximately 40 percent on average) and a credit crunch for microfinance 
organizations in Andhra Pradesh and beyond (MicroSave 2010). The Andhra 
Pradesh crisis motivated action on a national level. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
issued new regulations for NBFCs in 2011 and additional legislation and/or regulation 
is pending. 
 
State action to curb MFIs in Andhra Pradesh also gained momentum from some of 
the same tensions that exist in Tamil Nadu between its state-supported program and 
MFIs. The similarities in circumstances and dynamics between Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh beg the question why Tamil Nadu has thus far avoided a similar 
crisis. The fall-out from the crisis contributed to a sharp contraction of growth for 
MFIs in Tamil Nadu by 2011.  MFIs rely heavily on domestic banks for lending, as 
demonstrated by a study of wholesale lenders that found MFIs in Tamil Nadu 
primarily borrow from domestic banks due to priority sector lending guidelines and 
regulations restricting lending from foreign financial organizations. MFIs diversify 
lending sources by borrowing from a number of banks but do not have diverse types 
of lenders  (Marr & Tubaro 2011).35 In the aftermath of the crisis banks became more 
reluctant to lend to MFIs generally thus contributing to a contraction in growth in 
Tamil Nadu.  
 
Marr & Tubaro (2011) suggest the Andhra Pradesh crisis did not spread more 
significantly to Tamil Nadu because MFIs in the state operate using a model that 
balances dual social and financial goals and discourages mission drift, citing Equitas 
as an example of this model wherein a for-profit NBFC provides microfinance 
services alongside an affiliated NGO providing social services. (Equitas contributes 5 
percent of its profits to an affiliated NGO.) The implication is this model prevented the 
most egregious behaviour (for example coercive collection techniques) that 
accompanied rapid growth and undergirded state action in Andhra Pradesh. 
                                            
35 Only a few key non-bank lenders factored significantly into the wholesale lender market. 
Key non-bank lenders in the state include the Small Industries Development Bank of India 
(SIDBI), Oikocredit, and FWWB (Marr & Tubaro 2011). 
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Growth rates may also have contributed to limiting the degree of crisis in Tamil Nadu. 
During 2008-2009 SHG formation and linkage in Andhra Pradesh grew at 2.5 times 
the rate of Tamil Nadu. Given Andhra Pradesh’s already higher numbers of bank-
linked SHGs this meant that in 2008-2009 more than 400,000 new SHGs were 
formed and linked with banks compared with just fewer than 100,000 in Tamil Nadu. 
Growth slackened in Andhra Pradesh but was still strong in 2009-2010 with the 
formation of approximately 250,000 new SHGs. Meanwhile in Tamil Nadu the 
number of bank-linked SHGs actually dropped by 4 percent in 2009-2010. This may 
imply lower levels of competition, saturation, multiple lending and over-indebtedness 
in Tamil Nadu. It may also mean MFIs had fewer opportunities in Tamil Nadu to 
capitalize on existing SHGs for recruitment of new clients, a key source of escalating 
tension between the state and MFIs.  
 
A comparison of average loan sizes between Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu 
provide another basis to infer tension between the state and MFIs in Tamil Nadu may 
have avoided the degree of escalation found in Andhra Pradesh. Average loan sizes 
were lower in 2008 in Tamil Nadu than Andhra Pradesh and growth in loan size more 
moderate over the next few years. Also the gap between SHG and MFI average loan 
size in Andhra Pradesh became pronounced between 2008 and 2011. MFIs 
increased average loan sizes by more than 60 percent while average loan sizes in 
the state-sponsored program increased by just less than 20 percent. In Tamil Nadu 
the state-sponsored program appears to respond to a sharp increase in MFI average 
loan sizes. Although it is unclear exactly why this occurred, it may mean the state 
program responded to MFI competition by adapting its strategy and offering larger 










Microfinance faces a number of challenges and constraints in Tamil Nadu many of 
which derive from the institutional context. The aggressive promotion of microfinance 
by the state government through SHGs together with its wariness of MFI expansion 
and competition intensify the competitive and dynamic operating environment. The 
tension between the two arms of the microfinance sector may not have reached the 
intensity of Andhra Pradesh, but suggest a number of potentially adverse social 
impacts including increases in multiple lending and over indebtedness. On the other 
hand, partnership with the state (such as through bank-linkage programs) presents 
risk of cooption and mission drift given divergent objectives and visions for NGO 
action.  
 
A theme in Chapter 3 has been the role of the state in creating the operational 
environment for NGOs generally and NGO-MFOs more specifically. The 
Narashimham Committee reforms created a vacuum in rural finance provision into 
which NGOs and MFIs stepped and the SHG-bank linkage program provided 
additional momentum to NGO participation in microfinance through direct 
collaboration with the state. The state’s strong presence in ‘development 
management’ as well as its use of regulation sets important limits on NGO-MFOs’ 
room for manoeuvre with regard to social and financial performance. Put another 
way, the state in many ways shapes the landscape of NGO-MFO operation, dictating 
the available pathways to mission fulfilment and to an extent the nature and scope of 
missions that can be pursued. NGO-MFOs’ negotiation between social and financial 
performance is in part then a choice about how to respond to the state. 
Organizational identity and origin, including those particular to the Indian context, 
factor into NGO-MFO responses.  
 
The following chapter (4) shifts the discussion to the research methodology that 
informed the empirical work, which will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 









The motivation for my research was to understand how socially-oriented NGO-MFOs 
manage the tension between borrower self-reliance (social) and organizational self-
reliance (financial performance) in practice, getting beyond organizational rhetoric 
and externally-imposed prescriptives to understand the nature, quality and quantity of 
social performance management and assessment from the perspective of the NGO-
MFO. This chapter describes the research methodology. After presenting the 
research questions, I describe how the research evolved and make the case for 
moving towards a mainly qualitative approach. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then describe 
the two stages of the research, starting with the systematic review (Section 4.2) and 
followed by the case studies (Section 4.3). These sections address scope and case 
selection respectively, data collection sources, methods and analysis. A theme 
throughout the chapter is the evolution of the research design, particularly through 
negotiation between case study organizations and myself. The final section, Section 
4.4, reflects further on this negotiation, first discussing ethics, in particular the ethical 
issues around establishing and maintaining access, and finally reflecting on how my 
own social identities impacted the research.  
4.1.1 Research questions  
The overarching research question is how do NGO-MFOs manage the tension 
between promoting the self-reliance of clients (social performance) and of their own 
organization (financial performance)? The research takes a particular focus on social 
performance management systems based on assertion that an adequate flow of 
information on performance is a necessary input for any effective management of 
either social or financial goals.  
 
The research sub-questions include the following:  
 
1. How are social goals translated into performance assessment and 
management systems? 
2. What are the tools and systems for information collection and the feedback 
mechanisms to decision makers? 
3. What internal and external factors drive or constrain social performance 
management? 
4. How and to what extent do decision makers retain and enhance room for 
manoeuvre?  
5. To what extent did approaches to social performance management play a 
role in protecting MFOs in Tamil Nadu from experiencing the level of crisis 
recently experienced in Andhra Pradesh?  
 
The research sub-questions are both descriptive and explanatory. They are 
concerned with describing social performance assessment and management 
systems but also understanding underlying drivers and constraints on these. I 
adopted a two-stage research design. The first stage involves a systematic review of 
the published impact assessments of Indian microfinance. The second stage 
involves case studies of two Indian NGO-MFOs.  
4.1.2 Research approach 
This thesis began from a positivist view and evolved towards a more interpretivist 
view over the course of the research. At the outset my research approach was based 
on a mainstream and managerialist view of the performance assessment and 
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management challenge facing NGO-MFOs (that is to manage performance in light of 
information systems focused on social and financial performance indicators). I 
intended to describe and discuss the nature, quality and quantity of performance 
assessment and management by NGO-MFOs, to tell what was or was not happening 
and why. Despite a positivist view I chose data collection methods and types of 
evidence that were primarily qualitative. Qualitative methods were chosen 
pragmatically based on suitability for addressing the research questions. Holland and 
Campbell (2005) describe the relative strengths of qualitative (versus quantitative) 
research as its descriptive (rather than predictive) power, analytical depth (rather 
than breadth) and explanatory power. A qualitative approach thus suited the central 
research goal of describing and explaining social performance management and 
assessment systems, requiring a focus on textual and narrative data and analysis. I 
expected to also gather quantitative data on social and financial indicators, but 
textual data would be central to the thesis and viewed as adding factual depth.  
 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998) challenge the legitimacy of characterizing research as 
qualitative in terms of methods and types of evidence only and separated from 
epistemological debates between positivist and constructivist paradigms. However 
others assert alternative epistemological and ontological positions justify a pragmatic 
separating of these larger debates from methods and argue for the usefulness of 
mixed method approaches (Patton 2002, Holland & Campbell 2005). I established 
the research design on the basis of the latter argument. The choice of systematic 
review rather than a more traditional literature review reflected this orientation. 
Although the review involved a textual analysis (rather than a meta-analysis of 
correlations between key variables) it was chosen to avoid, through systematic 
procedures, bias towards impact studies published in more prestigious journals or 
about larger organizations. A review of a broad body of literature is consistent with 
the goals of the review. 
 
The systematic review looks to secondary literature as a source of evidence about 
the nature, quality and quantity of social performance assessment. It provides 
evidence from published impact assessment studies on types of indicators and how 
they are assessed. The case studies are a second source of evidence on social 
performance assessment, but drawn from a broader organizational context rather 
than discrete, formal impact assessments. The two bodies of evidence correspond to 
two different approaches to assessing microfinance. The first restricts assessment to 
independent and externally-driven impact assessment conducted at the sector level 
and primarily to inform policy and draw conclusions about the impact of microfinance 
broadly. The second represents the broader notion of social performance 
assessment and management wherein microfinance assessment is integrated and 
driven at the organizational level, addressing impact but other learning objectives as 
well. As such the two bodies of evidence present a point of comparison on the nature, 
quality and quantity of social performance assessment and management. I also 
considered the systematic review as potentially informing case study selection and 
did not finalize case study selection until completing the systematic review. Ultimately, 
however, I found the available impact assessment literature represented a very small 
minority of NGO-MFOs (see Section 5.4) and applied other methods to case study 
selection as will be described in Section 4.3.2. 
 
I began the case study fieldwork still with a normative framework about what 
constituted a good social performance management system and still with the intent to 
collect any available quantitative data for comparison with qualitative data collected. I 
arrived with a general data collection plan, interview guides and data checklist. Once 
in the field I found my case study organizations did not primarily identify as MFOs (or 
even necessarily as NGOs), creating push-back against my data collection plan and 
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tools, based as they were on mainstream frameworks of social performance 
management and assessment emerging from microfinance and NGO literature. I also 
found my case study organizations did not have significant quantitative data on social 
performance indicators nor a particular interest in collecting such data. The 
implication was this thesis moved from a positivist orientation and methodology to 
one that is more interpretivist. The process and means of data collection become 
more naturalistic, ethnographic, emergent and negotiated. 
 
Section 4.2 elaborates on the methodology of the systematic literature review 
including its scope, data collection and analysis. Section 4.3 elaborates on case 
study site and case selection, data collection sources, methods and analysis. In the 
latter section in particular I will describe the methodological shift that occurred 
through the case study fieldwork, in response to learning in the field as well as 
practical realities. The final section, Section 4.4, discusses ethical issues, in 
particular the ethical issues around establishing and maintaining access, and finally 
reflects on how my own social identities impacted the research. 
 
4.2 Research Design: Systematic Literature Review 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The systematic review provides a broad survey of impact evaluations of microfinance 
in India. The review examines what studies conclude about the impact of rural 
microfinance in India on its users and provides a means of evaluating the nature, 
quantity and quality of information supplied through this approach. This approach to 
social performance assessment represents the approach typically favoured by 
donors and government and as such constitutes an important framework and point of 
comparison against which NGO-MFOs’ own social performance management and 
assessment systems can be viewed and analysed. 
 
The Campbell Collaboration and the EPPI Centre provide guidance specifically on 
systematic reviews related to social policy. The EPPI Centre distinguishes a 
systematic review from a traditional literature review based on four key features: 1) 
methods are explicit and transparent, 2) follows a standard set of stages, 3) is 
accountable, replicable, and updateable, and 4) involves users to ensure its 
conclusions are relevant and useful (EPPI Centre 2009). The Campbell Collaboration 
likewise emphasizes explicit procedures that are defined in advance and allow the 
review to be repeated (Campbell Collaboration n.d.). By explicitly defining scope and 
methods prior to the review, systematic reviews intend to reduce bias, survey a 
broader body of literature or evidence and enhance the credibility of conclusions 
(EPPI Centre 2009). 
 
The methodology of the systematic review has been adapted from the EPPI Centre 
guidelines. Stages of a systematic review include setting the research question, 
establishing the review protocols (including scope and methods for the review), and 
conducting the review (searching for studies, screening studies, and synthesizing 
studies) (EPPI Centre 2009). The majority of the systematic review was undertaken 
between May and December 2010. The review’s question and protocols were 
developed during May and June 2010; searching and screening of studies was 
conducted during July and August 2010; the majority of study synthesis was 
completed between September and December 2010. The following two sections will 
summarize: 1) the review question and scope and 2) protocols used for searching, 
screening and synthesizing studies.  
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4.2.2 Scope36  
The question guiding the systematic review was: What is the evidence of the impact 
of rural finance in India on socio-economic indicators?37 The objectives of the review 
were to 1) examine what available literature suggests about the nature of social and 
economic impacts of rural microfinance in India on its users and 2) what the studies’ 
design and implementation suggest about the practice of social performance 
assessment through impact studies (including the nature, quantity and quality of 
information supplied). 
 
The review included studies of impact from retail financial services on their users or 
potential users.38 Any institutional provider may offer the financial services. Possible 
institutional providers include commercial banks (including regional rural banks 
(RRBs)), commercial or NGO-MFIs, and cooperative societies.39 NGOs and public 
institutions that support user-controlled financial services or facilitate linkage between 
users and financial institutions (such as through SHG linkage programs) were 
included. While they may not directly provide the financial services, NGO-MFOs are 
often integral to the provision of microfinance in user-controlled models. Studies of 
unregulated or entirely self-managed financial services, such as ROSCAs, ASCAs 
etc., were excluded. 
 
While subjects receiving financial services do so individually, impacts may be 
assessed on the individual, household, enterprise, self-help group or local community 
level. The review considered a range of socio-economic impacts on users of financial 
services including economic or money metrics and social metrics. Social metrics 
included measures of health and nutritional status, education, social and cultural 
resources and empowerment measures.  
 
The review included quantitative and qualitative studies representing a wide range of 
methodologies. Included studies explicitly intend to make some inferences regarding 
impact and in the case of quantitative studies use some form of comparison. Studies 
may be formally published, unpublished or web-based. They may be reported in 
academic journals, working paper series, conference proceedings, organizational 
reports or PhD thesis/dissertations. The review limited itself to studies available in 
English and only considered studies from 1991 to 2010 when the review was 
completed. The 1991 cut-off limits the review to studies of rural financial services 
since the financial sector reforms of the Narasimham Committee (see Section 3.3). 
                                            
36 For a more detailed description of scoping criteria see Section 5.1.2 
37 The broader term rural finance is chosen over microfinance in recognition that not all 
studies will self-identify with the term microfinance. 
38 Financial services are understood to include credit, savings, insurance and other financial 
services. The review included studies focused on the impact of non-financial services when 
the intervention also explicitly includes financial services. Financial services may be offered 
as a platform for pursuing wider goals of social mobilization and empowerment. The review 
included studies of interventions in which financial services are integral but viewed as 
subordinate to a wider social mission. 
39 While commercial banks, cooperatives and some MFIs are not NGO-MFOs, they may 
provide financial services as part of the SBLP. 
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4.2.3 Data collection and analysis40 
I created a list of proposed search terms based on the scope of the review described 
above. The search terms provided a starting point for each database search. The 
databases were primarily academic and organizational websites (for NGOs, research 
organizations, and funders) and provided coverage of major academic journals, 
conference proceedings, working paper series, organizational reports and other 
unpublished research.41 I used a search log to record the date of each search and 
the number of results by database and search terms used.  
 
For each search result I reviewed study titles and abstracts when available to 
determine whether the study met the inclusion criteria of the review as established by 
the review’s scope. Based on this initial review, search results were categorized as 
included, not included, or inconclusive. Full documents were then obtained and used 
to verify inclusion of all results categorized as included or inconclusive. Studies 
included based on searching and screening protocols were compiled along with a set 
of studies that were known to me prior to the review to create a full list of the included 
studies.42  I used an Excel spreedsheet to record the key characteristics and findings 
from each study and to facilitate comparison between the included studies and 
constructed a narrative synthesis of studies using the extracted data. The findings of 
the systematic review are discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
4.3 Research Design: Case Study 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The second stage of my research design includes two NGO-MFO case studies. I 
chose a case study design based on appropriateness to the research questions and 
goals. According to Yin (2003), case studies are useful when relevant behaviours 
cannot be manipulated (as through experimental designs) and when examining 
current events. Fitzgerald and Dopson (2009) further argue case studies are 
particularly suited to the complex contexts in which organizations are embedded. 
Thus a case study usefully facilitates observing an organization’s internal workings 
(in this case existing social performance assessment and management systems) and 
building understanding of them in relation to context and environment, consistent 
with the goals of this research. 
4.3.2 Case study selection  
The case studies were chosen from NGO-MFOs operating in the state of Tamil 
Nadu. Tamil Nadu was chosen based on three factors. First, a mature microfinance 
sector was appropriate for the fieldwork as a sufficient number of microfinance 
organizations was necessary to find organizations that met the criteria for case 
selection and were willing to be the subject of a case study. Tamil Nadu has a well-
established microfinance sector. Outreach through MFIs and SBLP is the second 
largest in India, only behind Andhra Pradesh (Sa-Dhan 2011, Srinivasan 2011). 
Second, Tamil Nadu provided an opportunity to examine the potential role of social 
performance assessment and management in avoiding or mitigating the crises seen 
                                            
40 For a more detailed description of search strategy see Section 5.1.3 (including Chapter 5 
Table 1: List of proposed search terms and Chapter 5 Table 2: Databases). Also see Sections 
5.1.4 and 5.1.5 respectively for more detailed descriptions of screening procedures and data 
extraction and analysis. Section 5.1.6 addresses limitations of the systematic review. 
41 The review did not generally include checking study references as an additional search 
strategy. 
42 All but one of the known studies would have been found following the review’s search and 
screening protocols. Searching generated over 2,000 results; after screening 54 studies met 
criteria and were included in the systematic review. 
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recently in a number of locales, including in Andhra Pradesh in 2010 (Marr & Tubaro 
2011). Finally, Tamil Nadu was chosen based on contacts available to me in the 
state, which ultimately were critical in identifying appropriate and accessible NGO-
MFOs. 
 
Case study selection focused on “potential for learning” rather than 
representativeness (Stake 2000, p. 446). The case study selection strategy evolved 
over several stages. The first stage was a two-step process. In the first step of the 
process, I compiled lists of MFOs operating in Tamil Nadu using Microfinance India: 
State of the Sector Report 2009 and The Bharat Micro Finance Report Quick Data 
2011 (Srinivasan 2010, Sa-Dhan 2011). I included MFOs as case study candidates if 
they had a socially-oriented mission and were headquartered in Tamil Nadu. A 
socially-oriented mission statement was seen as indicative of an organization’s intent 
to pursue and manage social outcomes. Application of these two criteria left 25 of the 
40 MFOs operating in Tamil Nadu as potential case studies.43  
 
To enhance potential for learning I initially intended to select four case studies 
representing the variety of ways NGOs participate in microfinance provision in 
India.44 Three would operate MFOs of different types and one would operate as a 
SHPI. The Status of Micro Finance in India 2010-2011 (NABARD 2011) provides a 
list organizations receiving funding at act as SHPIs in Tamil Nadu. However, detailed 
information on SHPIs, including contact information, was not available so the 
decision was made to focus on the population of MFOs identified through The Bharat 
Micro Finance and State of the Sector reports, still with the goal of reflecting diversity 
in the case selection but focusing on two predominant categories of MFOs in Tamil 
Nadu. The two categories are defined by legal form and delivery method. Table 4.1 
describes the distribution of MFOs in Tamil Nadu based on those two characteristics. 
The first category includes NGO-MFOs registered as societies, trusts, and section 25 
companies and working nearly exclusively with SHGs (whether through SBLP or 
independently). The second category includes NBFCs, working through a more 
diverse set of delivery mechanisms including SHGs but also JLGs or Grameen-style 






                                            
43 Microfinance India: State of the Sector Report 2009 (Srinivasan 2010), lists 230 Indian 
MFOs by state and was used to compile the list of the 40 operating in Tamil Nadu. The report 
includes data on the headquarters, legal form, delivery model and size (outreach and 
outstanding loan portfolio) of each MFO.  Additional data was gathered on the MFOs from 
The Bharat Micro Finance Report - Quick Data 2011 (Sa-Dhan 2011) for the purpose of 
screening potential cases based on the criteria. (The Bharat Micro Finance Report only lists 
39 MFOs operating in Tamil Nadu with 24 headquartered in the state. The set of 
organizations on the two lists almost entirely overlapped and I chose the more inclusive list as 
my primary source.) 
44 NGO-MFO participation in microfinance provision in India includes: 1) NGO-MFOs working 
as SHPIs in the SBLP, but not directly providing microfinance services, 2) NGO-MFOs that 
provide microfinance services primarily through SBLP SHGs and are registered as societies, 
trusts and section 25 companies, 3) NGO-MFOs working primarily through a diverse set of 
delivery mechanisms but independently of SBLP and registered as societies, trusts, and 
section 25 companies and 4) NGO-MFOs operating as NBFCs and through a diverse set of 
delivery mechanisms.  
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Table 4.1 Distribution of MFOs by Legal Form and Delivery Method 
 




NBFC Multiple NA TOTAL Percentage 
Delivery Method        
SHG 14 1 1 0 1 17 68% 
Grameen and/or 
JLG 
0 2 2 2 0 6 24% 
Individual Lending 0 0 1 0 0 1 4% 
Hybrid 0 1 0 0 0 1 4% 
TOTAL 14 4 4 2 1 25 100% 
Percentage 56% 16% 16% 8% 4% 100%  
 
In the second step of case selection process I considered access and potential for 
learning. As a first step towards evaluating MFOs on these parameters, I planned to 
send an introductory email to each potential case study organization with an attached 
set of open-ended questions. (The 10 questions designed for this purpose are 
attached in Appendix 9.) To test the efficaciousness of this strategy, the introductory 
email and questions were pilot tested with MFOs fitting the selection criteria but 
headquartered in the state of Karnataka. Approximately 17 MFOs were contacted in 
April 2012 with follow-on reminders sent over the next month but only one response 
was received.  
 
The selection process was adapted based on the very limited success of ‘cold 
contacts.’ Rather than independently attempting to assess potential for learning and 
negotiate access, discussions with Sa-Dhan (an association of MFOs) and Action 
Village India (a UK-based private donor) were initiated to identify organizations from 
those meeting the primary criteria (socially-oriented mission and headquartered in 
the state) that would provide solid potential for learning and with whom Sa-Dhan or 
Action Village India could facilitate initial contact. Both accessibility and potential for 
learning led to the selection of CRUSADE and ASSEFA as case studies. They 
represent the two categories of NGO-MFOs identified in the selection process. 
CRUSADE formerly formed SHGs and facilitated bank linkage as a partner in Mahalir 
Thittam but currently works with SHGs independently. It also has two small affiliated 
NGO-MFOs (a non-profit company registered under Section 25 and a second non-
profit MFO registered as a trust).  ASSEFA also delivers microfinance primarily 
through SHGs and currently operates independently of the SBLP. It has two affiliated 
MFOs. They are both NBFCs, the primary one being Sarvodaya Nano Finance 
Limited (SNFL). ASSEFA and CRUSADE, also met the basic criteria: socially-
oriented missions and headquartered in Tamil Nadu. The opportunistic sampling 
does not interfere with the potential for learning criterion but I cannot claim that the 
selected case studies are representative of NGO-MFOs in Tamil Nadu. 
 
There is some question as to whether the fieldwork ultimately produced one or two 
case studies.  CRUSADE has operated independently of ASSEFA since its founding 
20 years ago (see Section 6.2.1); however, a former ASSEFA manager founded it 
and the two are discussed in relation to each other repeatedly in the empirical 
chapters and discussion (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). CRUSADE and ASSEFA in a 
sense become nested case studies, with CRUSADE embedded in the larger 
ASSEFA case study (Patton 2002, Yin 2008, Bevan 2009). However I argue the 
close relationship ultimately enhances learning potential from the case studies. 
Findings regarding CRUSADE also enhance understanding of ASSEFA not only 
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through comparison but more directly to the extent CRUSADE is an extension of 
ASSEFA. 
4.3.3 Data collection sources and methods  
Rather than a method itself, the case study comprises multiple methods with the 
case as the unit of analysis or object of study (Fitzgerald & Dopson 2009, Stake 
2000). Data collection for case studies involves spending substantial time on site 
(Stake 2000). Case studies triangulate from multiple sources of information to 
establish the reliability of findings (Yin 2003). Neither of the case study organizations 
shares information widely or with any detail through websites or external reporting to 
professional (microfinance or NGO) associations and therefore access to 
organizational documents on both the case study organizations was limited prior to 
the fieldwork. The majority of data collection therefore happened during a six-month 
fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, India between November 2012 and April 2013. The pre-
fieldwork data collection plan focused on semi-structured interviews, document (and 
ideally data) review, and observation. I also decided on two phases of data 
collection. During the first phase the primary focus would be on relationship building, 
negotiating the parameters of the case study and increasing familiarity with the 
organization. The second phase would build on that familiarity to explore research 
questions in more depth. Table 4.2 describes the pre-fieldwork data collection plan. 
  
 69 
Table 4.2: Pre-fieldwork Data Collection Plan 
 
Data Collection Method Phase 1 Data Collection 
Document Review 
 
•   Reviewing external documents of potential relevance may 
include annual reports, rating reports, websites and any other 
marketing material, impact or other research reports, and MIX 
Market data. Internal documents (including strategic plans and 
policy documents) and archival data (possibly including social 
performance data) will be reviewed as available and relevant. 
•   Focused on questions 1-3 
Observation 
 
•   Observe any activities or processes relevant to SPM systems 
(e.g. data collection (possible connected to client recruitment or 
regular meetings), committee meetings, staff meetings) 




•   Beginning with a key informant in upper management and 
snowballing to other appropriate interviewees. 
•   Using an interview guide based on the 10-question survey 
previously developed for pre-fieldwork use. 
•   Focused on filling in gaps in organizational background and 
questions 1-3 




•   Participants selected from managers and field staff; two 
separate groups if adequate numbers 
• Using management dilemmas outline (adapted from Money with 
a Mission) as starting point for group discussion on what 
organizational characteristics drive or constrain successful SPM 
and why and strategies for balancing tensions; (involves group 
members individually rating their organization and then compare 
assessments of and discuss top issues) 




•   Semi-structured interviews: largely using events/issues 
uncovered in previous interviews to elicit stories about 
actions/behaviours used to balance tensions and using external 
events/issues within the sector (e.g. AP crisis, recent RBI 
regulations, pending MF bill) to elicit stories on the same topic 
• Conceived as a follow-up interview with contact in upper 
management - again snowballing to alternate or additional key 
informants in management as needed 
• Focused on questions 3-5 
 
 
Data collection was much less linear than the proposed data collection plan. As with 
the case selection process the data collection plan evolved in response to learning in 
the field and practical realities (particularly issues with access). Data collection 
methods did include semi-structured interviews (both individuals and in groups), 
document review and observation but the circumstances of fieldwork required flexible 
and opportunistic data collection with respect to time, place and to a more limited 
extent interview respondents. Access and its impact on the availability of information 
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(quantity of data, documents, who and how many managers I was able to interview) 
will be discussed further in Section 4.4 but below I will discuss more broadly the way 
the methods and tools of data collection evolved in response to learning in the field. 
 
Most significantly, in the initial interviews I found the interview guides and tools I 
prepared were too narrowly construed to capture the respondents’ own sense of 
organizational identity within which social performance was managed and assessed. 
The majority of managers worked with a range of organizational programs and did 
not compartmentalize their programs, goals or performance. In an awkward first 
interview with an ASSEFA zonal manager I asked the manager for input on 14 
management dilemmas (using a tool I adapted based on the 14 management 
dilemmas identified in Money with a Mission (Copestake et al. 2005)). I asked where 
on a continuum between two extremes he felt ASSEFA’s microfinance operations fell 
on each dilemma currently (and should ideally). The senior manager present (and 
acting as the interview translator) pre-empted most of the questions. He repeatedly 
emphasized the integrated nature of ASSEFA’s work and either asserted the 
irrelevance of each management dilemma or indicated ASSEFA fell exactly in the 
middle of the continuum. The tool thus failed to elicit the desired discussion of 
challenges in balancing specific aspects of the social and financial performance 
tension. After a follow-up discussion regarding the interview with the senior manager, 
I adapted my interview tool to discuss organizational goals broadly (through a 
discussion of mission and a SWOT analysis) as a starting point for identifying 
broader tensions between goals and between goals and context (internal and 
external), rather than focusing discretely on tensions within microfinance 
performance management.  I then followed up with questions specifically around 
respondents’ views on the meaning and nature of social performance assessment.  
As such, data collection was emergent not only during the fieldwork but often during 
interviews themselves. The extended period of fieldwork with intermittent visits 
provided the opportunity to reflect and learn from responses and iterate data 
collection tools between discussions with respondents.  
 
Less of the data collection occurred in discrete and formal ways than in the fieldwork 
plan as well. There were many opportunities for informal discussions: while driving to 
project sites, sharing meals and attending activities. With one key informant, for 
instance, all interactions occurred (by necessity) in unpredictable and informal 
settings. Recording these informal and often spontaneous ‘interviews’ was not 
generally practical. These interactions occurred in addition to more formal semi-
structured interviews but were sometimes more informative, complicating the task 
and value of precisely identifying the number of ‘interviews’ completed during the 
case study fieldwork. Tables 4.3. and 4.4 summarizes fieldwork for each case study 
by listing month by month the types of data collection activities that occurred, with 
whom and in what location. I have divided interviews into three categories based on 
the level of structure or formality: informal discussions, background or follow-up 
interviews and semi-structured interviews. Informal discussions and 
background/follow-up interviews were relatively unstructured, but I always had topics 
of interest in mind so no interaction can be said to have been completely 
unstructured. The distinction between informal discussions and interviews is simply 
the former’s informal and spontaneous nature. It should be noted that these 
distinctions are somewhat arbitrary and do not imply any kind of ranking of the 
relative value or relevance of the interactions. It should also be noted that project site 
visits also naturally involved informal discussions with staff and members who were 
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Observation also took on broader purpose. It was important, especially to ASSEFA, 
to introduce me to the full range of their integrated activities, rather than ‘allowing’ me 
to focus narrowly on microfinance-related activities. I took advantage of the 
opportunities offered to visit other project sites and attend activities. At the outset of 
fieldwork, I also envisioned myself as an outside observer with no role within the 
case study organizations and wanted to minimize any impact my presence had on 
respondent behaviour. In practice however it was difficult to simply be an observer. In 
many cases I became a participant observer, participating by filling the role of a 
‘guest’ at SHG meetings and conference proceedings and sometimes participating in 
discussions or work associated with the activities. Apart from cultural sensitivity or 
politeness participation was also important as an aspect of reciprocity and access, as 
discussed further in Section 4.5. Ultimately my transition to participant observer was 
consistent and an aspect of the larger methodological shift that occurred during my 
fieldwork.45 Thus my role in practice became a product of negotiation between 
organizational managers, staff, members and myself. 
4.3.4 Triangulation 
As noted in the previous section, the pre-fieldwork data collection plan included semi-
structured interviews, document (and ideally data) review and observation. Table 4.2 
lists the anticipated types of documents and objects of observation. The main focus 
of semi-structured interviews was managers, rather than lower level staff (such as 
fieldworkers) or SHG members, although I expected opportunities to informally speak 
with staff and members in the process of observing organizational activities and 
processes. Three levels of management were considered as potentially useful 
depending on the structure of each case study organization: field-level managers 
(such as branch managers), mid-level managers (such as area managers) and 
senior-level managers (including board members). Triangulation occurred between 
evidence collected through the three data collection methods and between interview 
respondents as described below. 
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 describe in some detail the data collection during CRUSADE and 
ASSEFA field visits, particularly in terms of interviews and observation. Ultimately, 
the upper two levels of management were most appropriate and practical for the 
semi-structured interviews.46 As reflected in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, contact with senior 
and mid-level managers (referred to as zonal managers in ASSEFA and program 
associates in CRUSADE) was substantial in both case study organizations through 
                                            
45 At meetings with members present (such as SHG meetings or the ASSEFA Farmers’ 
Conference) in particular I was treated as a special guest, often expected to sit in front of the 
group, next to staff and managers if present. SHG groups sometimes presented me with gifts 
or SHG meetings took on a performance quality with members wearing their respective SHG 
group dresses in honour of my attendance. At the Farmers’ Conference I attended I was 
asked to help light the five-point lamps commemorating the inauguration of the new agri-clinic 
facility and conference proceedings. As a guest and object of curiosity I was also expected to 
participate by answering questions about not just my purpose but also about myself and to a 
more limited extent the topics of group discussions. 
46 A lower level (or branch level) of management was not present in CRUSADE although the 
two most senior fieldworkers were interviewed. Additionally, while ASSEFA had branch-level 
managers many were newly promoted fieldworkers (see Section 6.1.2) with limited 
managerial responsibility. However, as expected, many opportunities for more informal 
discussions with members and staff, including fieldworkers, branch staff and others not 




semi-structured interviews as well as other discussions of variable formality and 
allowed for signficant triangulation between interview respondents.47 
 
Because of the presence of senior management during most of the interviews and 
discussions, additional emphasis was placed on interviews with external 
stakeholders together with document review and observation for triangulation, 
particularly on topics for which the circumstances would make candor difficult for 
interview respondents. For example, the ASSEFA founder’s representations of his 
own leadership style and role were primarily triangulated with observations and 
discussions with external stakeholders as opposed to reflections from other ASSEFA 
managers (see Section 6.1.4). An important external stakeholder was Action Village 
India (AVI), a UK-based long-term funder of both ASSEFA and CRUSADE. I had on-
going contact with AVI’s coordinator. (AVI also provided a number of externally-
produced reports.) Interviews with other organizations part of the Indian microfinance 
sector also provided opportunities to gather outside perspectives on ASSEFA in 
particular (see Appendix 11 for a list of interviews conducted with external 
stakeholders during the fieldwork in India).  
4.3.5 Data analysis 
Raw data included interview recordings, field notes (from informal interviews, 
discussions, observations and notes on some documents available for review only) 
and documents (organizational and sectorial) including some very limited tabular 
data. Field notes were taken during and immediately following all field contacts and 
interviews recorded when possible. Field notes, interviews and organizational 
documents were reviewed throughout fieldwork, with some transcription starting in 
the field. Data analysis began during data collection consistent with the emergent 
nature of the research (Miles & Huberman 1994, Rubin & Rubin 2005). The first 
stage analysis involved identifying themes, concepts and events to begin developing 
codes that would be applied to the case study data (Rubin & Rubin 2005). Analysis 
informed further data collection while in the field. 
 
The second stage analysis occurred following the fieldwork. The broad analytic 
strategy was to use a descriptive framework to organize the collected case study 
data. Transcribed interviews and digitized field notes were imported into NVIVO to 
facilitate analysis. Through review of data descriptive categories were identified and 
became a key set of codes or organizing principles. Data was coded and sorted 
according to these organizing principles. Coded material was compared across 
interviews, sources and cases and some visual representations or displays were 
used to organize principles (Miles & Huberman 1994).  
 
The categories represent internal and external characteristics relevant to 
organizational performance. The internal categories include mission, leadership, 
organizational culture, structure and human resources. External categories address 
an organization’s relationship with government, private donors, the microfinance 
sector and its members. While the organizational categories were identified through 
inductive data analysis, they are also informed by the literature. As such they roughly 
map to organizational characteristics found in previous research to be determinant of 
                                            
47 This included discussions with ASSEFA’s founder-leader and semi-structured interviews 
and informal discussions with the senior managers of SARC and SNFL. I had semi-structured 
interviews or discussions with half (five of nine) of ASSEFA’s mid-level (or zonal) managers 
and substantial informal discussions with other mid-level managers not involved with credit 
activities (managers of education trusts, farmers’ programs and agro-processing activities). 
Likewise, with CRUSADE contact with the senior manager-founder was extensive and I 
interviewed all three mid-level managers. 
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social performance (Copestake et al. 2005). They are the analytical categories used 
in presenting the empirical work in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The research set out to observe and describe the characteristics of performance 
management and assessment systems as a basis for reflecting on the social and 
financial performance tension, particularly as articulated through the conceptual 
framework introduced in Chapter 1 and discussed further in Chapter 2 (see Sections 
1.2 and 2.1). The conceptual framework orients the discussion of the social and 
financial tension faced by NGO-MFOs within a set of larger ideological debates. It 
also contextualizes these debates, found in the literature on NGO and microfinance 
performance management and assessment, within contrasting views of development 
management.  
 
As discussed above (see Section 4.3.3), the fieldwork called for a broader approach 
to data collection than originally conceived, taking into account the organization as a 
whole as well as any intentional processes and systems for the management and 
assessment of microfinance social performance. The analytical categories reflect this 
shift. By considering the wider organizational landscape within which social 
performance management and assessment occurs, the analytical categories 
acknowledge the relationship between organizational characteristics and social 
performance. They further recognize social performance management and 
assessment is not only contained in discrete systems but embedded and expressed 
through organizational characteristics. The analytical categories thus bear relevance 
to understanding of social performance management within the case study 
organizations, enhance the research’s explanatory power and support the discussion 
of the social and financial performance tension as oriented within the contrasting 
views and ideological debates presented in the conceptual framework. 
4.3.6 Establishing quality and rigor 
A common criticism of the case study method (and qualitative approaches generally) 
is the lack of generalizability of findings. However, with this research the case studies 
were never intended to be representative of the microfinance sector in Tamil Nadu 
generally or NGO-MFOs more specifically. Rather the goals of this thesis were more 
modest, to add to the body of empirical findings informing the literature on social 
performance management. The goal is to “thicken” understanding (Holland & 
Campbell 2005). The research may have particular relevance in thickening the 
understanding of social performance management among NGO-MFOs that are not 
outliers or ‘high performers’ according to the standards of the dominant models of 
microfinance provision. It aims also to contribute or thicken understanding of the 
literature by adding the perspective of the NGO-MFO.  
 
A further criticism of the case study approach concerns the reliability of findings, 
which was primarily addressed through triangulation. Multiple data collection 
methods and sources within the organizations contribute to ensuring a full in-depth 
understanding (Denzin & Lincoln 1998). As will be discussed further in Section 4.4 
there were some constraints on how successfully, or freely I was able to collect data 
from various sources—or respondents—within ASSEFA. Constraints came in the 
form of limits on where, how much and how independently I could travel to project 
sites and interview staff and managers. As a result triangulation was also sought 
through contacts outside the case study organizations (see Section 4.3.4), including 
AVI and other members of the Tamil Nadu microfinance sector, including 
representatives from other MFIs, NGOs and government agencies (a list of other 
organizations contacted in India is included in Appendix 11). Member checks also 
bolster reliability by allowing respondents to provide input and corrections on 
research summaries and findings. 
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4.4 Ethics and Reflexivity 
4.4.1 Ethics: negotiating access and independence 
During the fieldwork I introduced myself as a PhD student interested in the 
negotiation of financial and social performance within organizations using 
microfinance. I further represented myself as specifically interested in understanding 
the practitioner experience and point of view on these issues, and gained trust and 
access to a relatively secretive organization on that basis. While this honestly 
reflected my research interests and fieldwork goals it naturally does not preclude me 
from recognizing other views, including my own, in the process of analysis. I am 
aware that my findings may ultimately conflict with the views of research 
respondents, something they may not appreciate. To manage this tension—that is 
the need to accurately and empathetically represent organizational views while at the 
same time viewing them critically—I shared my findings with the case study 
organizations for their comment. Early in the analysis I composed case study 
summaries meant primarily to summarize the data and reflect respondent views and 
shared this with key informants, asking them to ‘correct’ any omissions, 
misrepresentations or misunderstandings.  
 
A related ethical tension emerged in maximizing my access to the organizations in 
the context of uncertain boundaries. Particularly in the case of ASSEFA throughout 
the fieldwork I sought increased access (time, documentation, control, independence 
of movement within project areas) and ASSEFA pushed back against my requests. 
ASSEFA pushed back by ignoring or delaying response to inquiries and requests. 
More often ASSEFA simply controlled my access by closely managing my field visits 
in a way difficult to distinguish between helpfulness and obstruction. Despite this, 
both ASSEFA and CRUSADE agreed to be case studies for the research and 
seldom (if ever) explicitly said ‘no’ to any of my access requests. Their reluctance 
and redirection thus created uncertain boundaries to access and created tension 
between my desire to maximize my access and the question of how far I could 
ethically push given the principle of on-going consent.  
 
In the initial stages of fieldwork I pushed to understand the boundaries better and in 
hopes the boundaries of access might also relax as the case study organization’s 
representatives came to know and trust me. The following paragraphs describe some 
of the constraints placed on my access and my efforts to understand and expand 
those boundaries. 
 
Overall both CRUSADE and ASSEFA were very generous with their time. However 
throughout I sensed a desire to meet my needs as quickly and minimally as possible. 
In my initial meeting with L. Kumar, my main contact with ASSEFA throughout the 
fieldwork and the son of ASSEFA’s founder-leader Loganathan, what I thought would 
be a brief meeting of introduction and discussion of the nature of research and scope 
of my request to include ASSEFA as a case study in the research, became a 3.5 
hour meeting that included a long background discussion with Kumar and an 
impromptu first interview with Asokkumar, the CEO of ASSEFA’s microfinance 
organizations. Arranging future interactions, however, was more difficult. The field 
visits proved particularly difficult to negotiate. I requested branch information so I 
could propose field visits but received only partial information and after some delay. 
Kumar didn’t initially respond to my inquiries to set up field visits and said a visit to 
Madurai (the headquarters of ASSEFA proper) would not be possible for over a 
month. It became clear the Madurai visit needed to occur first, before arrangements 
for any other field visits could be made.  I learned that Kumar was the gatekeeper but 
not the decider. Although never made explicit, it became clear I was communicating 
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with Loganathan through Kumar and the visit to Madurai was necessary to be ‘vetted’ 
by Loganathan. 
 
Loganathan in particular retained tight control over the nature, extent and timing of 
my access to ASSEFA. In our initial meeting, after I described my research purpose 
and interests he quickly dictated a four-day itinerary for my Madurai visit to Kumar 
and assigned Kumar to accompany me on my visits. Kumar thereafter clearly briefed 
Loganathan on my field visits. In terms of direct contact, he deflected attempts I 
made to arrange any type of formal interview saying Kumar could answer all my 
questions. However opportunities for informal conversations with Loganathan 
presented themselves. The first opportunity occurred on the fourth day of my visit in 
Madurai when we unexpectedly (to me) stopped by a marriage hall on the way to our 
field visit and Loganathan got in the car to join us for the day.  
 
After my field visit in Madurai I requested visits to two other project areas, resolved to 
be the Melmaruvathur and Sankarapuram areas. ASSEFA agreed to and scheduled 
the field visits but ultimately cancelled the Sankarapuram visit and rather I was 
invited to attend the Farmer’s Renaissance Conference being held at ASSEFA’s 
Pooryimpakkam campus and to which some Sankarapuram staff and SHG members 
would be attending.  
 
The constant companionship of Kumar was both a benefit and hindrance. Certainly 
given the short term of the fieldwork assistance with the logistics of field visits was 
invaluable. Kumar was also an important key research informant. On the other hand, 
Kumar’s presence at all interviews calls into question how candidly interviewees 
responded to questions. Additionally Kumar’s own position within the organization 
and as a host for my visit made it awkward for me and the interviewee if I tried to 
insist he translate and ask a question to the interviewee when he felt he could best 
answer it himself. Only the most senior managers (Loganathan, Asokkumar, and 
Kumar, as well as other senior managers (Vasantha, Muneeswaran) who were not 
key informants in the research) spoke English and so translation was required for 
other interactions. 
 
To explore the possibilities of expanding access, mid-way through the fieldwork I 
made several attempts to suggest traveling independently to project areas but these 
proposal were redirected. I also suggested I bring my own translator to scheduled 
visits, to ‘relieve’ Kumar of the burden of translating for me. Those suggestions were 
also dismissed. Such redirection was generally framed as helpful to me, that it would 
not be necessary for me to get my own translator because Kumar could help me or it 
would be too difficult for me to travel independently to project areas etc. However the 
control of the place and time of my visits, as well as ensuring the constant presence 
of Loganathan’s ‘proxy’ Kumar clearly was also about controlling and monitoring my 
access to ASSEFA staff and managers. 
 
During this period of fieldwork I was also visiting several other organizations to 
conduct one-off interviews. I considered the possibility that I could use my travel for 
this purpose to ‘drop-in’ on ASSEFA/SNFL branch offices in proximity to my other 
appointments, accompanied by my own translator. However, I ultimately felt doing so 
would violate ethical principles and informed and on-going consent given my access 
to ASSEFA was mediated through organizational leadership. I was not undertaking 
‘covert’ research and thus needed to comply with the conditions of access to staff 
and managers as negotiated through ASSEFA leadership.    
 
Interactions with ASSEFA can simultaneously be interpreted as a need to control 
what I see and hear and thus my impression of the organization and also as a desire 
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to ensure I, as a relatively brief visitor, encounter the information that will allow me to 
accurately (from their own perspective) understand ASSEFA’s organizational identity 
and work.  While the former presents challenges to the research (challenges I try to 
meet with triangulation as discussed in the previous section) the latter is consistent 
with research goals and in reality the assistance of ASSEFA was invaluable in 
meeting the logistical and language challenges of traveling in remote areas. 
 
ASSEFA and CRUSADE managers and staff took considerable time away from 
regular duties to discuss research topics with me and I wanted to offer something of 
value to ‘pay them back’ for their hospitality and accommodation but finding 
meaningful ways of giving back was difficult.  With ASSEFA in particular reciprocity 
seemed important from an ethical standpoint but also as another strategy for 
maintaining or even expanding access. Loganathan was clearly looking for ways for 
my visit to benefit ASSEFA and I was able to find several ways to ‘give back:’ 
contacting some people on his behalf regarding technical advise he was seeking, 
providing the research summary (which seemed appreciated as Kumar requested to 
share it with ASSEFA board members), and providing some English-language 
documentation of the farmers’ conference I attended. All of these were small 
contribution attesting to the difficulty of finding meaningful ways of giving back. The 
latter in particular seemed in practical terms unnecessary (given a Tamil-language 
documenting committee was already in place) but I made the offer because, as 
Loganathan said to me at the beginning of the conference, “everyone must 
contribute.”   
 
ASSEFA also sought a public relations benefit from my presence. At the conference 
Loganathan made a point of introducing me to other guests attending as speakers 
from government and academic institutions, gaining legitimacy from the interest an 
outsider, foreigner and researcher in ASSEFA’s work. Salaram (ASSEFA’s 
publication distributed among staff and membership) staff also interviewed me 
regarding my thoughts on the farmer’s conference. However, my attempts to balance 
access and reciprocity were not always successful. Over the course of the fieldwork I 
also agreed to give a management-based training to some ASSEFA staff in 
conjunction with a three-day field visit to Pooriyampakkam. Shortly before the visit 
Loganathan, via Kumar, sent me an agenda that included three full days of trainings 
led by me (a total of nearly 15 hours of training led by myself) a commitment that 
exceeded my expectations (or available preparation time). I replied, agreeing, but 
attempted to negotiate a more collaborative approach, which ended in Loganathan 
cancelling the training. Email correspondence with ASSEFA was slow and very terse 
so it was difficult to know fully their reaction to my counter-proposal but the exchange 
served as an example of the difficulty of balancing my fieldwork needs with my (and 
their) concern for reciprocity. 
 
Interaction with ASSEFA at times understandably reflected the inconvenience of my 
visit. Loganathan periodically indicated some fatigue with my questions and 
presence. At one point (on my visit to Pooriyampakkam) inquiring (somewhat 
irritated) what are the gaps, what is there left that I need to learn? After the Farmers’ 
conference Loganathan concluded, “Ok, now you have talked to everyone you want 
to.” This happened near the end of my fieldwork and after making the attempts 
described above to expand my access and independence to explore project areas.  
At this point I felt I had explored and pushed the uncertain boundaries of access as 
far as I could ethically. Although ASSEFA never explicitly said ‘no’ to any of my 
requests I felt the Loganathan’s reaction was indication that I had reached the limits 
of access and further pushing would violate the ethical issue of consent. I therefore 
concluded that I had exhausted my opportunities for field visits to project areas. 
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Access to CRUSADE was less problematic partly due to the smaller organizational 
size. I was able to visit a relatively wide range of project sites and was able to meet 
and speak with all staff and managers. However as with ASSEFA, CRUSADE 
managed my visit to an extent and I assume SHG group visits were chosen for me 
on the basis of good performance. A translator was also required for CRUSADE 
visits. Only the founder Jothi spoke English. All other interviews with managers, staff 
and members required a translator. Translators add a potential layer of 
misunderstanding and error into interactions raising the question of what nuances 
are being missed through the process of translation. This is particularly problematic 
in observing group interactions, such as staff meetings, conferences and SHG 
meetings, where the pace and number of speakers may make a translation—rather 
than interpretation—impractical. 
 
I was able to secure an ‘independent’ translator for CRUSADE visits, unlike with 
ASSEFA. During CRUSADE visits I used two different translators, Dr. Rajagopal 
(referred by an academic contact) translated for just one day of CRUSADE visits until 
I arranged through Jothi for a former employee, Lakshmikandan, to work as my 
translator. However, over the course of my visits to CRUSADE I realized Jothi had 
begun to give Lakshmikandan other CRUSADE work. As a result Lakshmikandan 
began multi-tasking (although in a limited way). As he also was working for Jothi, 
Lakshmikandan would sometimes stop translation and briefly leave to complete tasks 
for Jothi. In sum, initial consent and entry into the case study organizations was only 
the first step in building access: negotiating better and more independent access was 
an on-going aspect of the fieldwork. 
 
A second and related ethical tension was between maximizing my access to the case 
study organizations while minimizing the demands my visit placed on them. This 
tension presented itself most often and most tangibly around transportation to project 
sites. I tried to be as independent as possible in transporting myself to and from field 
visits sites (or rather tried to travel on my own as near to project sites as possible), 
however given the language barrier, limited public transportation options to rural 
villages, and in some cases safety concerns I did require help getting to and from 
train stations and organizational offices to project sites. I decided on a case-to-case 
basis whether to offer to pay to offset costs of transportation provided to me. When 
travel appeared necessary only for my benefit I offered to pay the cost of 
transportation (the driver and fuel). But when my visits were combined with field visits 
that would otherwise occur (such as Kumar’s regular duties of visiting project sites or 
traveling to attend meetings) I did not.  
4.4.2 Reflexivity: reflecting on the impact of preferences and social identities  
The evolution to a more interpretivist view implicitly required a shift in my own 
thinking and increased awareness of how my own preferences, thinking and social 
identities impacted the fieldwork (Lincoln & Guba 2000). In the first place, upon 
finding ASSEFA and CRUSADE were not the types of organizations I expected I had 
my own cognitive evolution away from my mainstream perspective on social 
performance management and resulting preference for a more planned and linear 
research approach. I initially resisted Kumar’s insistence I refer to ASSEFA as a 
social movement, reflexively returning to the tendency to see NGO or MFO as 
instrumentally useful categories around which I had designed my research tools even 
while acknowledging they may be reductive and not fully describe the mission and 
identity of the organization. I needed to adjust my own thinking on social 
performance management and manage my own discomfort with the uncertainty 
inherent in a more flexible and emergent research approach as it became clearly 
necessary if the research design was to be truly responsive to my case study 
organizations’ views.  
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Ultimately another of my identities helped me to find a mind-set compatible with 
ASSEFA’s social movement identification. Having been raised a Mormon, I have my 
own membership in a (relatively speaking) highly cohesive and identity driven 
community-based organization. I could relate to the family culture orientation of 
ASSEFA (even extending to the convention of calling non-related community 
members by family titles, although in the case of Mormonism family titles are not 
generally honorific as in ASSEFA but used to emphasize a type of egalitarian 
comradery). I could also relate to ASSEFA’s mixture of pragmatism and ideology. As 
with my own community, while ideology is critical to maintaining organizational 
mission, culture and solidarity, individual commitment and identification with the 
group can exceed knowledge or devotion to individual facets of the ideology. This is 
evident in the apparent inconsistency or unevenness with which individual principles 
are adhered to at times in service of more pragmatic aspects of group (or 
organizational) maintenance.  
 
My Mormon background provided a basis for understanding important aspects of 
ASSEFA’s identity and also for building some rapport with respondents (specifically 
with Loganathan with whom I discussed it).  Other social identities had a more 
pervasive impact on fieldwork interactions. During the fieldwork I was conscious in 
particular of how my gender may be impacting how I was perceived. While I had 
informal discussions with female administrative staff, fieldworkers and SHG group 
members, none of my key informants were women.48 Reflecting on my limited 
interaction with women, I wrote in my fieldwork journal: 
 
“…the women always seem to be in the back of car, sitting on the floor 
[as opposed to the chairs when a discussion was on-going and there 
were not enough seats for everyone], standing back observing, 
working in the fields in distance, serving the food—always in the 
background…”  (7 Feb 2013) 
 
ASSEFA is traditional in terms of gender roles within the organization. Interactions 
with members reinforced traditional gender roles as well. On my first visit to an SHG 
member’s business, after meeting the SHG member and borrower, we (myself, 
Kumar, and the area’s zonal manager) stepped inside the house to discuss the 
business with the male members of the family while the women of the family, 
including the SHG member, remained outside in the courtyard. The interaction 
appears at least superficially to contradict the idea of microfinance as about the 
economic and social empowerment of women.  
 
It is beyond the scope of my research to explore gender issues, whether within my 
case study organizations, as perpetuated by the organizations or as an aspect of 
social performance. However, the traditional gender roles within ASSEFA raise the 
question of how my own gender impacted how I was perceived. In the first place, I 
did not conform to traditional gender norms as a woman traveling alone. Some of the 
restrictions on my access may have reflected concern for the safety and 
appropriateness of my travel, limiting my case study organizations’ sense of what 
was possible for me to do without accompaniment (as well as who could 
appropriately accompany me). My apparent vulnerability was both a hindrance and 
help. I was offered help with transportation in particular that I may not have 
otherwise. I generally accepted help when it was offered as it genuinely reduced the 
                                            
48 The only senior ASSEFA manager who was female was the senior manager over all of the 
education trusts. Although we spoke informally she was not a key informant. I also met one 
female ASSEFA SMBT chairperson/branch manager. She was present during my first 
interview with a zonal manager, her supervisor, but she did not participate. 
 81 
difficulty and uncertainty around traveling in unfamiliar areas. Doing so may have 
reinforced perceptions of my vulnerability and limitations.  
 
More broadly speaking, the extent to which I do not fulfil traditional gender roles may 
have increased my foreignness and decreased the comfort or ease case study 
respondents felt interacting with me. In this context I could either could be treated as 
an ‘honorary male’ or I could provide reassurance by emphasizing the extent to 
which I do conform to traditional gender roles. I used my identity as a wife and 
mother to do the latter. In a culture where marriage and children are largely still taken 
for granted my family made me more relatable to some of my research respondents, 
particularly fieldworkers and SHG members but also more broadly, and I was able to 
share my personal circumstances as part of building rapport with staff and members. 
It may have provided some reassurance (especially as a women of my age) that I 
was married and had a child, and that my partner, child and mother-in-law had 
accompanied me to India.49 
 
This chapter has described the research methodology. After presenting the research 
questions, I describe the two stages of the research design: the systematic review 
and case studies. The scope and case selection, data collection sources, methods 
and analysis are addressed for each stage of the research. The overarching theme 
throughout the chapter is the evolution of the research design from a positivist to a 
more interpretivist view in response to learning in the field and practical realities 
(particularly related to negotiating access with case study organizations). The final 
section extends this theme, reflecting on related ethical issues and my own impact 
through my social identities on the research relationships. The following three 
chapters will present the empirical findings of the research described in this chapter, 
beginning with the systematic review in Chapter 5 and followed by the case study 
findings in Chapters 6 and 7. 
  
                                            
49 The limits of this reassurance were clear however in one conversation with fieldworkers in 
which they expressed disbelief that I could leave my child in Chennai in the care of my 
partner to travel to Madurai. Kumar explained that things were different where I was from and 
men and women share responsibilities like child care and cooking to which several women 
responded they would never let their husbands in the kitchen. (I did not offer, incidentally, that 
my partner also does all our cooking.) 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Findings: Systematic Review 
 
This chapter reports on the findings of the systematic review. The systematic review 
provides a broad survey of impact studies of microfinance in India. The chapter 
discusses what studies conclude about the impact of rural microfinance in India on its 
users and evaluates the nature, quantity and quality of social performance 
assessment through this approach. Impact assessments represent an approach to 
social performance assessment typically favoured by donors and government and as 
such constitute a point of comparison against which NGO-MFOs’ own social 
performance assessment and management systems (as discussed in the case study 
findings) can be viewed and analysed.  
 
Section 5.1 briefly reviews and elaborates on the methodology of the systematic 
review including the scope, search strategies and screening criteria. The second 
section, 5.2, reports on the methodological approaches and findings of impact 
assessments related to the most prevalent form of microfinance provision in India, 
the SHG model. In Section 5.3 the methodological approaches and findings of the 
remaining and more diverse group of impact assessments are discussed. The final 
section, Section 5.4, discusses conclusions. 
 
5.1 Systematic Review Methodology 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The Campbell Collaboration, EPPI Centre, Cochrane Collaboration, Centre for 
Evidence-Based Conservation and International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) 
provide guidance on conducting systematic reviews. The Campbell Collaboration and 
EPPI Centre focus in particular on reviews of evidence related to social policy and 
the methodology of this systematic review was adapted from the EPPI Centre 
guidelines. The stages of a systematic review include setting the research question, 
establishing the protocol (scope and methods for the review, searching for studies, 
screening studies and synthesizing studies (EPPI Centre 2009).  
 
The research question guiding this systematic review is: What is the evidence of the 
impact of rural finance in India on socio-economic indicators? The broader term rural 
finance is chosen over microfinance in recognition that not all studies will self-identify 
with the term microfinance. The objectives of this review are to 1) examine what 
available literature suggests about the social and economic impacts of rural finance 
in India on its users and 2) what the literature suggests about the nature, quantity 
and quality of available evidence and the practice of assessing impact.   
 
A review of the broader body of literature is consistent with the goals of this review 
and form the basis for choosing a systematic rather than more traditional review of 
the literature. By explicitly defining scope and methods prior to the review, systematic 
reviews reduce bias, survey a broader body of literature or evidence and enhance 
the credibility of their conclusions (EPPI Centre 2009). It is also important to avoid 
bias that could come from a process that favours impact assessments published on 
prominent websites and promoted large funders over smaller studies by local 






5.1.2 Scope of review 
 
Intervention 
The review includes studies of impact from retail financial services on their users or 
potential users. Financial services are understood to include credit, savings, 
insurance and other financial services. Studies may focus on the impact of one 
particular component or feature of a financial service or may consider impact based 
on a program as a whole. Studies may compare impacts based on program variants. 
Financial services may be bundled with non-financial services, such as business 
development services (BDS) or micro-enterprise support. The review includes 
studies focused on the impact of non-financial services when the intervention also 
explicitly includes financial services. As financial services may be offered as a 
platform for pursuing wider goals of social mobilization and empowerment, the review 
includes studies of interventions in which financial services are integral but viewed as 
subordinate to a wider social mission.  
 
Any type of institutional provider may offer the financial services. Possible 
institutional providers include commercial banks (including regional rural banks 
(RRBs)), commercial or NGO-MFOs, and cooperative societies. NGOs and public 
institutions that support user-controlled financial services or facilitate linkage between 
users and financial institutions (such as through SBLP) are included. While they may 
not directly provide the financial services, NGOs and public institutions are integral to 
their provision in the SBLP model. Studies of unregulated or entirely self-managed 
financial services, such as ROSCAs, ASCAs etc., are excluded. 
 
Subjects 
The review includes studies of the impact on users (actual and potential) of retail 
financial services in rural India.50 Users may participate with the intervention directly 
by receiving financial services or simply have access to the financial services. While 
subjects receiving financial services do so individually, impacts may be assessed on 
the individual, household, enterprise, self-help/affinity group or local community level. 
The impacts of financial services on providers were not considered. Institutional 
providers are not considered subjects of the review (whether as users of wholesale 
financial services or providers of retail financial services). However, some retail users 
are also involved in provision, as in the case of cooperative societies and SHGs, and 
are included as subjects. 
 
Impact/outcome measures 
The review considers a range of socio-economic impacts on users of financial 
services. Economic or money metrics are most often measured at the household and 
enterprise level. Household money metrics may include poverty status, income, 
consumption, assets, vulnerability, savings and credit (magnitude of debt/loans 
taken, use, repayment and sources).  Enterprise metrics include measures of 
enterprise creation and performance, such as revenues, profits and growth.51 Social 
metrics include measures of health and nutritional status, education, social and 
cultural resources, and empowerment measures. Empowerment is measured in 
multiple ways; indicators include psycho-social and relational (on both intra-
                                            
50 The review did not exclude studies including both rural and urban areas. 
51 Note that some of the above measures, such as savings and credit (magnitude, use, 
repayment and sources), are also measures of the performance of providers. Studies focused 
on provider impact and performance or in which such measures are included primarily as 
measures of provider performance were excluded unless the study also explicitly seeks to 
explore impact on users of retail services. 
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household and community level) aspects. Psycho-social indicators consider changes 
in confidence, self-esteem, self-efficacy etc. Relational aspects include changes in 
the intra-household dynamics around decision-making, ownership of income and 
assets etc. On the community level, relational aspects focus on changes in mobility 
and participation within public life etc. 
 
Study type 
The review includes quantitative and qualitative studies. Quantitative studies include 
controlled trials, action research, impact evaluations, social survey datasets, 
before/after studies, and observational research. Quantitative studies should use 
some form of comparison or control group. A variety of methods are acceptable: 
experimental, quasi-experimental, pipeline, or before/after designs (including recall, 
self-attribution, panel, or longitudinal data). Studies that do not have a comparison or 
control group, but compare groups within the treatment group i.e. examine 
heterogeneity based on program variants, geographical or subject characteristics are 
included if they explicitly intend to make some inferences regarding impact. 
Qualitative studies, including case studies and ethnographic research, are included 
provided they were highly independent and explicit about their approach and intent to 
makes some inference regarding impact. 
 
Studies may be formally published, unpublished, or web-based. They may be 
reported in academic journals, working paper series, conference proceedings, 
organizational reports or PhD theses/dissertations. The review only includes studies 
available in English and studies from 1991 to the present. This limits the review to 
studies of rural financial services since the financial sector reforms of the 
Narasimham Committee. 
5.1.3 Search strategy 
A list of proposed search terms (see Table 5.1) was created based on the subject, 
intervention and study type covered by the review.  The search terms were tested for 
validity and refined in ISI Web of Knowledge. (Appendices 1 and 2 include a record 
of the testing, the evolution of search terms and the recommended combination of 
search terms that resulted from the testing.) The recommended set of search terms 
were the starting point for each database, but were fine-tuned for use in each 
database to optimize the results based on the content and search features of each 
database. A search log recording the date of search, search terms and number of 
results for each database searched is found in Appendix 6. The databases searched 
were primarily academic and organizational websites (for NGOs, research 
organizations, funders) and provided coverage of major academic journals, 
conference proceedings, working paper series, organizational reports, and other 












                                            
52 The review did not generally include checking study references as an additional search 
strategy. 
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Table 5.1: List of Proposed Search Terms 
 
Set: Search Terms: 
1-Subject India AND 
Rural, small farmers, marginal farmers, 
labourers/labourers 
Poor/poverty, disadvantaged, scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes, backward 
castes, women, dalits, adivasi 








Livelihood and promotion 
Microenterprise and promotion 
3-Study type impact, outcome, evaluation, survey, 
assessment, review, case study, 
ethnography, action research 
 
 
Table 5.2: Databases 
 
Academic NGO/Funder websites 
EconLit (EBSCO)  IFMR, APMAS, EDA Rural Systems, 
NABARD 
IBSS  CGAP 
ISI Web of Knowledge  DFID, USAID 
Business Source Premier (EBSCO) Microfinance Gateway 
 MicroBanking Bulletin 
 Microfinance Network 
 World Bank 
 3ie, J-PAL 
 CYSD, SHARE, MYRADA, PRADAN 
 
5.1.4 Screening 
The results of each academic database search were imported and compiled into 
Endnote Web and then imported into Zotero reference manager for screening. 
Endnote Web provides the greatest ease for importing and compiling search results 
from databases, but Zotero offers greater facility in screening and managing search 
results. All search results (1,049 total from all academic databases) were first 
reviewed based on title and abstract with reference to an inclusion checklist. The 
result of the preliminary screening was recorded in Zotero by adding a ‘tag’ to each 
search result. (See Appendix 3 for a copy of the inclusion checklist and Appendices 4 
and 5 for the tags used in screening.) If the status of a result could not be definitively 
or easily concluded based on the title and abstract, it was tagged ‘inconclusive’. 
Inconclusive results were reviewed by and discussed with a second screener. Full-
text documents were retrieved for included and inconclusive studies to verify the 
studies met all criteria. A second tag was assigned to studies based on the outcome 
of the full-text review.  
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Searches on organizational websites yielded over 1,200 results. Management of 
search results from organizational websites varied based on the content and search 
features of the site, but broadly followed the same two-stage screening process as 
applied to results from academic databases. Study titles and abstracts (when 
available) were reviewed on organizational websites for relevance, full documents of 
included and indeterminate studies were downloaded, and the full document used to 
verify inclusion or exclusion of included and indeterminate studies. The conclusion of 
the second screening was noted using the review’s tags and all included studies with 
their full document attached entered into Zotero. All studies included based on 
searching and screening were compiled along with a set of studies that were known 
to the reviewer prior to the review to create a full list of included studies.53 After 
screening 54 studies were included (comprised of studies previously held by the 
reviewer and found through searches on academic and organizational sites). 
5.1.5 Analysis/data extraction 
Data was extracted from all 54 included studies. Information extracted from included 
studies was compiled in an Excel spreadsheet to facilitate comparison of study 
results. The excel spreadsheet was developed using the set of ‘test’ studies which 
were known to the reviewer prior to the review. Data extracted included study 
characteristics (study background, context, target group, intervention, sampling and 
comparison group methodology) and outcome data. The extracted data was used to 
construct the narrative synthesis of studies found in the following sections.  
5.1.6 Limitations  
A systematic review searches for and examines a broader range of literature than a 
traditional literature review. This is particularly useful for this study as it intends to not 
only synthesize major themes findings of socio-economic impact of microfinance in 
India, but also draw conclusions about what evidence does not exist, the practice of 
impact assessment and the implications of practice for the nature, quantity, and 
quality of evidence. Rather than focus on key institutions with the resources to 
conduct and publish large studies (which are often also the funders and/or promoters 
of microfinance), it is useful then to establish the variability or lack therefore) of 
impact assessment evidence and practice. While the advantages of a systematic 
review are important, there are also drawbacks. The process of defining inclusion 
and exclusion criteria is critical to creating a clear and manageable scope for a 
systematic review but also may reduce the review’s flexibility to include high-quality, 
insightful studies that do not meet all criteria.  
 
5.2 SHG Model 
 
Just over half of the studies (28) found through the systematic review focus explicitly 
on the SHG model of savings and credit delivery. SHGs are the most common 
mechanism for microfinance promotion in India due in part to the aggressive 
promotion of NABARD since the early 1990s through SBLP. NABARD likewise 
commissioned or collaborated on at least 8 of the 28 SHG studies (Rao 2003, 
MYRADA 2002, Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002, NABARD n.d., NABARD 2005a, 
Swain & Varghese 2009a, Swain & Varghese 2009b, and Swain & Wallentin 2009). 
Five of the eight studies however are linked to just two multi-state investigations of 
NABARD’s SLBP. MYRADA 2002 and Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002 report separate 
findings from the same larger investigation; Swain & Varghese 2009a, Swain & 
                                            
53 Note that all but one of the studies known to the reviewer prior to this review would have 
been found following the review’s search and screening protocols. 
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Varghese 2009b and Swain & Wallentin 2009 likewise present separate findings from 
a second.54 
 
In terms of scope, the 28 SHG studies can be divided into three loosely constructed 
categories.  First, half (14) chose a narrow geographic focus (all but three drew 
samples from just one district), but findings address a wide range of socio-economic 
indicators. Such studies often focus on the impact of SHGs promoted by a particular 
institution or program and typically involve samples of fewer than 100 SHG members 
(Moyle et al. 2006, APMAS 2009, Madheswaran & Dharmadhikary 2001, Rao 2003, 
NABARD n.d., Gaiha 2006a, Gaiha & Nandhi 2007, Barman et al. 2009, Umdor & 
Panda 2009, Pattenden 2010), although a few in this group have significantly larger 
sample sizes (NABARD 2005a, APMAS n.d., Reji 2009, Sarkar & De 2005). 
 
The second group of SHG studies (7) also have a narrow geographic focus but 
concentrate on an impact of particular interest (Holvoet 2005, Garikipati 2008, 
Mohindra et al. 2008, Ray-Bennett 2010, Leach & Sitaram 2002, Tesoriero 2006, 
Creevely & Ndiaye 2007). The remainder (7) have greater breadth through multi-
state coverage and generally larger sample sizes. This last group of studies includes 
the two sets of NABARD-commissioned studies from 2002 (MYRADA 2002, 
Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002) and 2009 (Swain & Varghese 2009a, Swain & 
Varghese 2009b, Swain & Wallentin 2009) and the World Bank-led studies 
(Deininger & Liu 2009a, Deininger & Liu 2009b). 
5.2.1 Methodological approaches 
Nearly all SHG studies (24) relied on a structured questionnaire or household survey 
to collect data from SHG members. By contrast, Leach & Sitaram (2002) and Ray-
Bennett (2010) are ethnographic studies and the APMAS (2009) study appears to 
have primarily relied on more unstructured interviews, focus groups and informal 
interactions for data collection55. Approximately nine of the studies refer to 
complimenting survey work with unstructured or semi-structured interviews and/or 
focus group discussions. Table 5.3a and 5.3b provides a summary of the 
methodological approaches applied by the 28 SHG studies.  
 
To be included in the systematic review, studies had to make some explicit 
inferences regarding impact. Quantitative studies had to include some mechanism 
for comparison. A variety of methodologies were accepted, including experimental, 
quasi-experimental, pipeline, or before/after designs (including recall, self-attribution, 
panel, or longitudinal studies). Studies without a comparison group but which 
compared sub-samples within the treatment group were included provided they 
intended to use the comparisons to draw conclusions about impact. Nearly all SHG 
studies used at least one of two comparison strategies. First, 13 of the 28 SHG 
studies relied wholly or primarily on cross-sectional surveys of SHG members and 
made before/after comparisons based on member recall and self-attribution. The 
second most common strategy (employed by eight of the studies) was a simple 
comparison group, usually consisting of a randomly-selected group of non-
participants. Simple comparison groups were also constructed from groups of 
participants in alternate microfinance programs (Rao 2003). 
                                            
54 Not surprisingly other large institutional donors either funded, commissioned or led a 
number of the remaining SHG studies: DFID provided funding for Garikipati 2008 and Leach 
& Sitraram 2002; USAID commissioned Creevey & Ndiaye 2007; Deininger & Lui 2009a and 
Deininger & Lui 2009b are products of a larger World Bank study of the SHG-bank linkage 
program promoted by the Andhra Pradesh state government (and supported by the World 
Bank), the District Poverty Initiatives Project (DPIP). 
55 The final study of the 28, APMAS n.d., provides no details on data collection methods. 
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Most comparison groups were matched to treatment groups based on observable 
individual- and household-level characteristics and only five studies reported 
applying rigorous methods intended to control for the selection bias created by 
observed and unobserved differences between treatment and comparison groups 
(Swain & Varghese 2009a, Swain & Varghese 2009b, Deininger & Liu 2009a, 
Deininger & Liu 2009b, Garikipati 2008). Four of these studies use a pipeline 
approach while Garikipati (2008) collected before/after (panel) data for both a 
treatment and a comparison group.  None of the impact studies used the ‘gold 
standard’ of impact assessment, a randomized control trial.  
 
Studies also varied in the sophistication with which data was treated or analysed.  In 
over half of the studies (15) analysis consisted of simple tabulations. Several also 
applied multivariate analysis, including tests of correlation and analysis of variance. 
Only in a few cases do studies apply multivariate regression and econometric 
techniques intended to account for selection bias, even though there are cases 
where it appears data has been collected that may have allowed for more 
sophisticated analysis.  
 
Overall the SHG studies applied relatively simple approaches to comparison group 
construction and data analysis. The studies’ methodologies may reflect the practical 
constraints of more time and resource-intensive designs, such as panel, longitudinal 
or randomized design. The studies’ data analysis techniques may reflect the resulting 
constraints on data availability and quality as well as perhaps in institutional capacity.  
Several studies usefully triangulate survey findings with qualitative data, including 
interviews with SHG members and leaders; village leaders; and NGO, bank and/or 
government representatives. However, more often inclusion of qualitative data 
collection and analysis is not transparent and it is difficult to evaluate its contribution. 
Overall, studies appear to favour a primarily quantitative approach to inferring impact, 
even when the problems of attribution and selection bias cannot or are not 
addressed through the rigor of the quantitative design. In such cases triangulation 
with thoughtful and explicit qualitative approaches could have been useful.  
 
Table 5.3a and 5.3b provides a summary of the methodological approaches applied 
by the 28 studies focused on microfinance provided through the SHG model and 
suggests a simple ranking of study reliability based on the rigor of the quantitative 
design and analysis (when relevant). The specific SHG program that was the subject 
of the study, the coverage (by state) of the study, and the number of treatment and 
comparison households or clients surveyed (when relevant) speak to the 
generalizability of the study findings. The design and analysis methods of the study 
speak to the validity of study findings. The descriptions of design and analysis 
methods are ranked as indicated, given equal weight, and summed to assign a 
simple rank of study quality.  
 
Studies with less rigorous design (before/after and simple comparison groups) and 
analysis methods (tabulation) face a higher likelihood that findings are clouded by 
recall error and selection bias. They do not generally provide evidence that positive 
results are significant and related to participation in an SHG program (i.e. represent 
changes that would not have occurred over time without program participation). 
While none of the studies have an experimental design, studies with more rigorous 
quasi-experimental designs and that take steps to mitigate selection bias improve the 
likelihood that positive findings are attributable to program participation. More 
rigorous approaches include combinations of with/without and appropriate analysis 
and combinations of with/with and before/after, including pipeline designs. The 
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following discussion considers the relative reliability of study findings and focuses 
primarily on discussing findings of studies with a rank of five or above (in Table 5.3b).  
 
Table 5.3a: Summary of SHG studies 
 























An Evaluation of Self-Help 




before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
APMAS N.D.
SHG Bank Linkage 
Programme: A study in 
Andhra Pradesh SBLP Andhra Pradesh Unclear NA
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
Gaiha 2006a
"Maharashtra Rural Credit 
Project"
from Reducing Rural Poverty 
in Asia
Mahrashtra Rural 
Credit Project Maharashtra 21 NA





Empowering Rural Women 
through Self-Help Groups: 




Project Maharashtra 20 10
primarily 
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
Moyle et al 2006
Personal and Economic 
Empowerment in Rural 
Indian Women: A Self-Help 
Group Approach
microenterprise 
support program Rajasthan 100 NA
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
MYRADA 2002
Impact of Self-Help Groups 
(Group Processes) on the 
Social/Empowerment Status 
of Women Members in 
Southern India SBLP
Andhra Pradesh, 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka 190 NA
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
NABARD N.D.
Self-Help Groups in 
Mayurakshi Gramin Bank 
Documentation of Sucessful 
Experiences, Impact and 
Performance Analysis
SBLP (Mayurakshi 
Gramin Bank) Unclear 70 NA
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
NABARD 2005a
Evaluation Study of SHG-
Bank Linkage Programme in 
KBK Region in Orissa SBLP Orissa 997 NA





Programme for Rural Poor - 
An Impact Assessment SBLP
Orissa, Jharkhand, 
Chattisgarh Unclear Unclear




Through SHG and DWCRA - 
A Study in Andhra Pradesh
microcredit 
program Andhra Pradesh 48 48
primarily 
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
Reji 2009
Socio-economic impact of 
microfinance: a study of 
neighbhourhood groups 
(NHGs) in Nilambur block of 
Malappuram district, Kerala
Community 
based nutrition & 
poverty 
alleviation 
program Kerala 200 NA
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
Sarkar & De 2005
Targeting the poor, increase 
in income and social 
implications under SHG-led 
microcredit programme in 
West Bengal
microcredit 
program West Bengal 366 NA




through women's self-help 
groups in South India RUHSA Tamil Nadu Unclear Unclear
before & after 
(recall) Tabulation 2
Pattenden 2010
A neoliberalisation of civil 
society? Self-help groups 
and the labouring class poor 





clients with & without Tabulation 4
Umdor & Panda 
2009
An assessment of SHGs 
under SGSY programme: 
evidence from Meghalaya SGSY Meghalaya
30 from 3 
sub-groups NA with & without Tabulation 4
Barman et al 2009
Financial Inclusion: A 
Comparative Study of 
Microfinance Models SBLP Uttar Pradesh 34 25 with & without Multivariate 5
Gaiha & Nandhi 
2007
Microfinance, Self Help 
Groups and Empowerment 
in Maharashtra
Mahrashtra Rural 
Credit Project Maharashtra 72 25 with & without Multivariate 5
Ranking of design: 1) before/after based on recall, 2) before/after based on panel, 3) with/without, 4) with/without & before/after 5) pipeline, 6) RCT
Ranking of analysis: 1) tabulation only, 2) multivariate analysis, 3) multivariate using strong methods to address selection bias
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5.2.2 Findings: economic well-being 
The positive impact of the SHG model of microfinance delivery is most often sought 
in two areas: economic and social well-being, including empowerment. Household-
level indicators of economic well-being measure increases in income, consumption, 
assets and employment; diversification of income sources; and decreases in 
vulnerability and poverty. The SHG studies generally find some positive economic 
benefit from SHG participation. 
 
Microfinance has been promoted as a poverty alleviation tool. Proponents argue that 
providing affordable credit to the poor for productive purposes will increase 
household incomes and bring poor families out of poverty. Several studies find SHG 
participation results in additional income generation (Madheswaran & Dharmadhikary 
2001, NABARD 2005a, Reji 2009, Moyle et al. 2006). These conclusions, however, 
are primarily based on small groups of respondents and may be program specific. 
Additionally, all of these studies rely on a cross-sectional survey with participant 
recall. Moyle et al. (2006) reports increased income for nearly every participant in 
SHGs promoted by the NGO Seva Mandir. Seva Mandir provides credit as well as 
microenterprise training. Nearly 88 percent of program participants report having no 
income prior to joining the SHG. The study however does not address the possible 
influence of attrition on results, that is whether program participants at the time of the 
study represent those that were successful, while participants for whom the 
intervention was not beneficial have left the group. Additionally Sarkar and De 
(2005), find that income generation is small and occurs when beneficiaries only 






















The Impact of Microfinance 
on Decision-Making Agency: 
Evidence from South India
TNWDP (Myrada 
& Rido) Tamil Nadu 250 50 with & without Multivariate 5
Mohindra et al 
2008
Can microcredit help 
improve the health of poor 
women? Some findings from 
a cross-sectional study in 
Kerala, India
microcredit 
program Kerala 592 336 with & without Multivariate 5
Swain & Wallentin 
2009
Does Microfinance Empower 
Women? Evidence from Self-
Help groups in India
SBLP
Andhra Pradesh; 
Tamil Nadu; Uttar 
Pradesh; Orissa; 
Maharashtra 805 156 with & without Multivariate 5
Creevley & Ndiaye 
2007
Development of a BDS 
Market in Rural Himalayas AT India Uttarakhand 90 126 with & without Multivariate 5
Garikipati 2008
The Impact of Lending to 
Women on Household 
Vulnerability and Women's 
Empowerment: Evidence 
from India SBLP Andhra Pradesh 117 174
with & without 





Swain & Varghese 
2009a
Does Self-Help Group 











members pipeline Multivariate 7
Swain & Varghese 
2009b
The Impact of Skill Develop- 
ment and Human Capital 











members pipeline Multivariate 7
Deininger & Liu 
2009a
Economic and social impacts 
of self-help groups in India District Poverty 




Deininger & Liu 
2009b
Longer-term Economic 
Impacts of Self-Help Groups 
in India
District Poverty 




Leach & Sitaram 
2002
Microfinance and women's 
empowerment: a lesson 
from India
microenterprise 
support program Karnataka 20 0 ethnography Qualitative NA
Ray-Bennett 2010
The role of microcredit in 
reducing women's 




BGVS Orissa 12 0 ethnography Qualitative NA
Ranking of design: 1) before/after based on recall, 2) before/after based on panel, 3) with/without, 4) with/without & before/after 5) pipeline, 6) RCT
Ranking of analysis: 1) tabulation only, 2) multivariate analysis, 3) multivariate using strong methods to address selection bias
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The SHG studies also find evidence of increased employment for SHG members 
(NABARD 2005a, Apmas 2009, Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002). Apmas (2009) reports 
that half of participants benefit from “more” employment and Puhazhendi and 
Badatya (2002) report an average 34 percent increase in a household’s person-days 
of work (from 303 to 405). Notably, in the case of the Apmas (2009) study nearly 60 
percent of the increase in employment is attributed to increased activity in animal 
husbandry. All three studies report very positive impact from SHG membership on 
employment creation. However, all three of these studies rely on relatively weak 
research design and again demonstrate the importance of weighing study context 
and design when evaluating study findings. The studies rely on a cross-sectional 
survey with participant recall of their pre-participation circumstances. Finally, in 
NABARD (2005a) and Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) the sponsor (NABARD) of 
the SHG program under assessment (SBLP) is also the sponsor of the study. In the 
case of Apmas 2009, the study evaluated the quality and impact of the NGO 
MYRADA’s self-help affinity groups (SAGs) and the team conducting the fieldwork 
included representatives of both MYRADA and Apmas. The composition of research 
teams may influence clients’ willingness to give candid answers regarding program 
impact. 
 
Few studies report decreases in poverty rates among SHG members. Two 
exceptions are Apmas (2009) and Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002). Both studies 
estimate impressive rates of poverty alleviation. Apmas (2009) asserts 94 percent of 
its sample respondents moved to a higher income category, with the percentage of 
poor or very poor clients decreasing from 83.3 to 11.6 percent of the sample. 
Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) report a more modest 13 percent decrease in the 
percentage of respondents below the poverty line. However, while the SHG studies 
find some evidence of poverty alleviation as well as increased work and increased 
income the evidence is not overwhelming given the context and design of the studies 
reporting the most positive impacts. 
 
SHG studies report more compelling economic benefit in the area of asset 
accumulation (Deininger & Liu 2009a, Deininger & Liu 2009b, NABARD 2005a, 
Apmas 2009, Reij 2009, Swain & Wallentin 2009). Deininger and Liu (2009a) report 
significant and positive impacts on non-financial asset accumulation while Swain and 
Wallentin (2009) find positive impacts on assets hold for various definitions of 
assets.56 Findings suggest the primary mechanism for asset accumulation is 
livestock acquisition and savings. Length of membership has a positive impact on 
savings (significant at the 10 percent level) and livestock (at the 5 percent level). 
Other studies confirm the significant contribution of livestock acquisition to asset 
accumulation (NABARD 2005a, Apmas 2009, Garikipati 2008). Swain and Wallentin 
(2009) further find the length of SHG membership has a negative and significant 
impact on agricultural income (at 5 percent level), reporting a fall in agricultural 
income of 27 percent but a rise in other income of 65 percent. The evidence thus 
                                            
56 Swain & Wallentin (2009) applied a pipeline approach to mitigate the bias introduced by 
self-selection. A group of “old” clients, “new” clients and non-clients were interviewed to 
assess the impact of SHG membership (as well as duration of membership) against a set of 
financial and non-financial assets. The study found SHG membership had a significant and 
positive impact on gross assets and net assets (gross assets minus recent liabilities) and 
gross assets less SHG savings (significant at 5 percent level).  Deininger and Liu (2009b) find 
an 8 percent increase in consumption for households in treatment areas but do not find any 
significant impact on income or asset accumulation in their study of the longer-term impacts 




suggests that SHG participation facilitates diversification of incomes away from 
agriculture and asset accumulation through savings and livestock.  
 
Swain and Wallentin’s (2009) findings on the economic benefits of SHG participation 
are positive overall but more measured than findings from less reliable studies. For 
instance, in the widely cited study sponsored by NABARD (Puhazendi & Badataya 
2002), researchers find a 30 percent return on assets and increases in total income 
compared with a 15 percent return on assets with no impact on total income in the 
Swain and Wallentin (2009) study. Length of membership also did not significantly 
impact income, business profits, or total expenditures. Swain and Wallentin (ibid.) 
suggest the less impressive results on income and more favourable findings for 
longer-term outcomes such as assets points SHGs’ limited short-term impact but a 
favourable long term impact. In a report based on the same dataset as Swain and 
Wallentin (2009), Swain and Varghese (2009b) look more closely at the impact of 
training (skills development and human capital) on assets. Results suggest training 
does not create an additional impact on asset accumulation but can reverse the 
potentially negative effect of credit on income. Notably, training positively affects 
income most when delivered by NGOs who form (but do not finance) SHGs. 
 
Like Swain and Wallentin (2009), Garikipati (2008) also finds evidence of income 
diversification. Garikipati’s study attempts to deconstruct the economic impact on 
households from the impact on women’s empowerment.57 Economic impact is 
measured through a set of four vulnerability indicators as well as a composite 
vulnerability indicator. The four vulnerability indicators were measures of drought-
related vulnerability, livelihood diversification, entrepreneurial behaviour, and 
investment in and access to social capital. Garikipati (2008) finds a strong positive 
relationship between SHG membership and decreases in overall household 
vulnerability as well as livelihood diversification (both significant at a the 1 percent 
level). Garikipati’s (2008) findings suggest decreased household vulnerability occurs 
through the purchase of non-financial assets, specifically livestock. Resistance to 
drought-related vulnerability was also significantly and positively impacted by SHG 
participation (at the 5 percent level). The results suggest that as the length of 
program participation increases the probability of the household coping with a 
drought and diversifying incomes increases.  
 
Economic benefits appear most often to be characterized by consumption smoothing 
and livelihood diversification with a possible decline in household vulnerability. This is 
consistent with studies on loan use, which find very few loans (one in five in 
Hyderabad (Sa-Dhan 2009)) are used to create new enterprises (Gadenne & 
Vasudevan 2007, Kalpana 2008).  Rather, loans are used for consumption purposes 
and as working capital in existing household enterprises.  As discussed above, 
livestock purchase has been found to explain asset accumulation and resulting 
livelihood diversification and reduced vulnerability.   
5.2.3 Findings: social well-being 
SHG studies also evaluate the potential impact of SHG participation on the social 
well-being of members. Social metrics include measures of health and nutritional 
status, education, social and cultural resources, and empowerment measures. 
Empowering women is a primary aim of microfinance from the perspective of many 
proponents and promoters of microfinance globally including SHGs in India. Unlike 
poverty alleviation, nearly all of the SHG impact studies include empowerment as an 
                                            
57 The study conducts a panel household survey in 2001 and 2002 in one district of Andhra 
Pradesh. Households with a participant were surveyed along with households with an eligible 
non-participant for comparison. 
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outcome of interest. However findings regarding empowerment are difficult to 
compare, not least because of the range of observed variables used as proxies of 
empowerment.  
 
Eyben et al. (2008, p. 3) conceptualizes empowerment as a process that occurs 
when individuals or groups are able to imagine their world differently and then to 
realize that vision by changing adverse power relations. Thus the empowerment 
process includes achieving “power within” and “power with.” The AIMS project 
constructed a framework for identifying four pathways of impact on individual 
microfinance clients and in particular women all with relevance to empowerment 
(Chen 1997, p. 4). Material impacts occur as clients gain access and control over 
resources within the household portfolio, increase their earning capacity and incomes 
and fulfil basic material needs. Cognitive impacts occur when clients experience 
increased knowledge, skills and awareness through the process of participation. 
Material and cognitive impacts can contribute to perceptual changes in individual 
clients wherein clients experience increased levels of self-esteem, confidence, 
positive changes in their vision of the future and a heightened sense of respect for 
themselves and from others. Finally, material, cognitive and perceptual impacts 
contribute to relational changes. Relational impacts suggest changes in the social 
mores governing relationships within and outside the household. Clients gain greater 
power in decision-making, enhanced bargaining capacity and political participation 
and increased mobility. Thus empowerment, while primarily conceptualized as 
requiring perceptual and relational changes, has material and cognitive aspects. 
Empowerment also has relevance in social, political, and economic spheres of life 
although economic empowerment does not inevitably lead to empowerment in the 
political and social spheres (Eyben et al. 2008). 
 
One useful way to group empowerment indicators is in terms of psycho-social and 
relational aspects of empowerment. Psycho-social indicators include measures of 
confidence, self-esteem, self-efficacy, assertiveness and awareness and roughly 
encompass perceptual and cognitive impacts discussed by Chen (1997). Relational 
aspects of empowerment focus on intra-household dynamics including changes in a 
member’s decision-making role, access to family resources, and ownership of 
income and assets and correspond with Chen’s (ibid.) relational impacts (as well as 
overlapping somewhat with the material impacts).  Relational aspects of 
empowerment also measure a member’s ability and efficacy when challenging and 
changing allocation of power and resources within the broader community. Common 
indicators measure women’s mobility and participation within the community and 
public life. The psycho-social and relational categories will be used to discuss SHG 
studies’ findings on empowerment below. 
 
Empowerment: Psycho-social  
The most consistent positive empowerment findings measure psycho-social 
empowerment and including self-reports of increased self-confidence, self-esteem or 
ability to deal with problems (MYRADA 2002, Tesoriero 2006, Gaihi 2006a, Reji 
2009, Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002, Apmas 2009, Moyle et al. 2006). A high 
percentage of surveyed SHG members consistently report to evaluators an 
increased sense of confidence in their ability to interact with people, institutions and 
adversities compared with before SHG participation. The finding is consistent across 
different approaches to its measurement. Moyle et al. (2006) used well-established 
multi-item scales of self-efficacy, self-esteem and proactive attitude.58 Apmas (2009) 
                                            
58 Moyle et al. (2006) concluded positive findings from all measures; however, the basis of her 
conclusions is unclear. The study does not compare scores with scores representing before 
program participation or with non-participants. Moyle et al. (2006) assesses psycho-social 
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asks respondents to report their level of confidence engaging in specific activities 
such as writing their name or approaching a bank. For instance, the data shows that 
the percentage of women who could sign their names increased from 38.3 percent at 
group formation to 86.7 percent at the time of the survey. The latter approach 
provides for empowerment indicators that are specific and measurable and clearly 
linked with program participation.  
 
Empowerment: relational at intra-household level 
The relational aspects of empowerment address whether SHG participation 
successfully mobilizes women to challenge and change existing social norms both 
within households and in the community. Unlike the consistent findings on psycho-
social empowerment, findings related to relational empowerment are more divergent 
and ambiguous. A number of the cross-sectional studies relying on recall for 
comparison purposes test for changes in intra-household power relationships by 
asking about women’s decision-making role; access to family resources; and/or 
ownership and control over assets, income, and loans (Puhazhendi & Badataya 
2002, Reji 2009, Gaiha & Nandhi 2007). Most SHG members report an improved and 
significant role in household decision-making. Puhazhendi and Badataya (2002) 
report that the percentage of households with joint decision making on purchases of 
household assets and investments grew form 39 percent before SHG participation to 
74 percent. However, Gaiha and Nandhi (2007), which also finds that the majority of 
women report joint-decision making, questions whether women candidly answer 
questions about household decision making.  
 
Garikipati’s (2008) study demonstrates the importance of looking carefully at intra-
household dynamics in assessing impact on women’s empowerment. The study 
examines seven measures of empowerment: ownership of household assets and 
incomes, control over minor finances, control over major finances, say in household 
decisions, work-time allocation, division of domestic chores and a composite 
empowerment measure. Garikipati finds a significant and positive impact from SHG 
membership on ownership of household assets (significant at the 10 percent level).  
However, SHG membership has a significant and negative impact on control over 
major and minor finances, work-time allocation and overall empowerment (all 
significant at the 10 percent level except for work-time allocation, which is significant 
at the 5 percent level).  
 
Taken together with Garikipati’s (2008) findings on the impact of SHG membership 
on household economic status (evaluated through measures of vulnerability and 
discussed in the previous section), the findings suggest that SHG membership 
benefits the household but negatively impacts the women’s relative status in the 
household.  In nearly 80 percent of cases, loans were used for consumption 
purposes or to enhance or create assets controlled by male household members. 
Only 20 percent of loans were used in enterprises that women managed or helped to 
manage.  When loans were diverted to enhance male-owned assets or enterprises, 
women had to rely on their own earnings to repay the loan, leading women away 
from work on family farms or within households towards low wage work.  
 
Qualitative studies confirm the importance of intra-household dynamics in assessing 
empowerment. Leach and Sitaram (2002) visited 20 women over six to eight months 
to record changes resulting from participation in a program that provided credit along 
with business and technical training. (The program trained women to enter the silk-
                                                                                                                             
well-being at the point of the study and then triangulates the results with questions to 
participants about whether this represent an improvement compared with pre-program levels. 
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reeling industry in Karnataka, a traditionally male-dominated sector). The study found 
that while the women gained business awareness and skills they did not achieve 
economic independence.  The program caused friction within the household and men 
often successfully sabotaged women’s enterprises. 
 
Holvoet (2005) provides the most focused examination of decision-making.59 The 
findings present a more positive picture of the effects of SHG participation on a 
women’s position within the household. Using a structured survey, Holvoet asked 
about seven topics: loan use, expenditures, money management, time and task 
allocation, kinship and family matters, agricultural business, and cottage industry. For 
each topic, the member was given several specific situations and asked who made 
the decision, rather than asking generic questions about typical behaviour. Holvoet 
(ibid.) found that SHG membership did impact decision-making patterns, shifting it 
away from male decision making toward more joint and female decision making 
though only when financial intermediation is combined with social intermediation. 
Longer-term group membership and more intensive group training and interactions 
intensify these patterns. Holvoet (ibid.) found no shift in decision-making patterns 
among group members who borrow directly from banks without any social 
intermediation. Likewise, Swain and Varghese (2009a) found positive results on 
women’s empowerment from SHG participation. Using measures spanning intra-
household and community-level empowerment, the study finds a significant changes 
over time for SHG members but not for the control group (significant at a 1 percent 
level). Survey questions asked about the nature of economic activity, control over 
independent savings, decision-making role within the household and reactions to 
hypothetical scenarios of abuse within the family.60  
 
Empowerment: Relational at community level 
Relational indicators of empowerment extend outside the household to the 
community level as well and relate to a women’s ability to challenge and change 
social norms. Common indicators measure mobility (freedom to go to health clinics, 
markets etc. without asking male members of the household for permission), 
awareness of rights and participation in political activity. As with aspects of intra-
household empowerment, findings from the SHG studies in this area are sometimes 
ambiguous, contradictory and are likely to be sensitive to different measures. 
 
In Tesorioro (2006), increased mobility (the ability to travel from the home or village 
and the ability to travel to the bank) was the top answer from SHG members when 
asked for the biggest change in their lives resulting from SHG membership. 
Puhazendi and Badatya (2002) also reports increases in the percentage of women 
with enhanced mobility from SHG participation. Tesorioro (2006) further finds 
increased involvement in the community by SHG members. Every SHG group in his 
                                            
59 Holvoet (2005) selected programs operating in similar villages and cities and targeting the 
same socio-economic strata and were similar on all aspects expect those for which the study 
intended to test. The study compared two credit programs, one with social intermediation and 
one without and compared client outcomes. The first program, the Integrated Rural 
Development Program (IRDP), did not involve SHG groups or social intermediation by an 
NGO. The second program, the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development Programme (TNWDP) 
offered credit services through women’s group and was NGO facilitated. Rido and MYRADA 
facilitated the TNWDP groups involved in the study. Holvoet included ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
MYRADA group members to compare the impact of social intermediation on decision-making 
over time. 
60 Swain and Varghese (2009a) also measured community-level metrics including awareness 




sample reports some type of social or community–based action beyond the credit 
and saving function of the SHG. Seventy-two percent of women report providing 
some kind of assistance to their village, 60 percent report participating in the 
Panachayat, and 56 percent indicate involvement in social action programs.  
Tesororio (ibid.) concludes that SHGs are an effective tool for empowerment and the 
challenging and changing of the conventional allocation of resources and power. 
Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) also find that large percentages of SHG members 
become involved in community activities, in particular protests. MYRADA (2002) 
reports SHGs’ community-based activities are most often related to village 
infrastructure (31 percent), education (30 percent) and social problems or issues (18 
percent).  
 
While the evidence seems to suggest that SHG participation increases levels of 
mobility and community action, it is not clear whether the activities measured 
represent empowerment as defined by Eyben et al. (2008). That is, while women 
may have increased voice in certain arenas it is not clear that the allocation of power 
and resources is being substantively challenged. MYRADA (2002) reports that 63 
percent of new SHG members and 49 percent of members in older groups indicate 
they have never had a role in the village-level decisions. Further the independence, 
quality and efficacy of the actions undertaken are not clear in the studies. Community 
activities may be explicitly or tacitly required as part of SHG membership, motivated 
or driven by the SHG promotion agency.  
 
Other social impacts  
Only a few studies consider impacts on nutritional status, health and education. 
Deininger and Liu (2009a, 2009b) find a positive and significant impact on nutritional 
intake. The effect was most pronounced for the poor and poorest of the poor 
households, possibly indicative of the way poorer households are likely to spend 
loans: on consumption and purchase of basic necessities rather than for productive 
purposes. 
 
Mohindra et al. (2008) focused on the possible influence of participation on women’s 
health through the social determinants of health.61 They find no association between 
SHG participation and exposure to health risks or self-assessment of health, but do 
find that people living in a household without a participant are more likely to face 
health exclusion than several categories of participant. They also find early joiners 
are less likely to report emotional stress and poor life satisfaction than non-members. 
 
SHG participation can impact education in at least two ways. Loans or income 
generated from increased productivity resulting from loans may be used to pay 
school fees and thereby increase school enrolment for children in the household. 
Alternatively, SHGs may impact the literacy of members themselves. Educational 
impacts are not a primary focus in the SHG studies; however, a few of the cross-
sectional studies report education-related impacts (NABARD 2005a, Apmas 2009, 
NABARD n.d.). Two report increased literacy as formerly illiterate members learn to 
read and write their names. Apmas (2009) also reports an increase in SHG 
members’ children attending higher education. 
 
                                            
61 The measures of health achievement include two measures of self-assessed health and 
two measures of mental health. Measures of health determinants include exclusion to health 





Several SHG studies consider heterogeneous impact based on the type of linkage 
between the SHG group and financial institution. Linkage types include: 1) linkage of 
SHGs directly to a bank, 2) linkage to a bank via NGO facilitation and 3) SHGs 
promoted by NGOs that also directly provide credit. Studies find impacts that differ 
with linkage type. Swain and Varghese (2009a, 2009b) find evidence that NGO 
involvement improves outcomes for SHG members. When facilitation includes 
training, linkage type three has a positive and significant impact on asset creation (at 
the 5 percent level) and direct linkage of SHGs to banks has a negative and 
significant impact on asset creation (at a 10 percent level) when compared with the 
impact of linkage type two.  Holvoet (2005) also found social intermediation 
contributes positively to impacts. Participation in SHGs with social intermediation 
shifted decision-making patterns from male-dominated patterns to more joint and 
female decision-making models.  
 
Negative impacts 
Very few studies explicitly explore any negative impacts that may result from SHG 
participation. Three studies refer to the burden of extra work and responsibility 
created by SHG participation (Moyle et al. 2006, Gaiha & Nandhi 2007, MYRADA 
2002). In Gaiha and Nandhi’s (2007) study 52 percent of SHG members reported 
working additional hours due to SHG membership and 48 percent reported greater 
responsibilities.  MYRADA (2002) refers specifically to the additional workload of 
SHG-related activities but asserts they do not prove too burdensome for members. 
 
 Garikipati (2008, p. 2621) finds potentially negative impacts in her exploration of the 
“impact-paradox” wherein lending to women has contributed to consumption 
smoothing, income diversification and decreased vulnerability to external shocks but 
has failed to empower women. As discussed in the above section on empowerment 
findings, although women often do not control the proceeds of the loan or the 
additional income generated from its productive investment, they do generally bear 
the responsibility for the repayment of the loan. This creates a burden without benefit 
for individual women. Gaiha (2006a) also finds that women most often bear the 
responsibility for loan repayment even while having at best partial control over 
selection of assets purchased by the loan. The potential damage from this paradox 
extends beyond a failure to empower women and the burden of additional work. 
Women’s status within the household can be damaged if inability to repay a loan 
forces the sale of a household asset or creates other hardship for the household. 
Additionally, even when women successfully repay loans the failure to change intra-
household power relations means that SHG participation can reproduce and increase 
existing inequalities within the household (Garikipati 2008). The resource inequality 
between the SHG member and male household members can increase as women 
access loans and bear the burden of loan repayment while men control the income 
and assets derived from its investment.  
 
Pattendon (2010) finds similarly disturbing patterns of inequality reproduction and 
intensification in his study of whether SHG participation leads to redistribution of 
resources or wealth. He finds that while SHG participation provides marginal 
economic benefit for wealthier SHG members, poor SHG members receive no 
material benefit from participation. Inequalities present at the outset of SHG 
formation mean that the wealthy SHG members are positioned to benefit the most 
from the interest on lending of intra-group savings. They also borrow most of the 
money provided by bank linkage and since they can both meet their basic needs and 
borrow larger amounts they are more likely to use loans for productive purposes. 
Poor SHG members borrow small amounts that are more likely to be used for 
consumption purposes and result in little economic advantage. Thereby, the situation 
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of poor households is not substantially improved through SHG membership, while 
wealthier SHG members are benefited, reinforcing and intensifying inequalities.  
Further, Pattendon found wealthier members lend group savings to poor households 
outside the group at interest rates comparable to moneylenders, creating another 
mechanism whereby the SHG essentially reinforces existing inequalities in resource 
access and power. 
 
The above findings suggest the importance of understanding how SHGs interact with 
existing power structures (both within the household and community) to either 
change the allocation of resources and power or reinforce and even intensify the 
institutions and norms that support existing power structures. In particular, the 
findings suggest that impacts need to be considered within the context in which they 
are produced and reproduced. Measuring economic empowerment only on a 
household level or SHG-level masks intra-group dynamics. Narrow methodologies 
generally fail to uncover not only important differential impacts but also the processes 
by which those impacts are occurring.  
 
5.3 Other studies 
 
Just over half of the studies (28) found through the systematic review of literature on 
the impact of financial services for the rural poor focus explicitly on the SHG model of 
savings and credit delivery. The other half (26) is a set of more diverse set of studies. 
They fall into three broad categories. First there are a set of studies (ten) that focus 
on the impact of microfinance on the rural poor but do not explicitly reference the 
SHG model of delivery (for convenience they will be referred to as the microfinance 
studies). Two key studies in this category are based on data from a large-scale 
investigation of microfinance delivery through MFIs sponsored by the Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) (SIDBI 2008, Imai et al. 2010). The 
other eight studies in this category focus on various government and NGO-promoted 
microenterprise programs.   
 
The second set of studies (nine) in this set of studies do not address the impact of 
specific microfinance models, programs or organizations, rather they address the 
impact of access to or use of credit generally in relationship to a particular outcome 
of interest. For example, one study found borrowing to be a key coping strategy for 
41 percent of households following a natural disaster (Sawada 2007). Another study 
found that in households without access to adequate credit the time allocation of 
children was negatively impacted, including a reduction by 60 percent of time spent 
at school (Sawada et al. 2006). The third and final set of studies in this group (seven) 
focuses on the impact of micro insurance. All of the studies of micro insurance found 
in the systematic review focus on health insurance. Five  of the seven studies focus 
on health insurance provided by SEWA in Ahmedebad, Gujarat and the surrounding 
rural areas.  
 
The remainder of the chapter will focus primarily on the ten (non-SHG) microfinance 
studies and present only summaries of the remaining studies, focused on credit 
access/constraint and micro insurance. The following section (Section 5.3.1) 
summarizes the methodological approaches (Table 5.4) and discusses the findings 
of the microfinance studies. Section 5.3.2 presents the summary of studies where 
access/constraint of credit is found to be a determinant (Table 5.5). Finally, Section 
5.3.3 presents a summary (Table 5.6) of micro insurance studies, touching very 
briefly on their primary indicators and the nature of findings. 
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5.3.1 Other microfinance studies 
The methodological approaches vary widely. As with the SHG studies, the non-SHG 
microfinance studies generally choose quantitative approaches but use relatively 
weak research design and analysis approaches. Four of the ten microfinance studies 
rely on cross-sectional surveys with before and after comparisons made based on 
participant recall. The strongest quantitative research design is found in the SIDBI 
studies.  
 





The studies in this category refer to a diverse set of context-specific microfinance 
programs and their findings may not be appropriately considered in the aggregate. 
For example, Swendeman et al. (2009) studies the Sonagachi Project, a multi-
faceted STD/HIV prevention program with a credit (cooperative) component. The 
findings can be broadly categorized however. Most studies focus on economic 
outcomes, including income, savings, consumption, employment, and poverty status 
(Basu & Basu 2003, Kaushik 1996, Mitra 2007, NABARD 2005b, Ramakrishnappa & 
Jagannatha Rao 2006, Swendeman et al. 2009). The findings are largely positive in 
these studies; however, they generally suffer from relatively weak research design.  
 
The most compelling (and methodologically rigorous) of the microfinance studies are 
based on data from a seven-year national longitudinal investigation of MFI-delivered 
microfinance initiated by SIDBI in 2001 (SIDBI 2008, Imai et al. 2010). The 
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complemented the survey with focus groups, case studies and semi-structured 
interviews. SIBDI (2008) reports findings from baseline and end line surveys of 
randomly-selected MFI clients and non-clients. The study refers to baseline versus 
end line comparisons made for each group as well as comparison between the two 
groups at end line with some tests for significance. Despite the apparently rich 
dataset, reported results rely heavily on before/after comparisons for the client group 
based on tabulations. The study finds increases between the baseline and end line 
on nearly all indicators. Imai et al. (2010) uses the SIBDI baseline client and non-
client data. The study uses a multi-dimensional welfare indicator (IBR-Index-Based-
Ranking) and finds that access to and use of productive loans from MFIs has a 
significant and positive effect on welfare. Benefits were larger for clients above the 
poverty line and in rural areas.   
 
It is interesting to note that despite the importance of MFIs as a delivery model for 
microfinance in rural India, the SIBDI studies (SIBDI 2008, Imai et al. 2010) 
represented the only substantial study of the impact of MFI services on the social 
and economic well-being of the rural poor in India found in the systematic review. 
This is in contrast to a fair number of studies (although many of relatively weak 
design) found on SHG-based microfinance delivery. This disparity may be a 
consequence of the more commercial orientation of MFIs, which generates less 
demand among funders and practitioners for studies of beneficiary-level social and 
economic impacts. One consequence is a limited ability to compare the outcomes of 
the two primary models of microfinance delivery in India. The SHG studies provide 
limited evidence suggesting that social intermediation, such as that often provided by 
NGOs in the SHG model, improves outcomes for clients, however the evidence is to 
limited and indirect to draw broad conclusions about the performance of the SHG 




5.3.2 Credit access/constraint as determinant 
Although microfinance plays a role in creating access to credit, the nine studies 
summarized in Table 5.5 are not focused on the impact of microfinance specifically 
and as such are somewhat peripheral to the aim of the systematic review. Rather the 
primary focus of the studies is an outcome that may or may not be affected by 
access to credit such as non-farm employment or incomes, aspects of farm 
productivity (Micevaska & Rahut 2008, Sarkar 2007, Sharma 2007, Subash et al. 
2004, Toor & Sidhu 2006), allocation of maternal labour and child’s time (Fuwa et al. 
2009, Sawada et al. 2006) and coping strategies after a natural disaster (Sawada 
2007). Credit access/constraint is only one of many possible determinants under 
consideration in the studies. As a result, a certain bias or arbitrariness may exist in 
the set of studies that emerged from the systematic review and conclusions about 
the impact of credit access/constraints cannot be made. Because credit is not the 
primary focus, only studies that reference credit access/constraint in the title, 
abstract, or keywords are likely to have been found. This may result in a bias towards 
studies that find credit to be significant determinant. Only one study mentions credit 
as insignificant to its outcome, in this case as a measure of farm productivity (Subash 
et al. 2004).   
 
Table 5.5: Summary of studies on credit access/constraint as determinant 
 
 
5.3.3 Micro insurance studies 
The final set of studies focuses on micro insurance and are summarized in Table 5.6 
below. These studies have a narrow focus institutionally and in terms of indicators 
measured, however the methodology is relatively rigorous when compared with other 
groups of studies. Five of the seven studies focus on the health insurance scheme of 
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insurance studies are, first, hospital admission rates, which are meant to increase as 
an indication of increased use of health services by insured clients. The second 
impact sought is financial protection measured either through fewer rates of 
“impoverishing” hospitalizations or reduced out of pocket payments. The results of 
studies are mixed.  
 






This chapter discusses the results of a systematic review of impact studies of 
microfinance in India. It discusses the impact of microfinance on users as reported by 
published studies but more fundamentally seeks to address the nature, quality and 
quantity of impact assessment through a discussion of the types of indicators used 
and how they are assessed. The results of the systematic review demonstrate that 
the most frequent subject of published Indian impact studies is the SHG model of 
microfinance provision, particularly the bank-linkage programs promoted by 
government agencies and institutional donors like NABARD and the World Bank. 
Predictably, those institutional promoters are also the most frequent source of impact 
studies (either through funding, collaborating or acting as actual evaluators for the 
study). The prominence of institutional promoters is consistent with the role formal 
impact assessment plays guiding policy-making as well as the imperative of public 
sector organizations to provide evidence justifying their investments in microfinance 
programs. The relative emphasis on the SHG rather than MFI model of microfinance 
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social goals and beneficiary self-reliance relative to organizational self-reliance when 
compared with the MFI model. 
 
One consequence of the preponderance of donor-driven SHG studies, however, is 
that the evidence on the impact of microfinance is somewhat narrowly focused. The 
evidence does not, for instance, provide much scope for comparison of models, 
whether between MFI and SHG models or between SBLP SHGs and non-SBLP 
SHGs. The quantity (or more precisely organizational/programmatic breadth) of 
studies is further narrowed when taking into consideration the number of impact 
studies that are linked to the same datasets produced by a small set of larger 
investigations. Both of these factors limit the scope for generalizing findings to the 
Indian microfinance sector more broadly. A second consequence of the nature of 
impact studies is that NGO-MFOs are not particularly visible in the literature. Only a 
handful of impact studies identify the relevant NGO-MFOs. Although NGO-MFOs are 
involved heavily in microfinance provision, including as facilitators in bank-linkage 
programs, the focus of impact studies is generally at the program rather than 
organizational level and most impact studies do not address the impact (or 
effectiveness) of NGO-MFOs directly, another aspect in which the impact 
assessment approach is somewhat narrowly construed. 
 
Impact studies generally utilize quantitative methodology and survey-based methods. 
However, the majority of studies are small-scale studies using research designs (in 
terms of sampling, comparison and analysis) not considered particularly rigorous by 
the standards of quasi-experimental design. As expected, the largest scale and most 
methodologically rigorous studies were promoted by the most well-resourced 
promoters, such as the World Bank, SIDBI and NABARD. The pairing of quantitative 
methodology with limited adherence to standards of scientific rigor may reflect 
resource constraints. It may also reflect the primary purpose of the studies. 
Institutional promoters may have proving goals, to which a quantitative approach is 
naturally suited, but also certainly have legitimizing goals, that is the need to justify 
investments in microfinance promotion. Selection of research design (particularly in 
the case of some of the NABARD studies) may reflect a ‘good enough’ approach 
chosen based on its capacity to convincingly demonstrate the positive aspects of the 
program as perceived by its promoters. As discussed throughout the chapter, 
although the findings suggest positive benefits from microfinance, particularly 
through asset accumulation and in terms of psycho-social empowerment, findings 
are mixed. Some studies report dramatic and overwhelmingly positive impacts and 
research design and purpose must be considered when evaluating the quality of 
evidence produced by these studies and the impact studies overall. 
 
The following two chapters address social performance management within NGO-
MFOs, reporting on the empirical findings from the second stage of the research, the 
case studies. They discuss social performance management and assessment 
systems as well as organizational characteristics providing their context. Chapter 6 
reports on relevant internal characteristics; Chapter 7 presents findings on external 
relationships affecting social performance management as well as discussing the 




Chapter 6: Case Study Findings: Internal Characteristics 
 
This chapter reports findings from the two organizational case studies conducted in 
Tamil Nadu, India. The case study organizations are both indigenous NGOs with a 
strong social orientation that are involved in microfinance provision. The case study 
goal was to understand how NGO-MFOs manage their social performance 
particularly in the context of sectorial trends, including the press towards rapid growth 
and commercialization, which, in India, ultimately culminated in a microfinance crisis 
in 2010. The case studies look at social performance management and assessment 
systems but also more broadly at the organizational landscape which provides the 
orientation, context and scope for performance management and assessment.  
 
Case study findings are reported over two chapters. This chapter introduces the two 
case study organizations and presents findings on the organization’s internal 
characteristics including mission, organizational leadership, organizational culture, 
structure and human resources.  Chapter 7 will present findings on the organization’s 
external relationships and SPA. Section 6.1 will introduce the first case study 
organization, ASSEFA, and discuss its internal characteristics and Section 6.2 will do 
the same for the second case study organization, CRUSADE.  
 
6.1 ASSEFA62  
6.1.1 Background: Historical View 
ASSEFA traces its beginnings to the Bhoodan land movement initiated by Vinoba 
Bhave in 1951. In the 14 years following its initiation, Vinoba Bhave’s Padayatra 
across India collected nearly four million acres of land and distributed it to landless 
farmers. Cooperatives formed and distributed loans from the government to help 
Bhoodan land allottees reclaim and irrigate donated land, much of which was arid 
and of poor quality. Despite these efforts some allottees, lacking the knowledge, 
skills, and confidence to make the land productive, felt ready to abandon the land. In 
this context a retired Italian philosophy professor and peace activist inspired by the 
land-gift movement, Giovanni Ermiglia, arrived in India. Professor Ermiglia met S. 
Loganathan, who was connected to the Bhoodan movement in the state of Tamil 
Nadu and the two partnered to form Bhoodan cooperatives named Sarva Seva 
Farms.  
 
Sarva Seva Farms helped allottees work collectively, sharing resources and 
manpower, to make the Bhoodan land productive. The first Sarva Seva farm was 
established at Sevalur in the Ramnad district of Tamil Nadu in 1968. A total of 70 
acres were made productive in the project through collective effort and with technical 
and managerial support provided to the farmers. Based on its success, the first 
project was replicated in other areas. Ten years later Sarva Seva Farm projects 
covered 79,000 acres, 364 Bhoodan families, and five districts. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s ASSEFA’s approach evolved as large adjacent 
tracks of Bhoodan lands became more difficult to find and pressure grew to include 
non-Bhoodan allottees. ASSEFA concluded that working only with Bhoodan allottees 
                                            
62 ASSEFA has promoted approximately 155 independent organizations including nine 
education trusts, five dairy companies, two NBFCs, one technical support company, two 
housing companies, one action research company, over 110 trusts comprised of federated 
SHGs, and trusts for other federated activity groups. Unless otherwise noted ‘ASSEFA’ will 
refer to the entire family of ASSEFA affiliated organizations while ‘ASSEFA proper’ will be 
used when refering specifically to ASSEFA the parent organization. 
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was unnecessarily limiting and was not creating the harmonious village relationships 
idealized by Mohandas Gandhi and his follower Vinoba Bhave. The following years 
were a period of expansion and experimentation. ASSEFA began working with entire 
villages, first introducing a new approach based on Gramdan.63 Gramdan together 
with the maturing of existing project areas advanced expansion beyond land 
reclamation and cultivation to an integrated development approach that included 
complementary economic and social programs. ASSEFA informally sponsored its 
first school in 1978 and by 1983 established its first primary schools. In the early 
1980s ASSEFA also began promoting health care initiatives and organizing dairy 
groups whose federated structures ultimately promoted their own dairy companies, 
setting up chilling barns and processing facilities. During this period the name 
ASSEFA was adopted and work expanded into five states beyond Tamil Nadu.  
 
Overcoming farmers’ long-standing attachments to their land proved challenging and 
by the mid-1980s Gramdan and approaches based on collective ownership generally 
were abandoned due to resistance from villagers. ASSEFA continued working 
through people’s organizations toward Gram Swaraj and expanded and strengthened 
its integrated development approach.  
 
Credit provision was a natural and early facet of ASSEFA’s self-reliant philosophy. In 
the early days working with Bhoodan allottees ASSEFA expected farmers to pay 
back ASSEFA’s investment. In addition to promoting Gram Swaraj, repayment 
leveraged limited outside funds for the benefit of additional allottees. By 1978 
ASSEFA was pooling a village’s common resources in a Gram Kosh managed by the 
Gram Sabha and distributed on a revolving basis for income-generating purposes. 
The mechanism for revolving village resources became increasingly formalized over 
subsequent years. Beginning in 1985 village-level Nidhi Foundations were formed by 
representatives from a villages’ various activity groups to mobilize revolving funds to 
be dispersed on a credit basis. The Nidhi Foundations were federated at the area 
level two years later to pool and make available larger sums. In another two years 
ASSEFA promoted an apex organization, a community owned NBFC named Sarva 
Jana Seva Kosh (SJSK), primarily to provide better financial management for the 
Nidhi federations’ pooled funds. 
 
During the 1990s ASSEFA partnered with Tamil Nadu state government (specifically 
TNCDW) on its IFAD-supported SHG bank-linkage program called Mahalir Thittam, 
providing further momentum to the credit aspect of ASSEFA’s work (see Section 
3.4).  By the late 1990s disenchanted with the management and tone of the state-run 
program, particularly growing party political interference (discussed further below), 
ASSEFA prepared to withdraw from the partnership. It explored promoting an NBFC 
to support the nearly 4,000 women’s SHGs formed by 2000. At this point, SJSK 
could not easily become an NBFC as a crisis amongst NBFCs in the late 1990s 
made obtaining new licenses difficult. Rather in 2001 ASSEFA bought an existing but 
defunct NBFC from BASIX, Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited (SNFL).  
 
ASSEFA established SNFL as a community-owned and managed NBFC. SHGs 
were federated into Sarvodaya Mutual Benefit Trusts or SMBTs. The SMBTs (112 of 
113) became SNFL’s owners, holding 99 percent of SNFL shares. SMBTs raised 
membership fees from their member groups and pooled fees with groups’ existing 
rotating funds to capitalize SNFL. SHG group leaders represent members on the 
SNFL and SMBT boards. SNFL became the predominant mechanism of credit 
                                            
63 The Gramdan or “village-gift” approach required the major part of the village land be 
donated by at least 75 percent of villagers. The donated land was collectively managed (by 
the Gram Sabha) and cultivated for the benefit of the entire village. 
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provision for ASSEFA, providing credit exclusively to SHG members through the 
SMBTs (which were SNFL’s borrowers).64 The SMBT structure also became the 
principle avenue for organizing non-credit activities. The number of SHGs grew 
rapidly and as of March 2008 ASSEFA had over 32,000 functioning SHGs with over 
half a million members65.  
6.1.2 Background: Recent changes  
The 2010 microfinance crisis that began in Andhra Pradesh precipitated a 
reorganization of SNFL and reorientation for ASSEFA. Although the bulk of SNFL’s 
portfolio sourced from Tamil Nadu, SNFL suffered from banks’ post-crisis reluctance 
to lend to MFIs. The RBI regulations that followed in May and December of 2011 
placed an additional burden on SNFL.  SNFL was immediately non-compliant with 
the regulations in at least two key respects, the first regarding borrower identity and 
the other loan size. The RBI regulations require MFIs receiving priority sector lending 
to lend only to individuals, SHGs or joint liability groups and not intermediaries like 
the SMBTs.66 In SNFL’s model, the SMBTs were SNFL’s borrowers. SMBTs on-lent 
to the SHGs and SHGs kept their own account of the disbursements to and 
repayments by individual SHG members. The lending structure inevitably meant 
SNFL lent sums far greater than the Rs. 50,000 limit stipulated by the RBI 
regulations.  
 
To tackle the dual challenges of shrinking lendable funds and non-compliance with 
RBI rules SNFL undertook a major restructuring. Measures taken significantly altered 
the identity of SNFL as a community-owned and managed organization. First, to 
continue lending SNFL relied on other ASSEFA affiliated organizations. SJSK made 
a contribution of surplus funds to SNFL. A second affiliated organization also made a 
small loan of surplus funds. These contributions reduced the proportion of SBMT-
owned shares from over 99 percent to about 80 percent of total shares. SNFL also 
focused on their weekly loan product with its up-front interest payments to support 
cash flow and cut expenses, including withdrawing SNFL from states other than 
Tamil Nadu. Even with these measures SNFL’s asset size declined to one-third of its 
peak, disbursements dropped, and it operated at a loss (see Tables 6.1 to 6.4). A 
jump in write-offs reflected some repayment problems, although the write offs were 
more indicative of the strategy for righting SNFL than of a sudden or precipitous drop 
in repayments. SNFL made aggressive provisions in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 for 
                                            
64 SNFL offers five loan products. The product offerings were in transition as of April 2013. 
Two new products were being introduced: a new shorter-term weekly product was added to 
the existing 20-week loan. A new agricultural product was added to existing housing and 
livelihood loans, all three payable monthly and with a 10-month term. The two ‘eliminated’ 
products; both monthly products for the purchase of milch animals, will still be offered to 
individuals but indirectly through loans made to ASSEFA federations and dairy companies 
who then will on-lend to individuals. The largest loan size across products is Rs. 15,000 and 
loans are offered with a 13.5 percent flat interest rate (23.8 percent on a reducing balance for 
monthly loans and 25.7 percent on a reducing balance for weekly loans). The branch retains 
4.5 percent as a fee for services and SNFL receives 9 percent. The weekly loan has been the 
most popular loan and accounts for the bulk of SNFL’s portfolio.  
65 Over half of the SHGs, 17,240, were qualified and registered for membership in an SMBT. 
66 In 1972 the RBI formalized definitions of several “priority sectors”, including agriculture and 
small- and micro-scale enterprises, that were not likely to have adequate credit without a 
special dispensation. Shortly thereafter targets were set for commercial bank lending to these 
sectors. Sub-targets focus on the “weaker sections” within those sectors. Current targets 
require that 40 percent of commercial bank lending is to the priority sectors. Bank loans to 
MFIs count towards priority sector lending requirements as indirect finance given the MFIs 
meet certain requirements.  
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bad loans (applying standards that they were required to comply with only from 2013-
2014) in response to bank concerns over its level of overdues. 
 
 





















                                            
67 Data for tables 6.1 to 6.4 from MFI Report: SNFL, 19 September 2013 (MIX Market 2013); 
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Addressing RBI compliance required amending the organizational model to record 
individual loans rather than SMBT loans in SNFL’s books. To address this challenge, 
the SNFL board approved changes to the model in December 2011 and in February 
2012 SNFL did not lend as it established branches at 91 of 95 SMBT centres in 
Tamil Nadu. The newly formed SNFL branches began lending directly to individuals 
in March 2012. Eligible borrowers would not only include SHG members but also 
other individuals, many of whom had previously borrowed from SJSK.  
 
Restructuring necessarily shifted the relationships between SMBTs and SNFL. The 
role of the SMBT changed. While still the majority shareholders, the SMBTs no 
longer borrow from SNFL. The SMBT operates under a management and collection 
agreement with SNFL, retaining one-third of the loan interest as a fee for services. 
The fee covers SMBT expenses including the salaries of SMBT employees excluding 
the SMBT chairperson. The SMBT chairperson generally also acts as the SNFL 
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meant little change of leadership at SMBT centres as existing chairpersons were 
simply given the additional responsibility and title of branch manager; or addition of 
staff however, accountability has shifted towards SNFL relative to the SMBT. The 
biggest operational change for SMBTs (and SNFL) under the new system is each 
must now account in their books for every individual loan. Greater responsibility for 
the collection of late payments therefore falls on SMBT staff, particularly fieldworkers, 
rather than SHG group leaders as in the past.   
 
The RBI regulations tested the operational capacity of SNFL, specifically the 
capability of its MIS to meet RBI and industry association requirements to individually 
track loans and submit data to the credit bureau High Mark. The software SNFL used 
pre-crisis could not manage data on individual loans or loans with upfront collection 
interest such as with SNFL’s weekly loan product. Even the ‘new’ software adopted 
by branches (the new system was in place in Nattam branch as of April 2012) 
requires significant training to ingrain work-arounds necessary to include data 
required by the credit bureaus. In January 2013, SNFL started submitting data to 
High Mark and thus offering fresh loans based on credit reports rather than personal 
declarations. However as of April 2013, training was on-going to ensure branch staff 
understood how to enter data as only two branches had submitted data in completely 
perfect condition ready for submission to the credit bureau. 
 
The restructuring also altered the role of SJSK. After falling dormant in the early 
2000s, SJSK became a registered NBFC in 2006 and then in January 2007 resumed 
lending to individuals, mostly men, who did not belong to SHGs. SJSK distributed 
credit through a separate mutual benefit trust structure whose activities overlapped 
geographically with 80 of the SMBT centres. ASSEFA kept the two organizations 
separate to protect SNFL’s identity as an organization owned and operated by 
women’s SHGs. With the restructuring the redundancy was eliminated. SJSK 
became a wholesale lender, lending primarily to SNFL but potentially other ASSEFA-
affiliated organizations including federations. All retail lending activities merged under 
the new SNFL branches. 
 
SNFL’s restructuring affects ASSEFA most profoundly at the SHG level. Although 
ASSEFA has a long history of working with various configurations of people’s 
organizations, the SHG became the primary people’s organization over the last 20 
years. In project villages entered after 1990 SHGs often replaced Gram Sabhas as 
the principal grouping for accessing and mobilizing villagers. The restructuring 
undermines the cohesiveness and sustainability of SHGs. Although many groups still 
function informally, they have lost their strongest incentive to persist—their role in the 
lending process—and in most areas individual members can bypass groups in the 
application for and repayment of loans.  SNFL no longer insists on monthly group 
meetings and ASSEFA is looking for other ways to strengthen the social bonds 
between SHG members. This can be seen as part of a larger ‘weakening’ of the SHG 
movement within ASSEFA as well as the microfinance movement in India generally 
(see Section 3.3). ASSEFA’s current growth area is working with farmers, 
predominately men, who are outside the SHG movement and access credit primarily 
through their own federated structure. 
6.1.3 Mission 
The first microfinance organizations were NGOs organizing rural women into groups 
to provide small loans on better terms than local moneylenders. Early microfinance 
organizations joined cooperative, credit union, and commercial and state bank efforts 
to address the lack of affordable financial services for the rural poor. The missions of 
these early microfinance organizations were explicitly social: to use microfinance to 
improve the lives of poor rural women and often to use microfinance as a platform for 
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mobilizing to address other quality of life issues. In India, SHG promoters clearly 
conceptualized microfinance with a focus on women’s empowerment. As ASSEFA’s 
background illustrates, it was among those organizations that undertook 
microfinance early and with an explicitly social purpose.  
 
ASSEFA’s mission was discussed with the founder, senior managers of two key 
affiliated organizations (SARC and SNFL) and three mid-level (zonal) managers.68 
Table 6.1 displays respondents’ descriptions of organizational mission from interview 
transcripts and field notes. The respondents describe ASSEFA’s mission, although 
the manager of SNFL reports on the mission of SNFL specifically but with reference 
to its relationship with ASSEFA. Overall, understanding of mission is remarkably 
congruent over organizations, geography and hierarchy. Respondents identify 
income enhancement as a central element to ASSEFA’s mission as well as raising 
the social status of members, such as through health and education initiatives. 
Income and social enhancement is pursued through a community-based approach 
that motivates members to work together, build a stronger sense of community and 
enhance self-reliance. One notable difference between senior managers (ASSEFA 
proper and SARC) and the other managers is the former more readily emphasizes 
the entire community as ASSEFA’s target group while the latter emphasize benefit to 
poor and vulnerable individuals. This foreshadows a key and evolving tension in 
ASSEFA’s mission between the individual impacts (economic and social 
enhancement) and the community impacts (solidarity and self-reliance) to be 





                                            
68 The founder, Loganathan, is also the senior manager of ASSEFA proper. The other two 
senior managers (Kumar and Asokkumar) represent SARC (Sarvodaya Action Research 
Centre) and SNFL. SARC is ASSEFA’s research organization and works closely with 
ASSEFA proper on developing and evaluating new projects. Three of SNFL’s nine zonal 
managers were present at a group interview. They represent zones based from Arni, 
Tindivanam, and Melmaruvathur. 
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Table 6.1: ASSEFA/SNFL Mission 
 
Over time enthusiasm for microfinance expanded the variety and altered the nature 
of many microfinance organizations. Newer entrants to microfinance provision 
included commercial financial institutions drawn by demonstrations of microfinance’s 
potential profitability (Copestake 2007). An increasing number of existing 
microfinance organizations began transforming into regulated financial institutions to 
gain access to additional finance and fuel growth. The transformation of the 
microfinance landscape and the rapid growth it precipitated raised fears of mission 
drift for microfinance generally and individually among socially-oriented microfinance 
organizations. And indeed, a post hoc reflection on the Indian microfinance crisis 
points “first and foremost” to the actions of those “certain impatient players” who 
pursued fast growth and commercial considerations at the expense of social 
considerations, creating negative consequence for the entire sector. The evaluation 
further identifies standardized products, high interest rates, abusive recovery 
practices and over indebtedness as discreet issues contributing to the crisis, 
although these issues are symptomatic of the strategies of rapid growth and 
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ASSEFA respondents consistently report the mission of ASSEFA has held constant 
through the microfinance sector’s ups and downs although some of its approaches 
have evolved over the years. Arguably both a strong organizational culture rooted in 
Gandhian ideals and a charismatic founder/leader still at ASSEFA’s helm offer 
protection from mission drift. (Organizational leadership and culture are discussed in 
Sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 respectively.) Additionally, ASSEFA senior managers credit 
its community-based approach with protecting ASSEFA from mission drift. SARC’s 
senior manager, Kumar, observes many NGOs that adopted microfinance 
subsequently lost sight of their missions. But ASSEFA, he contends, “can’t” lose 
sight of its mission because they “follow the people.” He continues by noting credit is 
only one need and as needs change ASSEFA must respond.  
 
The founder and ASSEFA proper’s senior manager, Loganathan, reiterates 
ASSEFA’s commitment to following the people, describing ASSEFA as having “no 
agenda” although projects have goals. He compares ASSEFA to a post office that 
receives resources and then delivers them to their intended recipient, ostensibly one 
or more of the 150 or so affiliated organizations. He expresses no interest in 
ASSEFA receiving “cold money” lacking clear ownership and therefore 
accountability. Although the post office analogy clearly downplays ASSEFA’s strong 
role in strategic planning at the very least, it highlights the Gandhian philosophical 
stance in which ASSEFA managers act as trustees who empower local people in 
their own development by acting on the people’s expression of need and priority. The 
post office analogy also distances ASSEFA proper from the day-to-day operations 
managed by the more local and autonomous zonal managers.  
 
Community-owned microfinance models like ASSEFA’s  have indeed generally been 
found less susceptible to mission drift (Srinivasan 2013). In the first place, 
community-owned microfinance institutions (COMFIs) are largely promoted by 
socially-driven NGOs, like ASSEFA, to which growth and profits are incidental to 
performance of social missions. In the second place, the structure of COMFIs can 
protect from mission drift. As with ASSEFA most Indian COMFIs rely on group, 
principally SHG, methodology with a two- or three-tiered structure drawing from 
membership to fill leadership positions including board representatives. The client-
centric governance structure facilitates member participation, creates a feedback 
loop and establishes a mechanism for grievance resolution. COMFIs must maintain 
effective peer monitoring to avoid capture of resources and power by individual 
members but member ownership and governance can provide checks on the power 
of external stakeholders to change organizational goals and strategy.  
 
Microfinance's (and SNFL’s) subordinate position relative to ASSEFA also 
contributes to ASSEFA’s enduring sense of mission. SNFL’s senior manager, 
Asokkumar, reports its mission as supporting ASSEFA’s through its role of providing 
accessible and affordable loans. ASSEFA has a long history of using microfinance to 
promote self-reliance among community members. However, ASSEFA does not 
consider itself a microfinance organization and SNFL is treated as one part of 
ASSEFA’s whole. ASSEFA’s founder memorably expressed ASSEFA’s orientation 
relative to the modern microfinance movement and its associated trends when he 
said ASSEFA was doing microfinance before microfinance existed and will continue 
to do it after microfinance ceases to exist.  
 
The support role of SNFL means respondents did not generally consider the trade-
offs between social and financial performance as discussed in the microfinance 
literature relevant to ASSEFA. SNFL’s financial performance was regarded as 
important to the extent that it allowed SNFL to sustain its own activities and cross-
subsidize non-financial activities. The formation of SNFL coincided with an effort to 
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decrease ASSEFA’s dependence on international funding (Sundaresan & 
Chandrapaul 2008). Respondents did not, however, cite growth as an important 
driver of financial performance, reflecting ASSEFA’s emphasis on maximizing social 
performance subject to financial performance. As Asokkumar states, he sometimes 
engages in a type of “ideological debate” with other senior managers about the 
stringency with which recovery should be enforced. He argues, “...unless recovery is 
good, unless you are able to get loans from the bank, you are not going to have 
profit. If you don’t have profit then you can’t fund all these activities…Only when we 
are strong we can undertake such social actions. That’s what sometimes Mr. 
Loganathan also will tease me, you are an ex-banker so you are always focusing on 
this thing. And I tell him only then I can help you otherwise how can I help you.”  
 
Consistent with the embedded position of microfinance within ASSEFA and its 
mission, ASSEFA does not identity as a MFO. However, Kumar and Loganathan 
both repeatedly emphasize that ASSEFA is also not an NGO. Rather ASSEFA self-
identifies as a social movement. Viewing ASSEFA from its own perspective as a 
social movement adds further nuance to understanding its mission. Although social 
movements are generally viewed as diffuse collectives of individuals, Mayer Zald and 
his collaborators particularly focus on the organizational aspects of social 
movements. They argue organizations are embedded rather than incidental to social 
movements. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 1218) a social movement 
organization is “...a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the 
preferences of a social movement...and attempts to implement those goals.” 
ASSEFA as an organization grew from the Gandhian inspired Bhoodan land reform 
movement and sought to create a collective of individuals to perpetuate and expand 
not only its redistributive accomplishments but also the values of Gram Swaraj. 
Although the most ambitious manifestations of ASSEFA’s early inspiration, including 
land redistribution and collective ownership, have been forgone ASSEFA maintains 
its self-identification as a movement rather than NGO or MFO. 
 
Beyond its origins and self-identification as a social movement, ASSEFA does not 
neatly fit the social movement mould. Although social movements are subject to 
numerous definitions, most definitions describe a collective of individuals with goals 
and organization using some form of “antagonistic discourses” (Dinerstein 2012, p. 
2). 
 
ASSEFA’s mission aims squarely at poverty reduction and it supports programs to 
increase the assets of its members. However, Bebbington (2007, 2010) argues social 
movements do not directly focus on poverty reduction but around drivers of poverty. 
Social movements impact poverty by challenging the hegemonic ideas and social 
relations that undergird poverty rather than directly affecting the assets of the poor. 
Bebbington (2010) does make some allowance for social movements focused on 
collective consumption as more likely to be involved in direct asset provision and 
more likely to be focused on basic needs than ideology.69 The Bhoodan land 
movement focused on collective consumption and challenged agrarian land tenure 
albeit in a Gandhian and hence less antagonistic fashion that commonly associated 
with social movements. Land redistribution occurred through voluntary rather than 
forcible (such as through occupation) means.  
                                            
69 Social movements concerned with collective consumption (as discussed in Bebbington 
2010) challenge asset provision and the norms around asset provision. Bebbington (ibid.) 
cites land movements that intially impact assets through occupation and subsequently 
challenging agragrian tenure structures. 
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Bebbington (2010) also addresses how asset provision (in this case savings and 
loans with specific reference to SEWA) may be used to mobilize, organize and build 
trust for the purpose of future collective action. This logic of action is familiar to 
microfinance generally and indeed Bebbington (ibid.) mentions microfinance as a 
“professionally led” effort that took on “movement-like” characteristics changing 
prevailing ideas about the feasibility and methodology of financial services provision  
(Bebbington 2010, p. 14). McCarthy and Zald (1977, p. 1226-7) also discuss the use 
of selective material incentives to “bind” individuals to social movement 
organizations, although they argue social movements primarily incentivize members 
through solidary incentives and value fulfillment. Of course the use of material 
incentives may bring individuals to the table so to speak but does not necessarily 
create the solidarity or value alignment needed for collective action. Perhaps then the 
key issue for ASSEFA’s current status as a social movement is the degree to which 
the poverty reduction aspect of its mission (including microfinance) operates in 
service of its community building or Gram Swaraj mission. Regardless of the degree 
to which ASSEFA fits strict definitions of a social movement organization, it’s self-
identification as one arguably influences behavior and as such the literature on social 
movements provides insight into how ASSEFA understands its mission. 
6.1.4 Organizational leadership 
Organizational leaders exercise significant control over social performance through 
the setting of missions, values, goals and long-term strategies (Copestake et al. 2005, 
p. 161). Considering their impact more broadly, leaders play a key role in creating, 
embedding and transforming organizational cultures. “Concern for culture” is the 
distinct feature separating leadership from management or administration (Schein 
2010, p. 195). Management by contrast is preoccupied with control and 
implementation of existing systems. As the founder and only leader (of ASSEFA 
proper) to date, Loganathan practically personifies ASSEFA’s culture, mission, 
values, goals and strategies although his own representations of his role consistently 
downplay his part in performing the key functions attributed to a leader. Just as 
ASSEFA has “no agenda” Loganathan reports he likewise has “no role.” In the single 
statement made directly referencing his role, he describes it as giving confidence to 
members. Thus his leadership role and style was most usefully understood indirectly 
through observations, interactions, anecdotes and attitudes expressed over the 
course of the fieldwork. 
 
Loganathan disavows any authority over decision-making or strategic planning as 
well as credit for outcomes (but by the same token accountability for outcomes) and 
rather casts himself primarily as an advisor. “ASSEFA”, he explains, advises and 
makes suggestions that the people may are may not be interested in. In a particularly 
illustrative anecdote, Loganathan describes a visit many years earlier to a prestigious 
management school—IIT-Ahmedabad —where he was invited to present a paper. In 
the course of a discussion on professionalism, he minimized his role in ASSEFA 
comparing himself and professionals generally to artisans. According to Loganathan 
the analogy offended (as intended ostensibly) attendees, students seeking the status 
of professionally trained managers. Loganathan offers a similar abdication when it 
comes to planning for the future. In reference to ASSEFA’s future plans he simply 
reflects that the future cannot be planned. One could make plans but then some 
other person will come in and pursue another course of action entirely. He adds that 
the people lead decision-making in any case although near the end of the 
conversation he anticipates ASSEFA would continue to do the same type of work in 
the same fashion: slow and steady. 
 
A stark but unsurprising contrast presents itself however between Loganathan’s 
portrayal of his own role and authority and images from the fieldwork: pictures of 
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Loganathan standing in for absent fathers at community weddings, signing copies of 
his book of short stories about rural life for a couple of young conference attendees, 
staff and members calling him by the honorific Longanathanji or Anachi (elder 
brother), and women farmers and ASSEFA members touching his feet in the Hindu 
tradition meant to honour elders including spiritual leaders. The respect and 
deference paid to Loganathan certainly suggests a level of “personal power” often 
found in charismatic founder/leaders and likely to translate into considerable 
influence (Handy 1993). 
 
As the senior (and only) manager of the apex organization, Loganathan clearly holds 
position and resource power as well. His time is spent traveling between project 
areas, communicating, information gathering and decision-making with managers 
and members. His organization is the “post office” through which any donated funds 
flow. As such he is the point through which organizational information and to a lesser 
extent funds are collected for the organization as a whole. The extent and way in 
which he uses his power to influence decisions is part of a ‘black box’ created by the 
informality of decision-making processes although he is regarded as the most senior 
authority and logic and available evidence suggest he influences decisions as such. 
For instance, when pressed on how ASSEFA decides which projects to take up (after 
acknowledging project ideas originate in the needs and priorities of the people) 
Kumar said “senior management” takes the final decision. Senior management 
seems to consistently include Loganathan with the relevant “sectorial people” also 
involved as appropriate (such as Vasantha and Muneeswaran (in charge of the 
education trusts and ASSEFA workers for over 30 years each) and Asokkumar). 
 
Theories of leadership contrast structured versus flexible styles (Handy 1993). It is 
difficult to interrogate Loganathan’s leadership style in these terms given his own 
orientation towards leadership and the ‘black box’ previously discussed. However the 
social movement literature contributes usefully on this point. Zald and Ash-Garner 
(1987) identify two leadership styles in social movements—articulating and 
mobilizing—distinguished by the types of tasks a leader emphasizes. Mobilizing 
focuses on reinforcing organizational goals and member commitment and articulating 
on creating linkages with other organizations. A leader’s style often shifts over the 
organization’s life to meet current needs. In periods of expansion or growth, 
leadership is likely more fully articulating. Having said that, Loganathan’s current 
leadership style appears more fully mobilizing. ASSEFA’s external relations will be 
addressed in more depth in Chapter 7 but can be generally characterized as either 
long-standing and stable (established in ASSEFA’s early years) or limited and 
guarded. Rather Loganathan appears focused within on the mobilizing tasks of 
strengthening the cohesiveness and values of the ASSEFA family not least by 
connecting members and staff with each other and to ASSEFA’s iconic historical 
origins through him. Loganathan’s preoccupation with mobilizing tasks fits movement 
organizations that, like ASSEFA, focus on individual rather than societal change 
(Zald & Ash-Garner 1987).  
 
In a sense Loganathan’s dismissiveness of his own authority can be seen as a prime 
example of his strong leadership role. Schein (2010) argues organizational cultures 
originate from three sources. The most influential in the organization’s early stages is 
the founder’s beliefs, values, and assumptions, in part because leaders choose the 
people to bring into the organization.70 Schein (2010) also discusses the 
mechanisms through which leaders reproduce or embed culture within the 
                                            
70 The other two sources of organizational culture discussed by Schein (2010) are learning 
experiences shared by the group over time and new ideas brought by new leaders and 
members. 
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organization over time, including deliberate role modelling, teaching and coaching. If 
interpreted as the former, Loganathan’s mobilizing style and circumspection 
regarding his own leadership may function as a device to reinforce the organization’s 
culture of Gandhian values. 
 
In the future a key leadership issue for ASSEFA will be succession, or who will 
replace Loganathan when he leaves. In social movements the departure of a 
founding leader, particularly one with a long tenure as head of his or her organization, 
can result in declining membership, factionalism (with the former actions and 
statements of the founding leader being used to legitimize opposing views) and 
professionalization of senior managers (Zald & Ash-Garner 1987). The latter is 
associated with goal transformation (and possibly mission drift) as goals become 
more conservative, reflecting increased concern for organizational maintenance. The 
capacity to avoid such negative repercussions following a founder’s departure is of 
course dependent on a number of factors including the qualities of remaining 
managers (such as their commitment to organizational versus personal goals), the 
ability of other organizations to co-opt remaining leaders, and the leaders’ ability to 
combat growing member apathy or lack of interest in the absence of the founding 
leader (Zald & Ash-Garner 1987).71 
 
Long-tenured founding leaders often mitigate against the development of leadership 
capable of meeting the challenges of their departure. The organization becomes 
closely linked with the founder. The board is often composed of the founder’s 
personal acquaintances and as such lacks independence and possibly the habit of 
taking a leadership role when needed. The founder provides the bulk of energy, 
vision and ideas such that their generation is not institutionalized (Tandon 2002, p. 
219). The “routinization of charisma” may not have occurred. This process involves 
the “institutionalization and rationalization of the goals and guiding myths of the 
organization” and, significantly, shifts incentives for staff and members from 
“gratification related to the mythic stature of the leader and the opportunity to 
participate with him to the gratification afforded by the performance of ritual and 
participation... “ (Zald & Ash-Garner 1987, p.136).  
 
Loganathan’s predominant role in mobilizing staff and members, connecting them to 
ASSEFA’s uniqueness and moral centre, suggests the “routinization of charisma” is 
an unfinished business. Whether and how this process will complete is critical to 
ASSEFA’s social performance given a well-understood mission reinforced by a 
stable organizational culture have been critical to protecting ASSEFA’s social 
performance (particularly in the absence of formal systems and processes to monitor 
social performance as will be discussed in Chapter 7). 
6.1.5 Organizational culture and structure 
Much of the NGO literature takes a prescriptive tone regarding organizational culture. 
The literature raises concerns over changes in organizational culture that may 
diminish social performance and that have been associated with the growing 
popularity of NGOs with institutional donors. The concerns often focus on the risks of 
organizational growth that requires extended hierarchies, increased functional 
specialization and professionalization, and increased capacity to raise human and 
financial resources (often through new relationships with donors). Poorly managed, 
such growth may shift accountability upward, centralize power, and create a more 
bureaucratic and less flexible organization that subordinates mission-related values 
                                            
71 Zald and Ash-Garner (1987) also identifies a base of support that is independent of 
membership as a condition under which goals become more conservative however this is 
less relevant to ASSEFA. 
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and commitment to professionalization and administration. Meanwhile the erstwhile 
and antithetical advantages of NGOs—such as small organizational size which are 
felt to allow for close relationships with local people and the ability to act swiftly, 
innovatively and flexibly—erode (Edwards & Hulme 2002). Microfinance literature 
likewise directs concern towards NGO-MFOs pursuing rapid growth toward 
sustainability and possible commercialization. Lewis (2003) describes microfinance 
as a “narrative changing intervention” that places new emphasis on market-based 
sustainability, changing not just strategies and structures but NGO cultures.   
 
Perhaps key to ASSEFA’s ability to avoid mission drift is an organizational culture 
that continues to reject the shifted narrative rationalizing rapid growth and 
commercialization. This is reflected in ASSEFA’s structure and growth strategy. 
ASSEFA grew largely by leveraging its existing network of people’s organizations, 
converting and combining them into SHGs and SMBTs.  ASSEFA became larger not 
by growing ‘up’ (increasing hierarchies) but by growing ‘out’ (promoting autonomous 
people-led organizations). By following this alternative model of growth ASSEFA 
avoided some of the pitfalls of rapid growth in microfinance provision. 
 
Loganathan’s philosophy and leadership style have contributed to a strong culture 
able to support its growth model. Schein (2010) defines organizational culture as a 
group’s shared basic assumptions. A threshold of shared assumptions is necessary 
for organizations to function and solve basic problems of “internal integration” and 
“external adaptation”. Schein (2010) places a particular emphasis on leaders as 
creating, reproducing and managing change in organizational culture. Handy (1988) 
describes organizational culture as an organization’s sets of values, norms, beliefs 
and ideologies that determine the way things are done within the organization and 
are reflected in organizational artefacts including structure. He offers a long list of 
factors influencing an organization’s ‘choice’ of culture (among four types he 
discusses) without a particular discussion of their relative importance. As Handy 
(1988) argues in “power cultures” such as ASSEFA, the organization depends on a 
central power source who exercises control through selection of like-minded people 
and personal contact. This type of organization retains its ability to act quickly but 
given its reliance of personal relationships cannot operate effectively if the 
organization gets too big. To grow it must, as ASSEFA has, promote other 
organizations.  
 
Loganathan essentially sits at the centre of a ‘web’ of autonomous hierarchies 
connected (as Figure 6.1 illustrates) by and through ASSEFA proper. Loganathan is 
positioned to influence each ‘string’ of the web.  ASSEFA’s promoted organizations 
may not have power cultures themselves. SNFL for instance is relatively more 
hierarchical than ASSEFA at large, with formalized processes and systems. 
Standardized processes for the application, management and repayment of loans, 
not the least to avoid fraud, necessarily characterize the relationship between 
SMBTs and SNFL. However it is perhaps SNFL’s relationship with the larger 
organization of ASSEFA that keeps it in check. The majority of SNFL board members 
share a personal relationship with Loganathan, Loganathan sits on the board himself 
and Asokkumar is a retired banker who previously served on the ASSEFA board and 
is personally loyal to Loganathan. In addition to maintaining a strong shared culture 
amidst continued growth, ASSEFA’s power culture allows for autonomy and flexibility 
at the local level. It simultaneously ensures no alternative, competing power centre 
can emerge, as autonomous organizations compete with each other and rely on the 
centre for information and resources. 
 
A natural place to start to understand the beliefs and values underlying ASSEFA’s 
and Loganathan’s ‘choice’ of culture is with its origin in the Gandhian-inspired 
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Bhoodan land movement. Gandian philosophy is both implicitly and explicitly 
implicated in ASSEFA’s model. Gandhi objected to the “delusion of modern 
economics”, including the idea that pursuit of self-interest, the foundational tenet of 
modern capitalism, is a desirable or advantageous basis for human conduct (Gandhi 
1908). He saw capitalism’s emphasis on maximizing aggregate material well-being 
as immoral and reductive in its neglect of the spiritual nature of man. Well-being 
should be more holistically sought through Gram Swaraj and the sociality of village 
life. As an offshoot of the Bhoodan movement, ASSEFA has explicitly inherited this 
worldview. The philosophy informs choices, such as the choice to prioritize 
community-building goals over goals of individual economic enhancement when the 
two work at cross-purposes. Loganathan spoke about the lack of “dignity” available in 
urban living and much of ASSEFA’s energy is directed currently to improving the 
economic proposition of agriculture to encourage youth to consider agricultural 
vocation.  
 
The emphasis on egalitarianism (Heginbotham 1975) is a correlate of the Gandhian 
criticism of the capitalist economic system and attendant emphasis on 
professionalism.  Bottom-up management speaks to ASSEFA’s commitment to 
participation but even more telling is the anti-professionalism in casual conversation. 
Kumar teased the general manager of the Sivagangai area, Thangaiah, that he was 
a “professor” because he had posted written summaries of the watershed project on 
the walls in advance of my visit. Loganathan joked about a prominent family from the 
North (who unfairly control land in the Cauvery Delta). They go away for schooling 
and come back “professionals” who “drink coffee” and “read The Hindu” each 
morning. During our last visit Loganathan commented that he would be away in rural 
areas for some time and may only see me again briefly in Chennai before I left India, 
explaining he was more comfortable with the people than with “intellectuals” like me. 
Although it is part of Loganathan’s disarming style to use flattery and self-deprecating 
humour in conversation, the sense of “intellectuals” and “professionals” being outside 
of the ASSEFA movement was clear. Preference was for an informal, homegrown, 
action-oriented and improvised style of management.  
 
Despite the cultural relevance to ASSEFA of Gandhian critiques of professionalism 
and capitalism, operating SNFL has required a degree of professionalism and 
formalization as previously discussed. ASSEFA may have been able to successfully 
navigate this apparent contradiction by pursuing what Loganathan calls the middle 
way: an alternative to capitalism and communalism that attempts to capture the best 
of both. In SNFL this was realized practically speaking through its member-centric 
ownership structure. There are economic trade-offs to the middle way. SNFL logged 
modest growth compared to the “mega” Indian MFIs: 19 percent during 2007-08 
compared to 1,700 percent and 700 percent respectively by Spandana and SKS 
(Nair 2010). Although not operating strictly speaking according the mainstream 
models of microfinance and the narrative changing values it promotes, ASSEFA’s 
approach carries the logic of other principles of effectiveness, those which assert the 
“diseconomy” of financial systems principles which carry risks and instabilities that 
ultimately undermine sustainable change processes (Fowler 1997). ASSEFA’s 
approach also echoes the logic of a social movement in its objections to mainstream 
and hegemonic institutions and models and pursuit of an alternative.  
 
Structure shares a close relationship with organizational culture. Organizational 
structure refers to how organizations allocate, supervise and coordinate work. 
Central to the idea of structure is how it allocates tasks and authority. Much of the 
discussion of NGO structure focuses around the extent to which a given structure 
creates hierarchy, concentrates authority or centralizes control functions and thereby 
potentially limits the flexibility and responsiveness of field operations (Fowler 1997). 
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In addition to its implications for organizational effectiveness structure reflects (or 
should) the underlying philosophy of how development is best accomplished (ibid., p. 
58). As structure involves the division of tasks and authority I will first provide an 
overview of ASSEFA’s structure and then discuss the division of tasks, in particular 
the way it divides tasks between managers and staff and the volunteer, member 
community. I will then address the division of authority to supervise the work and its 
implications. 
 
The way ASSEFA organizes its work reflects its community-building mission, 
specifically the goal of building community-based institutions. Each of ASSEFA’s 
activities follow a long-standing model in which villagers are organized into village-
level activity groups, activity groups are then federated at the area level to provide 
management support to groups and finally legal entities are promoted as apex 
bodies to offer professional support and mobilize resources to continue the programs 
(ASSEFA 2009, p. iii).  Group membership overlaps as an individual member may 
participate in more than one activity group, for instance a member may participate in 
an SHG and a chit group, but each activity has its own tiered structure. Figure 6.1 
illustrates relationships between village-based groups organized around a particular 
activity, their federated structures and the apex insitutions.72 The arrows signify the 
flow of membership and/or leadership from one body to another. For instance, the 
SHGs comprise the membership of the SMBTs. SMBTs select board members from 
the SHGs membership. Similarly, the SMBTs are the member-owners of SNFL and 
provide representatives to serve on the SNFL board. Figure 6.1 also illustrates the 
relationship of ASSEFA proper with affiliated apex institutions. Continuing with the 
prior example, ASSEFA proper contributes staff and board members to both SNFL 























                                            
72 It should be noted that the federated structures are also legal entities, usually trusts or 
societies. Also, the figure is simplified to a degree, for instance SHGs are also organized at 
cluster level, which is not shown. The cluster level association has a more limited operational 
role and is not a legal entity. Some of the apex organizations could also be broken down 
further. There are now nine education trusts but only the apex trust is shown. 
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Figure 6.1: ASSEFA structuring of activities 
 
 
 (Adapted from Brodhead 2008, p. 37) 
 
The tiered structure is meant to build capacity towards the long-term goals of 
financially sustainable and locally managed activities. The day-to-day tasks are 
divided between ASSEFA staff and managers, and the memberships’ volunteer 
leaders. The division of labour between the two groups is inverted traveling up the 
tiered structure, that is member leaders take on the majority of the day-to-day work 
required at the village level but their involvement decreases while ASSEFA staff’s 
increases over ascending tiers.73 
 
ASSEFA management overlays and overlaps the tiered structures. Nine zonal 
managers oversee a variable basket of activities within their given geographic region. 
They are part of the management layer below Loganathan and while technically 
employees of SNFL (their salaries are paid by SNFL) the zonal managers may 
oversee non-SNFL activities in their geographical zone. In fact the Nattam zonal 
                                            
73 For example, in the case of SHGs, ASSEFA fieldworkers (until recently) were primarily 
responsible for group formation and assisting with group capacity-building activities.  Group 
leaders were responsible for labor-intensive monitoring of group loan repayment. At the area 
level (SMBT) ASSEFA staff are the interface between groups and SNFL in the loan 
application, dispersement and repayment processes. Group leaders assist in loan verification 
processes and in SMBT management through board representation. Finally the most 
technically demanding roles are reserved for apex organizations staffed by ASSEFA and with 
minimal involvement by members except for board representation. 
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manager reports only 10 percent of his time was spent dealing with SNFL-related 
activities, while the other 90 percent he spent on non-financial activities which 
included SMBT social activities, housing and chit fund activities, and distribution of 
ASSEFA’s monthly Salaram magazine. 
 
ASSEFA schools and dairy processing units generally have separate management 
structures (from each other and from SNFL and other social activities) but even this 
‘rule’ is flexible. For instance, Vasantha, the head of the apex education trust, was 
also nominated by area SHG members to serve on the board of the dairy processing 
facility. Thangaiah oversees his area watershed projects (pursued in conjunction with 
the Farmers’ Renaissance Scheme) but also is on the board of trustees for the area’s 
education trust. Ultimately management overlaps between activities and legal 
entities. This speaks to some degree to the flexibility ASSEFA maintains to 
customize activities to the needs and resources of a particular area and also the 
degree to which activities are pursued in an integrated and coordinated fashion. 
 
As discussed in Section 6.1.4, Loganathan minimizes his and ASSEFA proper’s role 
in ASSEFA, characterizing it as supportive and advisory. ASSEFA proper has only 
five employees including Loganathan. Important support functions such as research 
and development (SARC) and IT support (Sarva Tech Solutions) are also promoted 
as separate companies from ASSEFA rather than held within ASSEFA proper or 
within the geographic divisions of ASSEFA. As such ASSEFA’s structure is not top 
heavy but relatively flat with a short distance between Loganathan and all other 
levels of management. The flat organization and traveling senior management 
facilitate communication and coordination.  
 
While ASSEFA’s structure is flexible and flat what is less clear is the scope zonal 
managers have to independently make strategic and operational decisions. As noted 
previously ASSEFA proper retains control over resources and information. Kumar, 
the head of SARC, which facilitates communication between ASSEFA’s geographical 
zones via the monthly magazine Salaram, travels with Loganathan and is also 
Loganathan’s son. ASSEFA proper and Loganathan specifically hold the power over 
any discretionary funds. SARC also implements any pilot activities. For example, 
SARC led SNFL’s transition toward RBI regulation compliance including managing 
training on the new computer system. Employees hired by SARC as part of this effort 
were then absorbed by SNFL. In a similar fashion SARC facilitated the pilot phase of 
the Farmers’ Renaissance Scheme. The close relationship between SARC and 
ASSEFA proper reiterates Loganathan’s control over any significant changes or new 
activities. 
6.1.6 Human resources 
Recruitment of appropriate staff is a critical aspect of NGO management. Among the 
choices are between recruiting staff externally and promoting internally, often a 
choice favouring either formal qualifications or field experience. ASSEFA’s senior 
ranks are dominated by a cadre of managers who have worked their way into their 
positions over decades-long tenures with ASSEFA, illustrating ASSEFA’s successful 
promotion of internal, field-tested staff. Of the eight senior managers interviewed 
during the fieldwork (five zonal managers, one general manager, and two senior 
managers of education trusts), all had been with ASSEFA since at least the 1980s, 
giving them tenures of between 25 and 30 years with the organization. They started 
their ASSEFA careers as a salesman in cottage industries, community workers, a 
health worker and project staff, or in other words as field-level staff. Promotions were 
given based on demonstrations they were “active” in their area and came with 
supervisory responsibilities covering progressively larger geographic areas. The 
longevity of senior managers may reflect ASSEFA’s tendency towards inward focus 
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and a strategy for reinforcing the organizational culture of familial loyalty and service. 
However it may also reflect a lack of viable alternatives or an ability to successfully 
attract or retain external recruits to senior management positions. This possibility is 
supported by the discussion of financial constraints below.  
 
The fieldwork allowed for much less detailed work histories of lower level managers 
and staff than senior managers but financial constraints and limited promotion 
potential would mitigate against successful recruitment and retention of skilled 
managers and staff.  As such ASSEFA must maximize the benefit of intangible 
incentives while accepting the limitations on its performance. ASSEFA’s strategy for 
retention places a strong emphasis on intangible, non-material incentives both as a 
matter of choice and necessity. Zald and Ash-Garner (1987, p. 123) differentiate 
social movement organizations from “full-blown bureaucratic organization” based on 
an incentive structure dominated by intangible incentives. Movement organizations 
focused on changing society are dominated by purposive incentives (value fulfilment) 
while movement organizations focused on changing individuals are dominated by 
solidary incentives (such as prestige, respect and friendship). The existence of 
second-generation employees also suggests patronage as an alternative material 
incentive available to reward loyalty of staff and managers.  
 
While intangible incentives and limited material incentives may motivate and satisfy 
some active staff the most ambitious of staff are still likely to leave the organization 
as Loganathan’s lifetime role as ASSEFA’s head and a stable senior management 
places limits on the power and authority one might rise to within the organization. As 
Asokkumar notes, those with ambition and/or high qualifications, though few, will 
most likely want to leave and do their own thing eventually. Other opportunities are 
available to them as well as potentially better financial compensation. However 
recruiting skilled staff, even if for only a relatively short-term, on the basis of the 
quality of field experience it can provide may be a viable strategy for ASSEFA as 
long as it remains relevant.  
 
ASSEFA faces significant financial constraints in particular to its ability to recruit 
technically-skilled staff. Conventionally material incentives have been downplayed in 
importance for NGOs when compared with the more intangible or psychological 
incentives inherent in commitment to a moral or social issues, but as Fowler (1997) 
points out material incentives became more important for the recruitment, retention 
and motivation of NGO staff as many NGOs became more market-oriented in 
the1990s. The trend towards market-orientation is principally associated, as 
discussed previously, with the increase in official donor dollars to NGOs and the 
ensuing change in the culture, management and accountability of participating NGOs.  
 
Asokkumar in particular grapples with the real and current challenge of recruiting 
skilled staff due to financial constraint. He reports, “I don’t think if a person is very 
high qualifications would like to work for us because of the salary package, 
compensation package. Probably he can join banks or some other financial services 
company…unless a person is totally committed to rural development like Vijay 
Mahajan was.” Even when able to recruit the particularly committed, Asokkumar 
points to the difficulty of retaining such individuals saying, “Few are like Vijay and will 
ultimately want to leave and do their own thing as will Vijay and others.” In additional 
to Vijay, Vasamalai and Jothi are examples of this phenomenon.74 
                                            
74 Vijay Mahajan is founder and CEO of BASIX and president of the MFIN network. 
Vasamalai is founder of the Dhan Foundation and S.R. Jothi Ramalingam is founder of 




Asokkumar’s own position as CEO of SNFL illustrates one of ASSEFA’s strategies 
for dealing with the financial constraints limiting its ability to hire technically skilled 
staff: relying on the semi-volunteer labour of a prominent, retired ex-banker. 
Asokkumar explains, “I am at the backend [?] of my life. I am not going to start any 
company. My daughter is saying don’t even work. Why are you working after 
retirement? Come and be with me.” He further points out that he currently only 
receives some compensation via SJSK but none from SNFL and as such works at 
least partially on a volunteer basis.  
 
The question remains then what is the impact on quality of staff overall of the 
financial constraints. Another aspect of this question is how deeply does the 
commitment to ASSEFA’s ideals penetrate lower levels of management and staff. In 
the case of SNFL, Asokkumar characterized it thus, “I always feel in any sample 
some 10 percent will be outshining. They’ll be…very hard working, sincere, 
committed. Another 10 percent will be absolutely hopeless…whatever you do you 
can’t motivate them…the remaining 80 percent will be average. It all depends how 
you motivate this 80 percent to perform better.” 
 
The problem of financial constraints and quality staff feeds in a circular fashion into 
the tension over social and financial performance overall. Improving financial 
performance would permit increased compensation and therefore higher quality staff, 
which would then feed back (in theory) into better financial performance. However 
improving financial performance without staff holding the requisite skills and 
experience stalls this virtuous spiral. Asokkumar also attributes fraudulent behaviour 
among a small percentage of staff directly to low salaries. Higher salaries and a 
stronger more robust IT systems (to prevent such behaviour) however both require 
an influx of capital either through better financial performance or otherwise.  
 
6.2 CRUSADE 
6.2.1 Background: historical view 
The founder of CRUSADE, S.R. Jothi Ramalingam, began his career working for 
state government during which he interacted and became interested in the voluntary 
sector. After six years, Jothi left government to work with the poor as part of the 
voluntary sector. He returned to Tamil Nadu and was introduced to ASSEFA by one 
of its supporters, Chris Wilde. Shortly thereafter, Jothi joined ASSEFA as a project 
manager in Nattam near Madurai, taking a 50 percent pay cut compared with his 
living as a government employee. Although describing the work as “good” and 
“satisfying”, he left ASSEFA to start his own organization after about six years 
because “I want to work only with the poor but that focus is not there [in ASSEFA]…I 
left…a well-paying job to work with the poor and…otherwise there is no point…” 
 
Jothi formed CRUSADE in 1991 and began work the following year in the Minjur 
block of Thiruvallur district north of Chennai. CRUSADE began work in 1992, the 
same year NABARD launched its SHG bank-linkage program and only about two 
years into the IFAD-supported project incorporating SHGs into the Tamil Nadu 
Women’s Empowerment Project (Fernandez 2006). From it’s inception CRUSADE 
chose SHGs as its “entry point” based on the potential Jothi saw in these initial 
efforts to contribute to development in rural areas in a sustainable and replicable way 
without a large external input. CRUSADE began with very little external support and 
only one paid worker. After six months battling resistance and suspicion from 
villagers, CRUSADE formed its first SHG. A turning point for CRUSADE came when 
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UK charity Action Village India (AVI) began financially supporting CRUSADE, in 
approximately 1995. AVI remains the principle supporter of CRUSADE 20 years 
later. A second stabilizing event for CRUSADE was its collaboration with TNCDW 
and Mahalir Thittam. Table 6.2 lists organizational milestones over the past 20 years 
as listed by Jothi (in bold) and in CRUSADE’s 2009-10 Annual Report.75 
 
Table 6.2 CRUSADE Milestones 
 
Year CRUSADE Milestone 
1992 Begin work in Minjur block 
1995 AVI begins supporting CRUSADE  
1997 Begin first 5-yr partnership agreement with TNCDW  
1998 Extend to working in Sholavaram block 
1998 Thinaipakkam Training Centre inauguration 
2001 Begin capacity-building of panchayat representatives 
2002 Karanodai Training Centre inauguration 
2002 Begin second 5-yr partnership agreement with TNCDW 
2005 Action Rural Housing (ARH) incorporated as a company; begins work 
in 2006 (2009) 
2007 Pudhumai Pengal Iyakkam (PPI), was registered as trust, apex 
institution for women SHGs (2006) 
2007 Pudupakkam Technology Centre work started 
2007 Community Health Centre started 
2007 NGO Alliance for strengthening panchayat institutions formed 
2007 Finish last partnership agreement with TNCDW 
2010 PPI/ARH office inauguration 
 
 
Chart 6.5 illustrates the growth in CRUSADE SHGs over time, with dramatic growth 
occurring during CRUSADE’s partnerships with TNCDW, only slowing near the end 
of the ten-year partnership. CRUSADE performed the typical role of a SHPI, 
including group formation, training and linking to banks. As the number of groups 
grew they were informally federated at the cluster level (a CRUSADE administrative 
unit). An apex association was also formed. In 2007 the apex association, Pudhumai 
Pengal Iyakkam (PPI), was formally registered as a trust.76 Nearly all of CRUSADE’s 










                                            
75 Some minor discrepancies exist between milestones dates provided orally by Jothi and 
those given in the annual reports. In such cases I have relied on the dates in annual reports 
as they are consisent across reports. 
76 Consistent with the SHG model of microfinance CRUSADE began by encouraging savings 
and the revolving of the groups’ own common fund followed by bank linkage. CRUSADE also 
augmented the groups’ funds with donated funds which were lent to individual members who 
repaid the loans to their respective SHGs who then repaid to their association. Such funds 
were transferred to and capitalized PPI. 
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PPI addressed gaps in the credit available from banks and in part represented an 
acknowledgment of the continued failure of the formal banking system to consistently 
and adequately meet the credit needs of SHG members (not least because of bank 
managers’ lack of responsiveness). PPI also reflected CRUSADE’s intention to 
promote community-based organizations that empower members, provide additional 
benefit, and ultimately become sustainable member-owned and managed 
organizations.78 It is governed by nine trustees elected from SHG group leadership.  
 
PPI was the second community-based microfinance organization promoted by 
CRUSADE. In 2005 CRUSADE promoted Action Rural Housing (ARH) to address 
unmet demand for housing loans among CRUSADE’s members. 79 A section 25 non-
profit company, ARH has 150 shareholders drawn from SHG group leadership. It is 
governed by five trustees, two of whom are also drawn from SHG group leadership. 
Around 60 or 70 houses have been built by SHG members to date with the help of 
ARH loans and PPI has provided nearly 40 loans to SHG members since formally 
registered. 
 
As with ASSEFA, CRUSADE’s mission extends beyond credit provision to an 
integrated development approach and as such it pursues a varied and 
complimentary set of activities. CRUSADE promotes activities in areas such as 
housing, health, and education. The interest and fees collected by PPI and ARH 
cross-subsidize non-credit activities in much the same way SNFL’s profits cross-
subsidize ASSEFA’s social activities. Of particular note, PPI’s income covers a 
portion of field workers’ (called cluster coordinators) salaries. PPI and ARH also 
directly contribute surplus in support of non-credit activities. PPI recently contributed 
                                            
77 The years represented in the chart represent the years for which data (via annual reports 
was available. 
78 PPI provides loans for five purposes: housing repair or construction, education, medical 
costs, income-generating activities, or consumption (such as the purchase of durable assets). 
PPI charges 1.5 percent flat monthly interest on all loans. The loan amount depends on its 
purpose with maximum loans reportedly between Rs 20,000 and 30,000. The loan term 
depends on total loan amount, for instance a loan of Rs. 5,000 has a term of 5 months, a loan 
of Rs. 20,000 has a term of 20 months etc. (PPI also charges a total of Rs 700/year/group in 
fees.) 
79 ARH charges 1 percent monthly interest on all loans. Interest charges are lower than with 
PPI and available amounts are larger, but the loans can only be used toward housing repair 
and construction. ARH was capitalized by contributions made by the shareholders as well as 





1993	   1997	   1999	   2003	   2006	   2010	   2012	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to cover some of the costs for an environmental camp co-sponsored by CRUSADE 
and the local panchayat. ARH recently distributed saplings to members, an effort 
complimentary to CRUSADE’s long-standing efforts promoting herbal medicine. Both 
PPI and ARH have used surplus to provide small one-off grants to ‘ultra-poor’ 
members, a group more recently a focus of CRUSADE’s activities. 
 
CRUSADE’s health-related activities have ranged from health camps (focused on 
diagnosis and referral) and health training (directly to members and of volunteer 
community health workers) to the promotion of herbal gardens and direct provision of 
health services through a doctor-run clinic. Educational activities have extended 
beyond training on health topics. Fairly extensive training was provided as part of the 
TNCDW partnership and was a primary incentive for CRUSADE’s participation in the 
government scheme. Training topics over the years have included group 
management, financial management, gender, leadership, literacy, local government 
and income-generating activities. The latter continues to be offered, currently in 
computers and tailoring. CRUSADE’s goals for 2013-2014 included promotion of 200 
herbal gardens, training 1000 women in health issues, 24 health camps, 2 
environmental camps, obtaining 200 ID cards for disabled members and training 100 
member daughters in an income-generating skill (principally tailoring, computers, or 
embroidery). 
 
CRUSADE’s federated structure provides easy delivery of training modules, covers 
costs of complimentary activities (such as in the case of providing saplings) and PPI 
and ARH themselves can provide complimentary services. For instance, PPI offers 
loans that can assist members in buying sewing machines after completing the 
tailoring training and for building individual toilets, a goal promoted through health 
training. In earlier years, ARH promoted the use of stabilized mud blocks in home 
construction to lower construction costs. CRUSADE provided training to two masons 
and facilitated production of the blocks at one of its training centres.80  
6.2.2 Background: recent changes 
According to Jothi the microfinance crisis had no impact on CRUSADE and its 
affiliated microfinance organizations. In reference to the reports of coercion and 
farmer suicides that precipitated the crisis Jothi adds, “But these are all stories for us 
and I have not investigated because of my time…but we don’t have any problem like 
this in our area in the sense you know we don’t run our institutions like an MFI. So its 
not a problem for our group members…” As community-owned and managed 
organizations, ARH and PPI more easily maintain a client-centric focus, with 
members involved in setting loan terms and relatively lenient repayment policies. 
CRUSADE’s structure also protects it from the challenges of the crisis’ aftermath. 
ARH and PPI are a non-profit company and trust respectively and so not subject to 
the new RBI regulations governing NBFC-MFIs. They also were not impacted by 
reduced liquidity to MFIs, as ARH and PPI’s revolving funds have not been 
maintained in this way.  
 
While the microfinance crisis may not have had a direct impact on CRUSADE 
microfinance organizations, the general plateauing of SHG formation that began in 
the wake of microfinance’s rapid growth in the 2000s is reflected in CRUSADE’s 
current trajectory. CRUSADE’s SHG formation has plateaued since approximately 
2010 and the number of groups monitored by CRUSADE actually decreased as 
better monitoring led to dropping inactive groups from its rolls. Rather than 
expanding geographically or upmarket as other MFOs have to continue growth, 
                                            
80 Production of mud stabilized blocks is not on-going. Difficulty procuring raw materials and 
high transport costs mean the blocks are no longer cost-effective. 
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CRUSADE has shifted its focus downmarket to potentially excluded groups including 
the ultra-poor and disabled. CRUSADE is forming new groups for disabled members 
with 30 groups formed thus far. It links the groups to banks, offers small soft loans for 
income-generation to those with mild disabilities and helps link the disabled members 
with government assistance. CRUSADE also identifies the ultra-poor (defined by 
Jothi as the “poorest of the poor”) who may have been excluded from existing SHG 
groups. CRUSADE provides small one-off grants for income-generating activities, 
medical costs or housing repair. Approximately 50 to 60 ultra-poor have been helped 
thus far by PPI and ARH has assisted four to five ultra-poor households with home 
repair grants of up to Rs. 7,500.  
 
CRUSADE plans to expand to two new blocks in 2014. Rather than forming new 
SHGs in those blocks CRUSADE is looking towards panchayats as the platform 
through which to achieve its goals. Jothi says, “So there [in the two new blocks] we 
are not going to have anything to do with the SHGs because we have not formed 
SHGs. We are going to work directly with the panchayats with limited objective. For 
example, to start with two objectives, one is working with the disabled people and 
another ultra-poor…so we want to motivate the panchayats' planning and all these 
things.” Similarly to SHGs, the panchayat system represents an opportunity to 
access a significant portion of the community and “spreading this whatever you 
believe in all the panchayats in a faster way.” The transition to panchayats from 
SHGs as its people’s organization of choice represents the diminishing growth 
potential in SHG work as well as the growing opportunity in panchayat work as 
national laws devolve more responsibilities to panchayats. The refocusing on 
panchayats complements CRUSADE’s long-standing and on-going activities training 
panchayat representatives, motivating women to stand for election and ward-level 
planning.81 
6.2.3 Mission 
As with ASSEFA, CRUSADE’s mission encompasses but is broader than income 
enhancement. Jothi describes CRUSADE’s mission as poverty reduction. He 
explains, “[The mission is] to reduce poverty. Reduce the health problem mainly. 
Reduce maybe even problems of the mind. So this is, less pain, less pain and more 
comfortable or more happy living…”   
 
Also like ASSEFA, CRUSADE pursues its mission through a community-based 
approach which until recently relied exclusively on SHGs. Unlike ASSEFA however, 
CRUSADE prioritizes benefits to individual members over community-building goals 
as demonstrated by its targeting of poor households.82  CRUSADE targets the poor 
as a point of principle. As Jothi asserts, a failure to target the poor would be a failure 
in its commitment to reducing inequality and possibly even exacerbate inequality. 
CRUSADE has used poverty means tests, participatory rural appraisal, and 
geographic targeting in the past to ensure appropriate selection of SHG members but 
relies primarily on direct observation and personal communication, informed by 
                                            
81 A panchayat includes approximately six to nine wards. CRUSADE facilitates ward-level 
planning via SHGs. CRUSADE has also collaborated with a state-level forum of panchayat 
leaders and a state-level movement (VSA) advocating policy changes to devolve more 
money and authority to panchayats.  
82 In our discussion of targeting Jothi initially defined the poor as the “bottom 50” (ostensibly 
referring to the bottom 50 percent of below the poverty line (BPL) households). Later in the 
discussion he simply referred to “below the poverty line”  households.  In practice many of 
CRUSADE’s communities were chosen for their dalit populations. 
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experience, to determine the suitability of new members.83 Although CRUSADE 
promotes and works through people’s organizations with an eye towards building 
their self-reliance it is without the inclusion of the entire community and the explicit 
goal of Gram Swaraj. This is confirmed further by CRUSADE’s much stronger 
commitment to connecting members with government benefits. 
6.2.4 Organizational leadership and culture 
Jothi, like Loganathan, is the organizational founder and leader and as such holds 
significant power and influence over the culture, mission, values, goals and 
strategies pursued by CRUSADE. However, while Loganathan minimizes his 
leadership role and casts himself as an advisor and facilitator, Jothi by contrast 
implicitly and explicitly acknowledges his central role. CRUSADE is Jothi’s 
organization. When reflecting on evolving relations with villagers Jothi describes their 
initial resistance to CRUSADE and how now “…we have a lot of relations which can 
capitalize on…” Now the women can rely on the “structures” and “resolve the 
problem or at least to have some sort of you know power, empowered to tackle the 
problems.” He continues, “I am happy because I used to say that some ten years 
back if I had to stop work then I would be very unhappy because its all unfinished so 
I’ll be very unhappy that we are not taken to logical conclusion. Now if I have to stop 
work I, ok there may be some feelings, but I know I won’t mind…because the people 
would, it will not stop because I stop. The people will carry it on.” The villagers will 
sustain the structures he has built. Jothi does not mention what if any CRUSADE’s 
continuing role would be beyond his retirement. 
 
The physical environment of the CRUSADE office also speaks to Jothi’s central role. 
He is the only one with an individual office and nearly all materials are stored there. 
Jothi’s office houses two computers and several file cabinets with documents 
stacked on top of the cabinets and bookshelves. Meanwhile the headquarters’ other 
rooms were sparsely furnished. One additional room has workspace with two desks 
and one computer, shared by staff as needed. During our interviews staff members, 
both managers, support staff and fieldworkers, streamed in and out of Jothi’s office 
consulting and reporting to him on operational issues, including their comings and 
goings. The scene brings to mind the spider web image used by Handy to describe 
the club (1988) or power (1993) culture. Jothi sits at the centre of the organization 
and with webs of direct communication extending out in “everwidening circles of 
intimates and influence” (Handy 1988, p. 86). Power cultures work best in small 
organizations and CRUSADE’s small size means communication is easy and direct 
with all staff.  
 
ASSEFA’s larger size means a shared organizational culture is critical to cohesive 
and consistent action by staff, avoiding mission drift and for Loganathan to maintain 
control over the organization. CRUSADE’s small size and Jothi’s clear position as 
leader allows him to maintain control through personal interaction with staff.84 Mid-
level managers, called program associates or program managers, have some 
supervisory authority (the degree of which seemed based on seniority) but appear 
primarily assistants and surrogates for Jothi. For example, Sakthivel, the most senior 
program manager was most vocal of the three managers, leading a staff meeting in 
Jothi’s absent. But he fell silent when Jothi arrived to take charge. Because of the 
relatively small size of CRUSADE’s project area, Jothi can have direct contact not 
                                            
83 CRUSADE’s methods of targeting and their outcomes will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 8 under performance management. 
84 CRUSADE has approximately two dozen paid employees compared with ASSEFA’s over 
400 paid employees (not including teachers and member volunteers). CRUSADE staff include 
eight cluster coordinators, three program associates/managers and support staff. 
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only with staff and all aspects of operations but also with individual members. “In 
fact,” Jothi reports, “in the ultra-poor project I know all the families we are assisting…I 
personally go and see because its a grant…all the 50 or 60 ultra-poor families I know 
because I visit them before even giving any assistance I make sure to visit.” Jothi is 
also personally involved in interventions made on behalf of members with third 
parties, including banks and government agencies. CRUSADE has maintained a 
power culture and avoided mission drift over its 20 years’ work but has done so in 
part because it has avoided the tensions of growth entirely. Although it has grown 
from its first eight groups in 1993 to managing approximately 485 groups in 2012 it 
has not grown to a size beyond Jothi’s ability to personally manage, although some 
systems have been introduced (such as a central monitoring system) to address the 
challenges of managing its larger size. 
6.2.5 Organizational structure and human resources 
CRUSADE employs eight field workers, called cluster coordinators, tasked with 
“monitoring” its SHG groups. Cluster coordinators oversee 40 to 80 groups each. 
They attend the SHGs’ monthly village-level and panchayat-level meetings.85 Their 
role includes addressing problems with accounts, repayments and bank linkage, 
conducting trainings and motivating members to participate in additional schemes 
such as life insurance. Two of the cluster coordinators are designated block 
coordinators with supervisory responsibilities over the other three cluster 
coordinators in their respective block.  
 
Three program associates or program managers assist Jothi in his oversight of field 
staff and project work. They “help” cluster coordinators. One project coordinator 
oversees CRUSADE’s medicinal herbs/gardens project, one coordinates the 
disability project and the third coordinates income-generation activities. The disability 
and income-generation program managers help cluster coordinators organize 
activities and address problems. The first coordinator, focused on the herbal garden 
project, enters, compiles and produces the quarterly report based on cluster 
coordinator reports of groupwise financial performance. In contrast to ASSEFA’s 
contingent of long-time managers CRUSADE’s program managers have worked with 
ASSEFA for one and a half, five and eight years respectively reflecting perhaps the 
lack of any promotion potential within CRUSADE. 
 
As with ASSEFA, CRUSADE has promoted independent community-based 
microfinance organizations to create additional benefit for SHG members and further 
their sustainability. Figure 6.2 below illustrates the structure of CRUSADE in terms of 
its interaction with its groups and its two promoted organizations, ARH and PPI. 
CRUSADE federated SHGs at the cluster level and then promoted a registered trust 
as an apex organization. The apex association, PPI, was registered as a trust in 
2007.86 The arrows indicate the flow of representation from the village-level groups 
up to PPI (in the form of the trustees).  
 
                                            
85 Village-level meetings are intended for all group members but panchayat-level meetings 
are only attended by groups’ animators. (Individual group meetings are held once or twice a 
month but managed by group animators and no longer attended by cluster coordinators.) 
Jothi reports CRUSADE used to have very strong panchayat-level groups but has backed 
away from that level of association since the state government’s drive to register panchayat-
level federations (PLFs). Registered PLFs include non-CRUSADE groups making monitoring 
of this level of association difficult for CRUSADE and prompting it to focus on the village and 
cluster level. 
86 Block-level associations exist also but only informally. The block level associations only 
include some animators from villages with “more groups.” Block-level associations selected 
the initial trustees for PPI. 
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Revolving funds previously managed by the informal associations were transferred to 
PPI to be governed by nine trustees selected by members from among SHG 
animators. Trustees meet quarterly to set lending guidelines and targets. Trustees 
also authorize loan dispersements (“write the checks”) and “monitor” loan repayment. 
PPI employs one part-time employee in Sholavaram block and one full-time 
employee (one of the trustees) in Minjur block to conduct the day-to-day business of 
the organization including bookkeeping, processing loan applications and liaising 
with the bank. As might be expected, CRUSADE coordinates closely with PPI and 
Jothi holds significant influence over it. CRUSADE’s cluster coordinators work on 
behalf of PPI in the course of their interaction with group members and receive a 
portion of their salary from PPI’s profits. Cluster coordinators promote loans from PPI 
and assist with application, monitoring and repayment of loans. Jothi remains close 
to PPI’s operations through his supervision of cluster coordinators but also through 
direct participation in PPI’s decision-making processes. He helps resolve issues as 
needed, reviews loan applications, and attends quarterly trustee meetings.  
 
CRUSADE has an equally close relationship with ARH. ARH was incorporated in 
2005 to provide loans exclusively for housing construction and repair. It was 
incorporated as a non-profit company with 150 group animators serving as company 
shareholders. ARH is governed by a five-person board that meets quarterly. The 
board includes two group animators (one from each block) and two external persons 
(one from the NGO and one from the banking sector). The fifth board member and 
managing chairperson of ARH is Jothi’s wife. She has significant involvement not 
only through board membership but also in day-to-day operations, essentially 
running the company (doing all clerical and accounting work) on a volunteer basis 
until early 2011 when the first and only paid (and part-time) staff person was 
appointed. Cluster coordinators assist in promotion, application and repayment of 
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ARH loans. As with PPI, Jothi is easily able to influence and coordinate ARH’s work 
with CRUSADE and PPI. Jothi stays connected with ARH’s activities again through 
cluster coordinators, his wife and direct participation in decision-making processes, 
including advising on loan applications and attending quarterly meetings.  
 
CRUSADE’s small size eliminates the distance between Jothi and field staff and 
even members, creating an effectively flat organization. Jothi is able to personally 
complete the task of integrating CRUSADE’s diverse tasks and projects. This 
includes coordinating the work of ARH, PPI and CRUSADE. Jothi attends staff 
meetings, ARH trustee meetings, PPI board meetings and even SHG meetings as 
needed. Jothi has formal authority in CRUSADE and although he does not have 
formal authority in ARH and PPI he exerts influence as the founder but also through 
their dependence on CRUSADE for technical and organizational support. 
CRUSADE’s small size allows for this complete concentration of authority in its 
founder while remaining flexible and responsive.  
 
This chapter introduces the two case study organizations and discusses internal 
characteristics—mission, leadership, organizational culture, structure and human 
resources—within which social performance management and assessment is 
embedded. ASSEFA and CRUSADE define their missions in similar ways: as income 
and social enhancement pursued through a community-based approach, but while 
CRUSADE explicitly targets the poor, ASSEFA prioritizes an inclusive community-
wide approach. Both organizations also rely on leadership by strong founders who 
are critical to the maintenance of organizational cultures reinforcing their missions. 
However, the two case study organizations diverge in their approach to 
organizational growth, often considered a risk to mission and social performance. 
Both have rejected the logic of rapid growth and commercialization characterizing 
recent trends in the global and Indian microfinance sectors. However, while 
CRUSADE has stayed small and largely avoided the risks of organizational growth 
entirely, ASSEFA has pursued a model of growth—growing out instead of up through 
the spinning off of autonomous but affiliated organizations—achieving significant 
scale and financial autonomy while mitigating the potential risks of organizational 
growth to mission and social performance.  
 
The case studies’ internal characteristics reflect their ideological underpinnings. They 
also point to the case study organizations’ responses to external pressures on 
financial and social performance. Chapter 7 will explore the nature and role of 
external relations further, including the case study organizations’ relations with the 
government, private donors, microfinance sector and members. Chapter 7 will then 




Chapter 7: Case Study Findings: External Relations and SPA 
 
This chapter continues reporting the ASSEFA and CRUSADE case study findings. 
Beginning first with ASSEFA (Section 7.1), the chapter will present findings on the 
organization’s external relationships with government (with a focus largely on state 
government), institutional donors, within the sector (including other MFOs, NGOs and 
banks), and its membership. Section 7.2 addresses CRUSADE’s external relations 
The final section (Section 7.3) narrows the focus from organizational characteristics 
and external relations to a discussion of each case study organizations’ social 
performance assessment system, a topic with both internal and external 
components. The following chapter, Chapter 8, will draw from the empirical chapters 




ASSEFA emerged from a period of state-NGO estrangement and conflict that existed 
during the 1960s and 1970s in India (see Section 3.2). Not surprisingly state-NGO 
conflict prompted increased state control and regulation of Indian NGOs, a trend that 
continued into the 1990s. The climate surrounding ASSEFA’s origin arguably 
contributes the tone of distrust with which it regards government and its development 
efforts. In interviews and informal conversations, respondents focus on ASSEFA’s 
close proximity and long-term commitment to the people in contrast to the 
government’s politically-driven armchair efforts. 
 
Over the course of ASSEFA’s organizational life, the Indian state has become more 
substantially and directly involved in poverty alleviation efforts.87 Additionally, apart 
from the 1960s and 1970s, NGO-state relations have involved close cooperation as 
the state continues to fund NGOs to deliver village-level services. ASSEFA has 
selectively participated in government partnerships despite its antipathy towards 
government. Kumar cites potential for “collaborations” as one of ASSEFA’s 
opportunities. He continues, “You can easily…know that [sic] different schemes that 
are available in the government or other private like hospitals who are willing to 
collaborate.” ASSEFA’s partnership with Tamil Nadu’s TNCDW in the 1990s is one 
example of its collaboration with government (see Sections 3.4.1 and 6.1.1). 
ASSEFA also has collaborated (and currently does collaborate) with NABARD and 
state government in at least six watershed projects. ASSEFA engages with state 
government in more limited ways through the exchange of expertise. It has 
representation on two state government committees on education and rural 
development respectively, uses government experts as trainers and leverages its 
own efforts with available government resources (such as government subsidies for 
purchase of agricultural implements). Its behaviour reflects duality in ASSEFA’s 
relationships with the state: antipathy alongside pragmatic collaboration.  
 
Threats to NGO autonomy come through the direct obligations of government 
partnership and more subtle processes of cooption that adapt the roles and 
objectives of NGOs to meet the state’s interests (see Section 3.2.3). Responses by 
NGOs include leaning in to new roles or opting out of government collaboration 
                                            
87 Partially in response to declining growth rates following Nehru’s death, beginning in the 
1960’s promotion of economic growth was supplemented by increased allocations towards 
programs directly targeting poor households such as minimum needs, employment and 
income generation (Guhan 2001). 
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completely (see Section 3.2.4). ASSEFA avoids cooption and reconciles the relative 
ambiguity of its position with regard to government by choosing partnerships 
selectively and exiting those that threaten its independence. ASSEFA voluntarily left 
Mahalir Thittam in response to increasing inequality in the relationship between 
TNCDW and the NGO partners. Specific complaints included TNCDW’s refusal to 
address problems raised by NGOs, including issues working with the local bank 
managers, and increasing demands made from local political party leaders for SHG 
support, such as that NGOs promote SHG attendance at political rallies. In other 
cases ASSEFA shifted strategies pre-emptively to remain free of interference, for 
instance retreating from work when it became politicized by government involvement. 
When the Tamil Nadu government entered promotion of Gram Sabhas, ASSEFA 
removed itself to focus on other configurations of peoples’ organizations. 
 
ASSEFA values independence from the complications government collaboration and 
the freedom to experiment.88 When ASSEFA left Mahalir Thittam it continued working 
independently with its SHGs, including promoting an NBFC to serve their credit 
needs. However, in the context of increasing allocations targeting the rural poor, 
avoiding government partnership has not secured freedom from government 
interference. At times it has placed ASSEFA in competition with the state 
government. Early in its evolution ASSEFA established schools in rural areas that 
were underserved by the state government. As the state subsequently began 
investing more heavily in rural education, ASSEFA increasingly was running schools 
in parallel with or in duplication of government efforts. Competition can adversely 
impact social performance. For instance, Vasantha, the senior manager of the apex 
education trust, blames competition from the state government for high teacher 
turnover at ASSEFA schools. The state offers, Vasantha asserts, higher pay and 
“easy work.” ASSEFA has sometimes chosen to exit rather than continue competing 
with government efforts. ASSEFA turned over some of its schools to the state 
government, citing their superior resources and hence greater ease with which they 
can support the on-going operation of the schools (such as in the area of 
Sivangangai where 5 of 15 schools were transferred to the state government’s care).  
 
The transfer of schools provides an example of ASSEFA exiting competition with 
government in provision of services in rural areas. In other areas, such as its dairy 
program, ASSEFA has chosen to persist despite competition and sometimes 
coercion from the state government. When ASSEFA attempted to establish its first 
processing facility for the benefit of its dairy groups the state government actively 
opposed them. ASSEFA ultimately pursued the case to the Supreme Court before 
being granted the right to open its processing facility. At the time it opened the first 
facility, the state government had no competition in collection and processing of milk 
from rural producers. In the years since ASSEFA successfully entered dairy 
processing the number of competitors has multiplied but the relevance of state-NGO 
competition remains (for ASSEFA and for members) as illustrated by one visit made 
to a dairy group. At least one group member reports sending half of her household’s 
milk to a government processor and half to the ASSEFA facility because while she 
was an ASSEFA group member, her husband held a leadership position in the 
AIADMK, Tamil Nadu’s ruling political party. 
 
Despite successfully competing with state government in dairy collecting and 
processing, recent microfinance regulation clearly demonstrate the state’s on-going 
                                            
88 A partial exception to ASSEFA’s preference for independence from the government 
interference appeared in the area of microfinance regulation. SNFL’s senior manager 
expressed relief that the RBI regulations would establish regulatory authority outside of the 
state government, which was deemed more easily influenced by politics. 
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ability to control and coerce NGOs through its regulatory powers (see Sections 3.2.2 
and 3.4.4). Although the regulation that emerged (thus far) from the microfinance 
crisis only applies to NBFCs, they illustrate the authority of the state to set the terms 
on which microfinance is provided and define the roles of different NGO-MFOs. 
While the microfinance organizations who most egregiously jeopardized client well-
being were arguably those pursuing commercial status and success regulation 
likewise impacts more socially-oriented NGO-MFOs like ASSEFA, including 
constraining their ability to pursue alternative (community-owned and managed) 
models of microfinance provision (see Section 6.1.2). 
 
Overall ASSEFA respondents perceived the government as able at any time to use 
the weight of their resources and regulatory power to control or coopt any aspect of 
ASSEFA’s work. Kumar pointed to the pattern of the Mahalir Thittam program in 
which NGOs perform the work of recruiting and supporting SHGs while the state 
program takes credit for the growth and success of the SHG movement in Tamil 
Nadu. As Kumar half-joked, “we start something and then government come and 
take it. We started self-help group. Government took away. Now we are looking at 
the farmers. So sometimes in the future the government will also take away the 
farmers group.” Regardless of the precision of this narrative it again reflects the way 
in which ASSEFA views itself relative to the government: in a position of relative 
powerlessness but superior effectiveness, innovativeness and resilience. Its narrative 
reflects its organizational culture (particularly through its time and place of origin) but 
the story itself is also pragmatic. Another aspect of managing the duality of its 
position relative to government, ASSEFA, throughout its interaction with the state, 
must maintain its legitimacy and viability. To maintain legitimacy as a civil society 
actor (Section 3.2.1) it cannot afford to be perceived as coopted by government and 
transformed into a mere service provider, but must preserve its role as a 
counterbalance to the state. However it must do so without creating undue hostility 
from the state that would threaten its viability.  
7.1.2 Private donors  
Relations with institutional donors are fraught with the “double-edged nature of 
contracts” (Copestake et al. 2005, p. 173). As in the case of government partnership, 
the financial and technical support offered by donors increases capacity and 
potentially performance however obligations to donors can compromise NGO 
autonomy, flexibility and redirect accountability upwards. Close donor relations 
coupled with poor oversight can breed over-dependence and erode financial 
discipline. An NGO thus must balance its need for support and the terms of that 
support with its performance. Over its history ASSEFA has struck its balance through 
careful selection of donor partnerships. More recently ASSEFA has used 
microfinance to cross-subsidize its development programs and move away from 
grant-based funding towards community-based funding, a strategy that enhances 
autonomy and is consistent with its overall development philosophy of Gram Swaraj. 
 
In any discussion of ASSEFA’s funding strategy it should first be noted that 
comprehensive or detailed information on ASSEFA’s finances was not available. This 
may indicate a reluctance to share such information with an outsider (and public 
disclosure of financial information is not required of NGOs in India) or it may indicate 
comprehensive information is not readily available in the organization generally. In 
organizations with a power culture information is often held closely by the founder 
and not regularly shared with middle or lower ranks in the organization The web-like 
structure means the central authority is more easily and exclusively the collection 
point for information regarding the full picture of organizational financial performance 
(see Section 6.1.5). The information available included annual reports for the last 
four years, which did not include any financial statements. A review of ASSEFA’s 
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history, produced in 2008 for its 40th anniversary, provided limited historical financial 
data. Interviews added some insight on current finances and funding strategy. 
Finally, discussions and annual reports from AVI, one of ASSEFA’s oldest 
supporters, added some additional detail. Financial information on ASSEFA as a 
whole, however, was not readily available. The limited financial information while 
telling in itself makes it difficult to compare or augment characterizations of the 
funding strategy and its effect against financial records. It also made it difficult to 
create a complete picture of donor relationships over time. What is clear is that 
ASSEFA uses selective partnership and cost recovery to protect its autonomy. 
 
Loganathan describes donors as “friends.” ASSEFA’s relationships with its donors 
are long-term and friendly. This includes “friends of ASSEFA” groups in the UK and 
Italy. AVI, previously called “Friends of ASSEFA” (FoA), is one of ASSEFA’s longest 
supporters. FoA started in 1988 as a discussion group of people interested in India 
and took on a fundraising goal when in 1990 it began raising funds for a Vadugapatti 
area project in which ASSEFA was assisting villagers with the purchase of looms and 
silk production. In 1992 FoA was asked to manage the Lathur area project that was 
co-funded by the UK government and at this point FoA became a funding agency.89 
Although only one of its donors, AVI provides a useful example of the types of 
supporters ASSEFA garners. Loganathan expands, “We have connections with 
organisations like AVI all over the world. All have common philosophies and beliefs. 
We see them all as being part of the ASSEFA family. They are an extension of the 
work we are doing here in India and allow more people, the world over, to find out 
about what we do.” (Action Village India 2009). Such financial relationships provide 
freedom for experimentation. 
 
In addition to careful donor selection, ASSEFA uses microfinance to cross-subsidize 
its non-credit programs and reduce dependence on external funds. As described in 
its 40th anniversary review, this strategy was at least part necessity, responding to 
diminishing external funds. “As the major long-term donors of ASSEFA such as 
ICCO reached the end of their grant periods in the late 1990s Annachi decided to 
change the financing strategy from grant based development to community self-
financing.” (Sundaresan & Chandrapaul 2008, p. 90).90 (See Section 3.2.3) 
 
Also in the 40th anniversary review Vijay Manoharan related some of the plans 
ASSEFA made to facilitate its transition from a “100% grant based organisation to a 
nearly 100% community and loan fund based organisation….” The plans included 
“To use nearly 6 percent [of interest income from credit operations] for education and 
health related programs.” with the intention to raise “No grants…externally unless the 
local situation demands it.” (Sundaresan & Chandrapaul 2008, p.93). The plans were 
quoted from a 2003 internal memo and outlining action to be undertaken over the 
next three years.  
 
The efforts cited in The Silent March of the Invisible Force (Sundaresan & 
Chandrapaul 2008) were ostensibly successful as indicated by Chart 7.1.91 As the 
table illustrates, grant-based funds as a percentage of the “development programs” 
                                            
89 FoA later began fundraising relationships with five other Indian NGOs, “all of which are 
personally known to our members.” After broadening its support beyond ASSEFA, FoA 
changed its name to Action Village India (AVI) in 1997. 
90 ICCO = Interchurch organization for development cooperation 
91 It is somewhat puzzling that the 2003 memo was cited but not any subsequent reporting of 
what was actually done given the three-year timeframe was long past at the time the 2008 
review was published. 
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budget declined from 10 to 5 percent from 2003 to 2008.92 Kumar also reported that 
currently (as of the 2012 fieldwork) only 5 percent of ASSEFA’s Rs. 500 crore annual 
budget is grant-based with the remaining 95 percent covered by the locally mobilized 
funds and bank loans. External funds are primarily used for expansion and for the 
support of education programs. Other programs and activities are supported by 
revenue raised from interest earned on-lending bank loans, school fees, sales of 
dairy and other agricultural products and other money mobilized from local 
communities. Thus members largely fund ASSEFA. This funding model is consistent 
with ASSEFA’s focus on Gram Swaraj, mobilizing local resources to meet local 
needs and demands. The model also aligns with ASSEFA’s vision of itself as a 
people-led organization in which mobilization of local funds builds organizational self-




                                            
92 It also interesting to note the even more marked progress made replacing grant-based 
funding for development programs with local funds throughout the 1990s. Data is not 
available to indicate exactly what was responsible for this shift although it does correspond 
with a period of growth and formalization of microfinance provision (although pre-SNFL). 
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Chart 7.1 ASSEFA: Increases in percentage share of local contributions  
for development programs versus grants 
 
Taken from Silent March of the Invisible Force (Sundaresan & Chandrapaul 
2008, p. 44) 
 
7.1.3 Microfinance sector 
Rapid growth leading to over-saturation and multiple lending is often cited as a 
contributory factor to the microfinance crisis in India. And indeed, in Tamil Nadu there 
were 3.85 microfinance clients for every poor household (Srinivasan 2011). However, 
respondents within and outside ASSEFA assert over-saturation was not an issue 
overall in Tamil Nadu and rather assert the significant potential for the continued 
growth of microfinance. Respondents were similarly dismissive of competition 
between SNFL and other MFOs as problematic or contentious. Kumar states, “It’s 
[competition with other area MFOs] not relevant. Because ASSEFA has been there 
for a long period and many of the microfinance institutions are NGOs. They were 
once worked in ASSEFA. [Laughs].” He continued by pointing to BAXIS, PRADAN, 
and the Dhan Foundation as off shoots of ASSEFA working in microfinance in Tamil 
Nadu. As part of the same conversation respondents were questioned about some of 
the newer entrants to the Tamil Nadu microfinance sector, including Equitas, Grama 
Vidyal and SMILE. The zonal manager downplays their presence in the area, 
characterizing it as small. Respondents did acknowledge the problem of multiple 
lending (specifically borrowers taking loans from SNFL to pay back loans owed other 
MFOs) however they emphasized the recent addition of the credit bureau Highmark 
to address the problem.  
 
Banks are a funder and competitor for SNFL. As SNFL lenders, banks can expand or 
constrain ASSEFA’s financial and social performance capacity in a similar way as 
government and private donors. ASSEFA’s relationship with banks is one of 
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necessity and generally unsatisfactory. As part of its partnership with TNCDW in the 
1990s ASSEFA facilitated the linkage of SHGs to local banks for the purpose of 
opening saving accounts and accessing loans. ASSEFA found bank managers and 
staff difficult to work with given their reluctance to engage with SHG groups. On 
leaving the partnership, ASSEFA established SNFL and it no longer assisted SHGs 
with bank linkage for the purpose of seeking credit. However NBFCs in India cannot 
accept deposits so SHG members still rely on banks for savings accounts at least.93 
 
Since establishing SNFL, ASSEFA’s primary relationship with banks is through bank 
loans taken to maintain SNFL’s lendable corpus. SNFL’s success obtaining loans 
has been irregular since the crisis. When microfinance was growing rapidly “the 
banks were knocking at the doors of the company.” At the peak Asokkumar reports 
SNFL borrowed more than 800 million rupees per year from banks. Bank borrowing 
had fallen to just ten million rupees at the time of the fieldwork due to the liquidity 
problems accompanying the crisis. Even though SNFL’s pre-crisis growth was 
modest when compared with MFIs pursuing rapid expansion and access to 
commercial finance, Asokkumar still cites over-borrowing (and the resultant high 
overdues) as complicating ability to borrow banks funds in the current climate. 
Asokkumar states (in reference to the period since the crisis), “…whenever available 
we are raising the money from ourselves…so that some level of lending is 
maintained.” He expresses the same desire for independence from banks that 
ASSEFA expresses generally in regards to government partnerships. Asokkumar 
expresses somewhat wistfully that SNFL “as far as possible we must try to reduce 
our dependence on bank loans” even though, he continues, “we cannot do away with 
bank borrowing.”  
 
To improve SNFL’s position, SNFL has addressed overdues to make it more 
attractive to banks and considered strategies to diversify funding sources and avoid 
over-dependence on commercial banks in the future. In the first place, SNFL has put 
all bad loans to zero and is committed to not return to pre-crisis levels of bank 
borrowing (and related growth rate) but rather to “limited borrowing.” In the second 
place, Asokkumar speculates that the new NBFC-MFI legislation would open up 
additional sources of loans for SNFL, such as foreign commercial organizations, 
particularly “social lenders…who know ASSEFA very well” and “understand the 
philosophy of ASSEFA.” This is consistent with ASSEFA’s desire to seek 
partnerships generally with like-minded partners who respect their autonomy and 
social mission. It also reflects ASSEFA’s habit of trading on its reputation as a well-
respected and long-established organization committed to social performance. 
Asokkumar further also speculates SNFL may negotiate an alternative relationship 
with banks in which banks used SMBTs as a management and collection agent (as 
does SNFL). Rather than loaning to SNFL the bank will be loan directly to the 
borrower but use SNFL’s SMBT structure to manage dispersal and collection for a 
percentage of the interest rate.  
 
SNFL’s current strategy with regards to banks reflects necessity born of the crisis but 
also a strategic thrust to increase its autonomy, by reducing its overall dependence 
on banks and the extent to which its dependence constrains performance. It also 
reflects the extra difficulty faced by SNFL, as a community-owned and managed 
MFO, in its bank relationships in the post-crisis context. SNFL’s model is not 
consistent with mainstream models of microfinance and is at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to more mainstream MFIs seeking bank loans given the 
metrics on which banks judge MFIs.  
                                            
93 Kumar reports ASSEFA does not regret NBFCs inability to take deposits, saying that would 
make them just a bank. 
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SNFL faces similar disadvantage in the sector more broadly. New RBI regulations 
penalized SNFL in a sense, not allowing for the community-owned and managed 
model and requiring SNFL’s restructuring (see Section 6.1.2). SNFL also receives 
pressure from microfinance associations to which it belongs (specifically MFIN) for its 
slow compliance with Unified Code of Conduct, attributable to an alternative 
approach that increases the cost of compliance. The tension in SNFL’s relationships 
with banks, regulators and microfinance associations demonstrate the pressure and 
difficulty SNFL (and by extension ASSEFA) faces in meeting the norms and 
standards of mainstream microfinance while maximizing social performance 
according to its own model and mission.94 
7.1.4 Members 
As discussed in previous sections, ASSEFA sees its membership as an extension of 
itself or part of the ASSEFA family. ASSEFA may even object to categorizing 
member relations as ‘external’. Members are involved in the ownership and 
management of microfinance as well as other activities. A strictly client-service 
provider relationship, as seen in mainstream microfinance models, does not fully 
describe the rationale behind ASSEFA/SNFL staff-borrower interaction nor does it 
reflect the level of overlap between those the categories (of staff and borrower). 
 
The first way ASSEFA’s demonstrates a more intense level of engagement than 
client-service provider is through its community-wide approach. A zonal manager 
describes how he enters a new village. He starts by visiting the village tea shop 
where he meets local village members, introduces himself, and introduces ASSEFA. 
He asks for referrals and introductions to prominent village members. Upon gaining 
the favour of important village members, ASSEFA begins organizing groups, 
including groups to benefit the members of prominent households. ASSEFA’s 
method for organizing women into federated SHGs is not substantively different than 
other socially-oriented MFOs using group methodology, but perhaps what makes 
ASSEFA distinctive is the variety of often overlapping credit-based groups it forms 
throughout the community. In addition to organizing women into SHGs and SMBTs 
for credit and non-credit purposes, ASSEFA organizes chit groups. For instance, one 
area has 600 chit groups that draw members from its pre-existing SHGs. Group 
membership overlaps more extensively considering the entire household. A male 
household head may participate in a farmers’ group while his wife participates in an 
SHG, dairy and/or chit group.  
 
Social movement literature distinguishes between movement organizations with 
inclusive and exclusive membership requirements. The distinction exists not in 
targeting as the labels apparently imply but in the demands of membership at entry 
and on-going. An inclusive organization requires minimal levels of initial commitment, 
“a pledge of general support without specific duties, a short indoctrination period, or 
none at all.” In contrast an exclusive organization holds new members in a longer 
period of initiation and requires “the recruit to subject himself to organization 
discipline and orders, and to draw from those having the heaviest initial commitments” 
(Zald & Ash-Garner 1987, p. 125). In a sense the SHG movement as a whole is 
                                            
94 SNFL reports performance data to MIX Market. It also belongs to Sa-Dhan, an association 
started to represent community-based organizations and MFIN, the newer of the associations 
represents (in large part) the subset of microfinance organizations that are NBFCs. As 
NBFCs they are larger and more closely regulated by RBI and so face a different set of 
problems compared to other MFOs. The NBFCs represent almost 80 percent of the total 
microfinance sector, but in terms of number of members probably less than 10 percent of Sa-
Dhan’s members.  
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characterized by exclusive membership requirements given the typical six-month 
period of initiation in which SHG group members are trained and ‘prove’ their 
discipline through regular savings. After entry, inclusive organizations require little 
activity by members and they can belong to other groups or organizations 
“unselfconsciously.” Behaviour is “not as permeated by organization goals, policies, 
and tactics.” As one would expect, exclusive organizations require greater amounts 
of energy and time and more “extensively permeate all sections of the member’s 
life…” (ibid.).  
 
ASSEFA clearly aims for a relatively intensive level of participation from members. 
This occurs through ‘layering’ of activities as described above as well as the 
significant responsibilities held by many participants. Members serve as group 
leaders and teachers and mentors to newer members (as in the case of the Farmers’ 
Renaissance Program in which “progressive farmers” are identified, recruited and 
then asked to serve as teachers, mentors and group leaders). The expectations of 
memberships extend beyond the governance duties built into a given activity’s 
structure as well. Asokkumar refers to the mutual support SHG members provide 
each other outside the formal group interactions such as on the occasion of a 
member daughter’s marriage. Loganathan points to the high attendance at a 
wedding of two ASSEFA workers as evidence of the strong solidarity of ASSEFA 
membership beyond any individual group. He also expresses frustration that not all 
ASSEFA schoolteachers enrol their own children in ASSEFA schools. But clearly, 
demonstrations of loyalty and commitment are expected which are beyond those 
required by governance of the activity group structure and even their formal social 
activities. Such demonstrations are evidence of ASSEFA’s successful community 
building. 
 
Participation levels inevitably vary by geographical area and by individual. Individual 
community members cannot be compelled to participate nor can members be 
compelled to meet every expectation. As discussed in Section 6.1.3, ASSEFA 
incentivizes membership and participation in the ASSEFA family through material 
incentives (credit), but while material incentives draw people to the organization 
ASSEFA’s mission relies more fully on the solidary incentives for membership and 





Like ASSEFA, CRUSADE became an early partner of TNCDW’s Mahalir Thittam 
project, when it was recruited to partnership in 1997.  And as with ASSEFA, 
CRUSADE ultimately became disillusioned with the collaboration. Jothi describes 
Mahalir Thittam as becoming “more bureaucratic” over time with a progressively less 
equal relationship between NGOs and TNCDW. Jothi further characterizes Mahalir 
Thittam as not only designed to take credit for the successes of the SHG movement 
but also to monitor NGOs (illustrating CRUSADE’s distrust of government, 
particularly state government). The partnership with TNCDW came early in 
CRUSADE’s development and was pivotal in sustaining and stabilizing the 
organization. It provided valuable training inputs at a time when resources from other 
donors were small. But as Jothi says “…I got fed up with all this government funding. 
So now…we can afford to say no to all this…”  
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Although CRUSADE and ASSEFA’s experience with government partnership bears 
broad similarities, there are at least two differences in their orientation towards 
government. The first difference is ideological. Although CRUSADE also carefully 
chooses collaborative opportunities to avoid cooption, unlike ASSEFA it actively 
assist its members with accessing government benefits as a substantive and 
deliberate aspect of its activities. The organization no longer works directly in 
partnership with the government but “we try to enable people to get the benefit from 
government…. it is their right.” Jothi continues, “The benefits should reach the 
people. Government you know allocate money. For example allocate money for 
several things. And it is the people’s right to get it.” This speaks to ASSEFA and 
CRUSADE’s disparate emphasis on Gram Swaraj and community-building as a goal 
relative to individual economic and social empowerment. ASSEFA emphasizes self-
contained programs to meets members’ needs. For instance, government-owned LIC 
(Life Insurance Company), the largest insurance company in India, bears 
responsibility to offer insurance to vulnerable classes. It approaches NGOs asking 
them to sell its insurance through their networks of SHGs. ASSEFA has rejected 
such proffers in favour of creating its own insurance scheme (the Sarvodaya Social 
Security Scheme). CRUSADE on the other hand participates in the scheme because 
it “benefit[s] the people.” It does so even though the small commission does not 
cover costs (time spent on the scheme by cluster coordinators) and it experiences 
on-going difficultly working with local LIC office.  As such, while CRUSADE maintains 
its independence from the obligations of government funding and partnership, its 
staff necessarily spends a significant time interacting with local government officials 
as part of major strategic thrusts as well as on an ad hoc basis on behalf of SHG 
members. CRUSADE also indirectly works with government in several ways. For 
example, recently the College in Minjur requested CRUSADE send 50 SHG leaders 
to a training it was holding based on a government award. It also designs certain 
programs to leverage or augment government benefits. ARH and PPI offer loans, for 
instance, designed to augment government funds available for housing and toilet 
construction.  
 
The second difference between CRUSADE and ASSEFA’s government orientation 
relates to their capacity to leverage partnership opportunities. ASSEFA relates 
stories of resisting government obstruction and interference in order to go its own 
way (see Section 7.1.1). CRUSADE has also retreated from certain approaches due 
to government interference (such as its reorientation away from panchayat-level 
federations and towards cluster and village-level federations after government 
promotion and registration of the former). CRUSADE has also been selective and 
limited in its collaborative efforts based on (as expressed) its desire for autonomy 
and to avoid politicization. However, CRUSADE expresses much more frustration 
with lack of responsiveness and corruption in the government departments with 
whom it sought collaboration. This includes two disappointing attempts to seek 
funding from HUD Corporation (a government housing agency) and the National 
Medicinal Development Board respectively. In both cases unethical behaviour 
(including bribe-seeking) prevented CRUSADE from making successful bids for 
funding. CRUSADE received funding early in its history from the Social Welfare 
Department. Jothi explains this success as due to a personal relationship with the 
chairperson and continues, “And that way it works. If you don’t [have] personal 
contact then it doesn’t work and otherwise you know it goes like this” [referring to the 
HUD and Medicinal Board experiences]. Perhaps CRUSADE soured on government 
partnership in part because of this lack of success and that lack of success stemmed 
from its smaller organizational size (compared with ASSEFA), both in terms of SHG 
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networks and networks with government officials. Its smaller size, geographical 
penetration and prestige likely give it less leverage with government agencies. 
 
As with ASSEFA, CRUSADE’s orientation towards the government has been both 
ideologically and strategically pivotal. However CRUSADE casts itself more as a 
facilitator and mediator between poor families and the government. CRUSADE 
recognizes the government’s growing role in rural development and while it sees 
government efforts as disingenuous, Jothi recognizes their impact. He noted that the 
role of NGOs has been “reduced” over the past 20 years as government involvement 
increases (including the increasing delegation of authority to local panchayats). He 
questions whether self-reliance is built by government programs or rather just 
another type of dependence. But as Jothi’s wife concludes “now we are happy that at 
least somebody’s there to take care of the poor people.”  
7.2.2 Private donors 
CRUSADE and ASSEFA have similar approaches to private donor relationships, and 
at least one supporter in common. CRUSADE views donors as partners with whom it 
has long-term relationships. CRUSADE has only a handful of private donors, mostly 
based in the UK and who are connected with its first and primary contributor, AVI. As 
previously discussed, AVI began funding CRUSADE very early in its history and Jothi 
noted this event as a milestone in CRUSADE’s development (see Section 6.2.1).   
 
CRUSADE seeks collaborative donor relationships. The increasing inequality in the 
NGO-TNWDC relationship was the primarily reason Jothi cited for leaving Mahalir 
Thittam, rather than the unhappiness with the politicization and ineffectiveness of 
project management as emphasized by ASSEFA. It should be noted however that 
the primary benefit of the TNWDC partnership was training for the cluster 
coordinators and group leaders, a benefit with diminishing returns over time. TNWDC 
also pays a small commission for SHG formation and linkage, but reportedly so small 
as to not be particularly compelling, although that is not to suggest CRUSADE’s 
quitting was related to compensation per se. CRUSADE also continues to work with 
LIC even though benefits to CRUSADE are minimal and there are problems with 
local office staff. 
 
Much like ASSEFA, CRUSADE has pursued self-reliance through PPI on the theory 
that its profits can be used to cross-subsidize and sustain non-credit activities. 
However, PPI operates on a much smaller scale than SNFL and its profitability has 
clearly been limited. In fiscal year 2012-2013 PPI did not make a profit, although it 
had in previous years. Ultimately, CRUSADE is clearly still dependent on its private 
donors, particularly AVI, in a way ASSEFA is not. AVI funds the majority of staff 
costs, and as a listing of CRUSADE activities demonstrates, staff costs are likely to 
comprise the vast majority of CRUSADE’s expenses. Ivan Nutbrown, AVI’s 
Coordinator, mentions he has been encouraging Jothi to diversify its funding sources 
to hedge against any future changes in AVI’s situation. During the fieldwork, I 
attended a staff meeting where AVI featured prominently on the agenda. Staff was 
planning for the annual AVI visit, planning which villages, groups, and projects to 
present to visitors. Additionally Ivan had notified Jothi that there might be a gap in 
funding for six months. He requested Jothi prepare a report on how CRUSADE would 
deal with the potential shortfall of funds over the six-month period. Jothi reassured 
staff that CRUSADE would find a way to cover salaries and commenced a review of 
which activities could be continued given these circumstances (nearly all) and 
potential for income-generation (several ideas were suggested). 
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7.2.3 Microfinance sector 
CRUSADE acknowledges the presence of NGO and MFO competitors in the area 
but is dismissive of their impact on CRUSADE activities and performance. Jothi 
argues its early entrance, long-term presence and sincerity protected it from 
significant competition from other organizations. Jothi reports other NGOs “come and 
go” but don’t persist because they have “no base” in the area. Currently four or five 
NGOs operate in the block but “people” say CRUSADE is more effective.95 He 
reports limited contact with other NGOs but noted NGOs working in other sectors 
(such as AIDS) sometimes approach CRUSADE to collaborate. One competitor NGO 
caused problems for CRUSADE in Minjur block for a time, competing with them in 
SHG formation, until their activities declined and, Jothi reports, their groups began 
“coming to us.” In total competitor NGOs have successfully drawn “one or two” 
CRUSADE groups away, Jothi says, by making “a lot of promises” but only a few, 
maybe 10 percent leave and may come back while the remaining 90 percent remain 
stable with CRUSADE. 
 
Likewise with MFOs, Jothi reports two or three MFOs coming into its area of 
operation. “They pushed a lot of money into the groups and even now some of the 
members have taken loan from them…” This too, Jothi asserts, has waned. He says 
they heard the stories of problems in Andhra Pradesh that figured prominently in the 
microfinance crisis but “these are all stories for us…we don’t have any problem like 
this in our area in the sense you know we don’t run our institutions like an MFI.”  
 
CRUSADE’s relationship with banks is fundamentally different than ASSEFA’s. 
CRUSADE does not currently seek bank loans to on-lend via ARH or PPI. In this 
sense PPI and ARH have achieved greater autonomy from external parties than 
ASSEFA. By not pursuing bank funding PPI and ARH face significant limits to their 
sizes and lending capacity but also are free to manage their performance as they see 
fit and are not subject to the terms and expectations of banks in that regard. 
CRUSADE is still concerned with bank relations however. Banks are the 
intermediaries with whom PPI and ARH disperse loans to its members. More 
importantly, its SHG members interact with banks for savings and lending purposes 
generally and as discussed above CRUSADE still acts as facilitator and mediator in 
terms of forging relationships and resolving problems. 
 
Jothi has a number of complaints against local banks, calling them “sharks” who do 
not understand SHGs because they operate on a different “wavelength,” one 
governed by a profit orientation. CRUSADE observes banks creating savings from 
bank loans, achieving repayment through fresh loans, ignoring lending norms (such 
as loaning up to four times a group’s savings), failing to distinguish between poor and 
rich individuals, and retaining interest on government subsidises (to revolving fund) 
meant for SHG members. Problems with individual bank managers (including those 
listed above) remain some of the most oft-cited problems facing SHGs although 
problems are branch and manager specific. At the same time, Jothi cites SHG 
members’ greater confidence and independence interacting with banks, 
management of their bank accounts and getting bank loans as among the successes 
of individual SHG groups and the SHG movement overall. Successful groups “go to 
the bank…and get things done…”   
                                            
95 Jothi is most likely referring to Sholavaram block, one of CRUSADE’s two operational 
blocks and the block in which it is headquartered. The Tiruvallur District website reports 
Sholavaram block has a population of 156,628 (from Area and Population, 2011 (Tiruvallur 
District 2011)  
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Given banks play both a part in and obstruct SHG success, what remains somewhat 
unclear is what CRUSADE’s strategy is towards banks, that is whether they 
encourage their SHG members to minimize their dealings with banks or not. In a 
SHG meeting, Jothi advised one SHG group to accumulate savings in their common 
fund (rather than revolve the funds) to leverage greater loan amounts from banks. 
Saktivel advised groups attending another village-level SHG meeting that a group 
with a large common fund interested in taking out a bank loan should not take out a 
bank loan but lend and rotate the common fund. He argued they should “improve 
their own development not banks” (although he also advised they equalize their 
interest rate of 2 percent with the bank’s 1 percent monthly interest rate). CRUSADE 
respondents further report it encourages group members to take credit from any 
source, including banks, if it will be beneficial to them and sees interaction with banks 
as a key indicator of successful SHGs. Respondents simultaneously report 
CRUSADE doesn’t encourage bank linkage and rather encourages SHG members to 
use PPI, ARH and their own common fund for their credit needs.  At the very least, 
there has been a transition for CRUSADE since its inception from the role of 
encouraging bank linkage to a role of warning and protecting SHG members from 
bank abuses.  
 
7.3 Social performance assessment 
7.3.1 ASSEFA  
Chapter 6 and the first two sections of Chapter 7 have discussed the organizational 
landscape within which ASSEFA and CRUSADE confront and manage tensions 
relevant to social performance management. This section finishes the presentation of 
case study findings with a narrower focus on social performance assessment 
systems. It presents findings related to the translation of the social content of 
missions into systems and tools for information collection and feedback to decision 
makers. Social performance assessment, SPA, includes any “activity intended to 
clarify how far an organization is achieving social goals” (Copestake et al. 2005, p. 
178). As discussed in Chapter 2 both NGO and microfinance literature criticize a lack 
of attention to assessment and its contribution to mission drift (Lewis 2007, Edwards 
& Hulme 2002).  
 
One way to explore ASSEFA’s approach to SPA is relative to three common types of 
assessment activity discussed by Roche (1999): monitoring, evaluation, and impact 
assessment. The three activities are distinguished based on timing and frequency, 
analytical level, and specificity.96 In ASSEFA the distinction between the three 
activities is not distinct but it is instructive to observe activities ASSEFA engages with 
regularity versus periodically and what issues are or are not incorporated. 
 
Kumar described ASSEFA’s monitoring process with regards to a watershed project 
in Sivangangai. When asked what criteria or indicators ASSEFA uses to judge the 
project’s success, Kumar cites the goals of the project: to raise farmer income, 
recharge the area’s groundwater, and increase adoption by farmers of certain 
sustainable and organic farming methods. The approach to monitoring progress on 
                                            
96 As discussed in Section 2.3.2, monitoring occurs frequently. It generally examines inputs, 
outputs and project activities and compares objectives with results. Evaluation occurs less 
frequently and also considers processes. Impact assessment occurs infrequently, usually 
near the end of a project or intervention. Impact assessment focuses more on outcomes and 
impacts and often considers external influences and events.  
 145 
those goals was, “Every month you know we make…discussion, what is the progress 
and then also visible impact because this is a very long-term impact creation.” He 
went on to describe visible changes in the environment as increased vegetation due 
to recharged groundwater. Kumar’s response succinctly describes ASSEFA’s 
approach to monitoring performance. In other contexts, Kumar responds in kind that 
the primary way ASSEFA tracks progress on goals (and observes impact) is through 
“direct contact” through which they “see changes.” Zonal managers similarly cite 
observation and personal knowledge of member participation—sometimes 
transmitted indirectly through weekly staff meetings and sometimes directly 
conveyed through anecdotal reports from members—as the mechanisms through 
which information on the progress made on goals is collected and transmitted 
upwards. ASSEFA’s regular or on-going processes of assessment then are informal 
and flexible. 
 
In the same conversation with Kumar regarding Sivagangai’s watershed project, I 
asked how ASSEFA observes increases in income (one of the stated goals). 
Kumar’s response shifted to describing the dairy groups and acquisition of milch 
animals as evidence of impact on income through asset creation. Kumar’s response 
to the income question suggests assessment is holistic and flexible in the sense that 
assessment of a project’s success is not necessarily seen as discreet from 
assessment of ASSEFA’s efforts as a whole.  
 
In a sense, ASSEFA’s values and project goals are fixed but the standards against 
which to measure success are flexible and negotiated. Further to this point are the 
different responses three zonal managers give when asked how they assess their 
own performance. With Kumar as translator, Manoharan replies “I will get satisfaction 
or progress in introducing new programs, non-credit programs, in my region. How 
many villages got benefited, I get satisfaction.” Ramakrishnan says “he make a plan, 
annual plan, finance as well as non-finance. So based on the achievement, 80 
percent, 100 percent, 120 percent, I get satisfaction….“ Finally Kothandam replies 
“whenever I start initially the program, when I go to that village, how I get the 
response from the people, based on that I get satisfaction.” He later elaborates, “And 
also the number of invitation I get for their family function.”  
 
SPA generally implies an integrated and routine activity creating a feedback 
mechanism to decision-makers. ASSEFA’s processes of observation, communication 
and consultation may be frequent but they are not systematic. They happen in an 
informal and ad hoc manner and as such assessment process lacks transparency. 
The first issue is whether processes of consultation are genuinely happening and 
with whom. It is also difficult to evaluate the quality of the processes. Once again 
there is a bit of a ‘black box’ around these processes of assessment that obscure, for 
instance, the influence of personal and position power. There is room for personal 
influence to impact the timing, content, and results of assessment processes. Whose 
opinion matters more? Under what circumstances do decision-makers respond to 
feedback? Also, how freely do members, staff and managers feel they can criticize 
ASSEFA’s efforts or are the consultation processes primarily rhetorical? I observed 
consultations happening between senior management and zonal managers. At the 
Farmer’s Conference, nightly consultations were held after the close of formal 
proceedings to discuss the next day’s events. Senior managers (including 
Loganathan), zonal managers, other staff and member leaders participated. Many of 
my field visits occurred in conjunction with Kumar’s regular responsibilities of visiting 
project sites. Consultation with managers and members was clearly occurring on 
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those occasions as well. Given the language barrier (and that Kumar was acting as 
my translator) I was not able to understand those interactions. So while it is clear that 
consultation processes occur and include members I am not in a position to consider 
their inclusiveness, content or quality. This is not to say, however, that they are not 
as represented and if so the nature of the assessment process provides flexibility to 
respond quickly to changing needs and circumstances of the organization. 
 
ASSEFA also periodically engages in more formal processes of data collection 
including surveys. ASSEFA’s affiliated research and development organization, 
SARC, leads these efforts. While more structured even more formal processes are 
generally formative, motivated by a particular learning objective such as to provide 
answers needed in project design and implementation. A case in point relates to the 
Farmer’s Renaissance Scheme (FRS) near Melmaruvathur, which was just ending its 
pilot phase during the fieldwork. At the outset of the project ASSEFA community 
college students conducted a baseline survey of farmers, collecting data on farmers’ 
land use, inputs, outputs, needs, demographics, implements used, sales, challenges 
and role models. The data aided in project design. At the areas Farmer’s 
Renaissance conference, held during the fieldwork, two additional data collection 
processes were discussed. First, ASSEFA set up a process to collect data from 
farmers as they registered for the conference. The data would be used to create a 
directory of participating farmers for their reference and benefit. Second, Kumar 
planned to begin a crop productivity competition at the conference. Data on farmers’ 
current crops and yields would be taken at the conference. Farmers who met certain 
production goals the following year would receive a reward. A committee would 
monitor and measure productivity over the next year and compare with the baseline 
data collected at the conference. Although the competition would be voluntary and 
was primarily aimed at motivating farmers it could provide helpful data on how 
successfully farmers increased yields, a main goal of the FRS project.97 
 
Either of the proposed conference data collection processes could provide an 
opportunity for a second round of data collection to check against the project’s 
baseline survey. It is interesting to note however that in the case of data collected at 
registration, its purpose and meaning was narrowly construed. The only planned use 
of the data was to compile a directory to distribute amongst the farmers for their 
reference and benefit.  As for the crop competition, Kumar later indicated they had 
not done it after all. It was put on the “back burner”. In none of these three FRS data 
collection efforts (two implemented and one only conceived) did assessment of the 
success of the new pilot project factor as a primary motivation. 
 
The degree of scientific rigor applied in impact assessment is a frequent topic of 
debate in NGO and microfinance evaluation literature. Put another way, the debate 
over rigor is a debate over the importance of scientifically proving impacts (see 
Section 2.3.2). It is clear from ASSEFA’s assessment and data collection efforts that 
scientific rigor is not a priority, speaking to the alternative purposes for which 
ASSEFA engages in data collection. Data collection efforts are formative, informing 
project design and implementation, but are not primarily a mechanism by which 
ASSEFA determines impact.98 For example, when discussing the prospective 
                                            
97 The goals of the FRS were to increase productivity and income through adoption of organic 
and sustainable farming practices. 
98 In the case of ASSEFA’s social security program, 4S, ASSEFA did conduct a small study 
to look at impact. SARC compared state and national data on maternal health with that of 
ASSEFA members making a claim against 4S for wage recovery.  
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farmers’ competition, Kumar said it would be a way to track productivity as a goal of 
the program was to increase productivity through the adoption of certain farming 
practices. When I inquired whether they would track the adoption of the practices in 
question along with production statistics Kumar indicated they weren’t planning to but 
maybe they should. 
 
ASSEFA’s assessment approach can in part be attributed to the role of the 
organization relative to membership. ASSEFA operates under the principles of a 
people’s organization (see Sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.5). Members are not clients or 
beneficiaries but members of the ASSEFA family and participants in the 
management of its efforts. Accountability, specifically downward accountability, and 
feedback mechanisms are built into the structure of the organization. Processes of 
participation are to a degree ‘proof’ of success. Finally, being a people-led 
organization in some sense shifts responsibility for success downward. As 
Loganathan describes, ASSEFA, as a trustee, provides ideas and information and 
the people decide. Kumar made this distinction (of duty) clear when asked about 
whether ASSEFA does satisfaction surveys. He replied they do not, because “that is 
for the organization.” I asked about it again in terms of facilitation: as a tool to identify 
problems early. Kumar reiterates that ASSEFA relies on participation—attendance 
and contribution—to identify problems and track success. 
 
Asokkumar provides another rationale for ASSEFA’s more informal and ad hoc 
assessment style. In his description of ASSEFA’s approach to measuring progress 
on mission he talks about the impact of resource constraints. He states, “I don’t think 
we go in such a very formal manner of trying to measure and all that. You know, 
when you go and look at formally then you have to do it with very scientifically, very 
systematically… and that means you have to engage proper manpower for that and 
that could cost money…Occasionally, one of the organizations of ASSEFA tries to 
see what is there…what has been done.” Asokkumar also raises questions of 
whether it is ethical or even necessary to conduct more formal assessment given its 
resource demands. He states, “…if you want to have a proper evaluation then you 
have to really have people and spend a lot of time and money on that. If you have 
that…probably you can use it then to try to help needy people more.” He continues, 
“you know where you are lagging…And also people who are working with that also it 
comes with their suggestion for…action…”99 
7.3.2 CRUSADE  
Much like ASSEFA, CRUSADE relies heavily on personal observations and 
consultations for monitoring of progress on its goals. CRUSADE’s smaller size allows 
Jothi to have direct and immediate contact as needed with staff and members (see 
Section 6.2.4). As Jothi states, “…we known through our observations…that the 
standard [of quality of life] has gone up.” Also like ASSEFA, CRUSADE periodically 
                                                                                                                             
 
99 Despite similarity overall, some distinctions exist between ASSEFA’s assessment approach 
overall and SNFL. SNFL as a microfinance provider and NBFC is subject some formalized—
and external—systems meant to monitor social performance. Some are statutory, such as the 
RBI regulation setting loan and interest rate limits among other restrictions. SNFL also is 
working to comply with the Unified Code of Conduct for microfinance providers published by 
microfinance associations Sa-Dhan and MFIN. Statuatory requirements govern for SMBTs 
that build in assessment processes, primarily related to financial performance. (Boards are 
required to meet quarterly and review financial performance against budgets and an annual 
general board meeting of all SHG members reviews performance.)  
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collects data more formally on specific questions from a sample of its groups. As 
Jothi describes, “…we also get…specific information on specific things like…we want 
to know how many women are doing work, how many are not doing work, and then 
how they are engaged, whether it is full-time or part-time or whether they go for 
agriculture labour work or they go for government work. So suppose we want to have 
this information, what we do, say there are 500 groups, so you take up 20 percent of 
the groups, 100 groups, you conduct this sample survey and then you project it to the 
whole population.”  
 
The most notable difference between ASSEFA and CRUSADE’s assessment 
approach surrounds targeting. Unlike ASSEFA, CRUSADE cares about targeting the 
“poorest people” to be members of its SHG groups and has formally assessed the 
poverty levels of households in its project area to ensure proper targeting. ASSEFA 
by contrast does not screen SHG members based on any income criteria. When 
asked about group membership, Kumar states ASSEFA includes only “deserving 
cases” in SHG groups and notes that many members were day labourers. But at the 
same time Kumar insists income is not a criterion for group membership. When 
asked whether it was important to know the income of women in the groups given 
ASSEFA’s goal of raising their incomes, Kumar replies, “ Right. But they don’t select 
people based on the income as a criteria…No, our ultimate objective is to you know 
bring the people together irrespective of their economic status or social status to 
work together…So any member who want to have a group…then she can start the 
groups.”  
 
To a certain extent targeting of “deserving cases” occurs through self-selection. 
Currently SNFL’s maximum loan is only Rs. 15,000, half of PPI’s loan limit of up to 
Rs. 30,000. However, Asokkumar still notes, “I don’t think we have really gone to the 
poorest of the poor…I think if we have done that we would have sunk.” He continues, 
“I was teasing Mr. Loganathan, you say that you are there to help the poor but the 
people who come here…to pay me they do not look like the poor people because 
one woman was [motion with hands a large size]…fat. Another woman was having 
so much of golden…. two of these people…who are there…they have come to repay 
their loan and you said…you are helping only poor. I told Anachi it doesn’t hold 
water.”  
 
CRUSADE generally relies on similar methods as ASSEFA—personal interaction 
and observation—for assessment of poverty level. But it has opportunistically used 
more systematic and quantitative data collection methods. Jothi describes a baseline 
survey conducted in all of its villages to assess poverty level. The survey collected 
data about household demographics, housing, occupations, and assets including 
other variables. A scoring system was devised to rate the poverty level of households 
based on their survey results. It was conducted in all villages households, “Maybe 
leaving alone some of the households where’s [sic] there’s no need.” Interestingly the 
survey was conducted ten years prior to the fieldwork, at a time of rapid growth for 
CRUSADE’s SHG groups. The survey was never repeated but as Jothi stated, “…we 
know because of so many indicators that the life has changed and…people are more 
well-off…We have not scientifically repeat survey [but] we know through our 
observations and indicators that the standard has gone up.”100 
 
                                            
100 Jothi notes that Chris Wilde did attempt to repeat the survey three or four years ago but 
the report was never finalized. 
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CRUSADE is less financially independent than ASSEFA and this may explain much 
of the formal assessment it conducts. Many of the examples of data collection 
involve external partners, whether they provided the impetus or the resources or 
both. At various points in the fieldwork Jothi referred to CRUSADE’s reporting 
requirements to AVI. During one interview as we discussed ward-level planning, Jothi 
suddenly remembered AVI had asked him to report formally on one village’s 
successes through ward-level planning. Jothi immediately called out to 
Narayanasamy, asking him to go to the panchayat and inquire about the dates 
demands made by the village SHGs were met by the panchayat. At CRUSADE’s 
staff meeting staff discussed progress on AVI-set targets for construction of 
household toilets and soak pits. AVI, CRUSADE’s primary donor, certainly motivates 
and shapes assessment processes. Also at a staff meeting CRUSADE prepared for 
an upcoming visit with AVI. The visit would involve a discussion of a recent 
participatory process wherein CRUSADE asked six groups of SHG leaders a set of 
five questions each. The process was conducted in collaboration with AVI and was a 
formal mechanism for getting feedback from SHG members and would result in 
resolutions made by a “core group” of member leaders.  
 
An interesting question is the relative importance to CRUSADE of formal processes 
of data collection versus less formal process of observation and consultation, 
particularly given the formers mostly external impetus. Certainly the formal 
assessment processes described by Jothi, while formal and systematic, are not 
routine or integrated. This is reinforced by an anecdote provided by Jothi. After 
describing the baseline survey’s scoring system Jothi said, “…So I can give you that, 
that is our own system of identifying the poor. I have to search that. So I don’t know 
where to find out this but definitely it should be there. Somewhere. I have to search 
everything.” He continues, joking about all the papers around his desk, “Look at the 
papers. It’s all piling. So I just collect and after a while I cannot see all these things 
and so if I don’t refer for a month I just put it there [on top of the filing cabinets] and 
cover it…if you don’t refer [to] it for a month you don’t require it…So put it there 
somewhere and then if there is a need then I search. I know it is not a very scientific 
approach but I can’t help it.”  
 
Neither CRUSADE nor ASSEFA prioritize formal or systematic social performance 
assessment. Monitoring and evaluation activities were largely informal, flexible and 
ad hoc. Personal communication and observation were the primary data collection 
methods to establish progress on social goals. To the extent that more formal 
assessment activities were undertaken the purposes were formative rather than 
summative. Alternatively, formal assessment activities were motivated (as seen most 
clearly in CRUSADE) by external stakeholders and, as Jothi implies above, were 
seen as of somewhat limited usefulness to the organizations themselves. As such, 
the lack of formal assessment efforts, particularly with summative goals, may reflect 
at least in part the degree to which ASSEFA and CRUSADE have sought and 
achieved relative autonomy in their relationships with government and private 
donors. As discussed in this chapter, both case study organizations chose 
partnerships with government and private donors selectively; both carefully 
manoeuvred to avoid government entanglements that could compromise 
independence and flexibility. Microfinance, particularly for ASSEFA, has been a key 
strategy for building autonomy from financial dependence on private donors or 
government partnership, using it to cross-subsidize non-credit activities. Managing 
external relationships is thus a critical aspect of managing social performance. In the 
discussion and conclusions chapter that follows (Chapter 8) I will explore further the 
way external and internal organizational characteristics relate the case study 
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organizations’ orientation towards social performance management and reflect their 




Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Revisiting the research questions and conceptual framework 
 
My research asks how NGO-MFOs manage the tension between borrower (social) 
and organizational self-reliance (financial performance). The research takes a 
particular focus on social performance assessment and management systems based 
on assertion that an adequate flow of information on performance is a necessary 
input for any effective management of either social or financial goals. My research 
also considers the organizational landscape that provides the context and scope for 
performance management. Sub-questions dealt with in the research include: 
 
1. How are social goals translated into performance assessment and 
management systems? 
2. What are the tools and systems for information collection and the feedback 
mechanisms to decision makers? 
3. What internal and external factors drive or constrain social performance 
management? 
4. How and to what extent do decision makers retain and enhance room for 
manoeuvre?  
5. To what extent did approaches to social performance management play a 
role in protecting MFOs in Tamil Nadu from experiencing the level of crisis 
recently experienced in Andhra Pradesh?  
 
The research sub-questions are both descriptive and explanatory. They are 
concerned with describing social performance assessment and management 
systems but also understanding underlying drivers and constraints on these.  
 
Chapters 5 through 7 present the empirical findings of my research. Chapter 5 
presents the results of the first stage of my research, a systematic review. The 
systematic review looks to the secondary literature as a source of evidence about the 
nature of social performance assessment. It contributes to sub-question one by 
providing evidence from published impact assessment studies of the types of 
indicators used in social performance assessment and how they are assessed. The 
case studies provide a second body of evidence on the nature of social performance 
assessment and management but as internalized by NGO-MFOs rather than from 
externally-driven, discrete and formal impact assessment. Chapters 6 and 7 present 
findings from the second stage of the research, which includes two case studies of 
Indian NGO-MFOs. The case studies constitute a more in-depth and ethnographic 
contribution to the discussion of questions one and two as well as the remaining sub-
questions.  
 
The empirical findings demonstrate that the case study organizations have a 
coherence and identity independent of the mainstream microfinance model. Since 
the 1990s the mainstream model of microfinance provision emphasized rapid growth 
and commercialization and defined social performance primarily in terms of the 
increased breadth of outreach expedited by organizational expansion (see Section 
2.4). Although variations on the mainstream model argue for the relevance of 
additional measures of social performance, particularly depth of outreach, the 
mainstream microfinance model still narrowly focuses the debate over social and 
financial performance around maximizing sustainability versus poverty outreach 
(Fisher & Sriram 2002). By focusing on socially-oriented NGO-MFOs my research 
addresses the social/financial performance tension in light of the larger development 
goals and missions held by these NGO-MFOs. It also examines the social/financial 
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tension from the NGO-MFO’s own perspective. By doing so the goal of my research 
is to “thicken” understanding of NGO-MFOs social performance management and 
assessment in India. 
 
The conceptual framework presented in Chapters 1 and 2 (and included again below 
as Figure 8.1) orients the discussion of the social/financial performance tension 
within a set of larger debates. Each row highlights an ideological tension NGO-MFOs 
face as represented in a relevant body of literature. The rows could also be 
visualized as a set of concentric circles. The literature on performance assessment of 
NGOs in microfinance (and the tension therein) is embedded within a set of 
increasingly broader bodies of literature, beginning with literature on NGOs in 
microfinance, then NGOs in development generally, and development and 
management studies. When viewed in its entirety the conceptual framework crudely 
summarizes two views or models of microfinance provision, referred to here as the 
mainstream model and the alternative (or NGO) model. However, it is important to 
note that framework does not map perfectly down columns. In practice an NGO-MFO 
can lean more or less mainstream or alternative with regard to the debates 
represented by each individual row and overall. For instance, an alternative NGO-
MFO may do service delivery alongside empowerment (although they may only 
pursue service delivery to facilitate empowerment). Likewise, NGO-MFOs with a 
social performance first approach to microfinance provision may emphasize positivist 
and summative performance assessment. 
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Figure 8.1: Conceptual Framework 
Field or sub-field Mainstream view Alternative view 
 
[Management studies] Scientific management ‘Romantic’ management 
(emerging from criticisms 
of CDM) 
 
Development management Management of and in 
development 
(Implies the means 
(tasks) and ends 




(Implies the means and 
ends of development are 
the same) 
 
NGOs in development Service delivery first Empowerment first 
 
NGOs and microfinance Financial performance 
first 
Social performance first 
 
Performance assessment of 







The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the case study findings relate to the 
conceptual framework. It fills out the framework by addressing the variability within 
the mainstream model. But the chapter also goes beyond the mainstream model and 
its limited and neoliberal construction of performance assessment (as defined by the 
financial sustainability and poverty outreach matrix) to permit exploration of 
microfinance’s interactions with the larger development goals and more radical 
poverty alleviation strategies often held by alternative NGOs (Copestake 2013, 
Fisher & Sriram 2002). I look beyond the mainstream microfinance model by 
continuing to compare it with an alternative or NGO model. I also go further and add 
to the framework by contrasting the mainstream model with the alternative model 
combined with social movement characteristics, moving beyond alternative NGOs 
and further into the broader and more informal idea of civil society.  
 
The chapter employs the same analytical device, although less explicitly, used in 
Chapters 6 and 7 in which the ‘anatomy’ of a development organization is discussed 
with reference to categories including organizational mission, leadership, structure, 
culture, human resources and categories of external relations (government, private 
donors, microfinance sector and members). Although it is more a feature of 
mainstream management to distinguish between organizational systems in this way, 
the device is carried over into the discussion of the alternative model, where systems 
may not be as clearly defined, to facilitate comparison.  
 
Section 8.2 discusses the mainstream microfinance model and Section 8.3 
juxtaposes the mainstream model with the alternative or NGO model of microfinance 
provision. Section 8.4 moves beyond these models and argues that even the 
alternative NGO model does not adequately explain the case study organizations’ 
model of microfinance provision, discussing the significance and consequence of 
ASSEFA’s self-identification as a social movement. Thus in a sense Section 8.4 adds 
a fourth column to the conceptual framework, one that incorporates the social 
movement identity. Section 8.5 reflects on relationship between the conceptual 
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framework and the analytical categories used in the discussion of microfinance 
models while Section 8.6 considers the contribution of the systematic review to the 
case studies. Section 8.7 then examines the relationships between microfinance 
models and social performance assessment systems. Finally, Section 8.8 draws 
some conclusions and implications for Indian microfinance and Section 8.9 discusses 
limitations of the research and areas for further research. 
 
8.2 Mainstream microfinance model 
  
Despite ASSEFA’s long history of mobilizing community finance, in its most recent 
iteration of doing so through SNFL ASSEFA has adopted many of the ‘best practices’ 
of mainstream microfinance (see section 2.4). Many of these best practices are 
borrowed from the informal practices of poor villagers, organized and formalized with 
a more explicit focus on achieving the financial sustainability of the microfinance 
organization. Such practices include group lending, intensive repayment (with weekly 
or monthly repayment), microenterprise (or promotional) credit products and a focus 
on lending to women. SNFL has maintained the relatively high repayment rates 
associated with such practices (with portfolio at risk (greater than 30 days) under 10 
percent since its inception) (See sections 6.1.1. and 6.1.2.).  
 
SNFL has also achieved a level of growth unmet by ASSEFA’s previous community 
finance efforts. But despite rapid growth in the mid-2000s, SNFL’s growth lagged 
compared with other prominent Indian microfinance organizations (see Section 
6.1.5). Slower growth can arguably be attributed to ASSEFA’s rejection of other key 
tenets of the mainstream microfinance model including specialization. Rather than 
positioning microfinance as the centerpiece of its operation, ASSEFA has embedded 
SNFL and microfinance within an array of other development activities and a mission 
that extends well beyond efficient delivery of microfinance to poverty reduction and 
community building (see Section 6.1.3).  
 
ASSEFA’s mission includes a commitment to people-led development and 
community building and this is reflected in its approach to microfinance provision and 
resultant slower growth. SNFL is a member-owned and managed MFI. Until recently, 
SNFL lent exclusively to members of its owner-SMBTs, comprised of SHGs. SHGs 
were not conceived exclusively for the purpose of microfinance delivery (in terms of 
the SHG movement in general) but were conceived as people’s organizations with 
empowerment objectives (see Section in 3.3). Other microfinance organizations, 
such as Grameen Bank, also formed groups for dual mobilization and credit provision 
purposes, but later focused less on its mobilizing objectives and more on becoming a 
specialized bank. In contrast, SHGs have continued to be viewed by ASSEFA as 
people’s organizations as demonstrated by its continued emphasis on federating 
groups and promoting apex organizations like SNFL (see section 6.1.5).  
 
SNFL’s growth is further constrained by ASSEFA’s bundling of microfinance with 
other activities. Growth of ASSEFA as a whole (and SNFL by attachment) occurs 
through the slow process of spinning off autonomous affiliate organizations 
responsible for individual projects, sometimes in a specific geographical region within 
ASSEFA’s program area. As such ASSEFA’s primary approach to growth is through 
deepening involvement or layering programs within the same geographical area thus 
constraining SNFL, which can only grow as ASSEFA broadens its reach by 
expanding into new geographical areas (see section 6.1.5). When ASSEFA does 
expand to a new geographical area it does so by organizing and mobilizing 
community members for the purpose of joint action on a number of fronts and not just 
for microfinance provision.  
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ASSEFA’s approach is slower than more specialized microfinance. The mainstream 
microfinance model predicts slower growth will constrain the scaling up-financial 
sustainability virtuous spiral. And while SNFL has achieved a degree of financial 
sustainability, an aspect of this constraint is evident in its limited ability to 
professionalize SNFL. SNFL does not have the resources to attract and retain 
technical staff and skilled managers. It is not able to revamp its MIS system to more 
easily comply with industry standards (in terms of reporting to credit bureaus for 
instance), reduce instances of fraud, and increase its flexibility to adapt loan products 
to customer needs (see section 6.1.6).   
 
The two-fold mission of microfinance is providing financial services to the poor 
through financially-sustainable market-based organizations. In regard to the former, 
the effectiveness of ASSEFA’s model is unclear. ASSEFA’s depth of outreach is 
unknown. ASSEFA deliberately does not track the poverty status of clients at entry or 
at any subsequent point to benchmark the depth of outreach. Rather it explicitly 
chooses not to exclude any ASSEFA member from participating in and borrowing 
from SNFL regardless of income. Asokkumar, SNFL’s CEO, acknowledges it likely 
does not serve the poorest (based on his own anecdotal observations of SNFL 
clientele) although ASSEFA most likely does serve lower income households based 
on small maximum loan sizes (see Section 7.3.2). The question remains however to 
what extent (what proportion) of SNFL clients are poor and the depth of outreach 
(that is, the distribution of middle to upper poor served versus any of the poorest).  
 
While ASSEFA mirrors the ‘parts’ of the mainstream microfinance models—including 
the dual goals of financial sustainability and financial services to poor households—it 
rejects the ‘whole.’ ASSEFA rejects the financial systems approach’s ultimate goal of 
mainstreaming or building a commercially-viable microfinance organization serving 
the poor. It clearly has a ‘social performance first’ approach as evidenced by its 
prioritization of community-building even given higher costs and slower growth. 
ASSEFA’s approach thus resonates with arguments made by the poverty-oriented 
approach for the logic of prioritizing social over financial goals. This extends to 
acceptance of concessionary funds (such as from social investors) as appropriate as 
well as that bundling can co-exist with a strategy for financial sustainability (see 
section 2.2). However, as with the financial systems approach, ASSEFA also rejects 
the central tenet of the poverty-oriented approach: that targeting the poor, particularly 
the poorest, is a critical element of microfinance that must be deliberately pursued 
and monitored to avoid mission drift. Although ASSEFA certainly intends to serve the 
poor and aligns with the poverty-oriented approach’s primary goal of positive impact 
on poor households (usually framed as poverty reduction, women’s empowerment or 
promotion of community-based organizations (Simanowitz & Walker 2002)), it does 
not do so deliberately or exclusively. Further, inclusion of middle, upper poor or even 
vulnerable non-poor clients is not justified on the basis of cross subsidizing services 
to the very poor as is sometimes argued by both mainstream approaches. Financial 
sustainability is also not aimed primarily at expanded breadth of outreach. Rather 
ASSEFA pursues both goals of financial sustainability and serving the poor as part of 
its own community-building ends. Financial sustainability is pursued to subsidize 
other non-credit activities and to establish autonomy from the state and to an extent 
the market and is not an attempt to operate successfully within the market. 101  
 
Given ASSEFA does not conform with the ideology prescribed by the most prominent 
microfinance model, one way to better understand ASSEFA’s difference is through 
                                            
101 SNFL cross-subsidizes ASSEFA non-credit activities but perhaps more interesting, 
ASSEFA has combined microfinance with other cost recovery approaches and other 
programs also cross-subsidized SNFL in the intermediate aftermath of the AP crisis. 
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its origins and ideology. The most obvious influence is its Gandhian ideology which 
advocates for individual performance of duty (performance of duty being 
interchangeable with observance of morality). Duty requires self-restraint in material 
gain and rather a life devoted to selfless service devoted to nurturing the solidarity 
and self-reliance of rural communities or Gram Swaraj (even romanticizing rural 
village life). This model of personal behavior and the ideal of Gram Swaraj thus 
mitigate against the ‘divisiveness’ of serving only the poor. Gandhian ideology also 
mitigates against a strongly commercial approach given its opposition to capitalism’s 
promotion of competitiveness in the pursuit of individual material self-interest and the 
inequalities it reinforces. Thus building a development approach on the principles of 
the capitalist market as do mainstream microfinance models (particularly the financial 
systems model) would be antithetical to codes of personal and organizational 
behavior and developmentally reductive (see Section 3.2.4). 
 
A second way to better understand ASSEFA’s deviation from the mainstream 
microfinance model is to examine its approach to financing. ASSEFA has 
demonstrated over time the willingness and flexibility to reinvent itself in order to deal 
with the problem of financing. The adoption of microfinance can be seen as just one 
iteration of ASSEFA’s pragmatic approach. ASSEFA has mobilized local funds since 
its earliest years as an ideological and practical matter, but it also relied on foreign 
funds from its “friends.” ASSEFA’s longest-term supporters are considered part of the 
ASSEFA family and are often collections of private donors rather than professional 
northern NGOs or international donors. Sums contributed by these donors are on-
going but relatively small. To expand, particularly geographically, ASSEFA has relied 
on projects with larger donors (such as Action Aid, PLAN etc.). As the availability of 
foreign funds has diminished however ASSEFA has sought other ways to expand. 
One way of understanding ASSEFA’s partnering with TNCDW in the 1990s is as an 
opportunity for ASSEFA to extend its reach and establish itself more solidly over its 
assigned geographical area.102 The financial incentives for NGOs to participate in 
Mahalir Thittam were modest (mostly small payments for group formation and 
linkage and in-kind funds in the form of training) but the SHG model was a natural fit 
for ASSEFA given its prior and on-going use of community-based organizations in its 
work. Meanwhile the MFIs were growing in numbers and size and demonstrating 
potential for financial sustainability. ASSEFA’s promotion of SNFL, as a community-
owned NBFC, was a type of marrying of its network of SHGs, built during the 
TNCDW partnership, with the financial potential of MFI promotion, while maintaining 
its commitment to people-led development.  
 
As with NGOs generally, particularly those focused on social change, the challenge 
of financing extends beyond raising sufficient funds to the political questions around 
how the funds are raised. In the course of raising funds, the NGO must consider the 
source’s impact on its ability to continue to challenge inequalities. Institutional 
(government and private donors) and market-based funds raise the risk of cooption 
through loss of control or mission focus. Edwards (2013) argues for the importance 
of matching social change goals with appropriate funding strategies. Democratic 
funding models favor participation and equality from below and maximize autonomy 
                                            
102 The prestige and relative autonomy associated with being an early partner of the program 
were also likely incentives. Early on the state was looking to NGOs like ASSEFA to provide 
access to rural women. The first director of the program spent time visiting with ASSEFA and 
its members in preparation for the program roll-out, essentially giving ASSEFA a role in 
program planning and design. However as the program became more established the state-
NGO relationship shifted and became less compelling for ASSEFA. The State-NGO 
relationships became more unequal and personal connections were lost as the original 
director moved on. 
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from influence or coercion from above. ASSEFA’s current financing strategy 
combines commercial and democratic models by pursuing microfinance with 
collective ownership arrangements. This leverages the potential for returns offered 
by commercial strategies while maintaining downward accountability structures. 
Historically ASSEFA has utilized all funding strategies: democratic, institutional (both 
government, private donor (NGO), and to a more limited extent official aid (via their 
NGO donors)) and commercial but while trying to avoid building dependence on the 
latter two through selectively managing duration and nature of those relationships.  
 
8.3 Alternative or NGO microfinance model 
 
The NGO literature provides an alternative more radical model for microfinance 
provision. Rather than economistic arguments, the NGO model relies more on 
normative and political arguments about what is developmental based on values 
associated with ‘alternative development’. Alternative development emphasizes 
structural change. Development is political, technical fixes can only address poverty 
and inequality in limited ways and altering power structures is necessary to achieve 
lasting and substantive change for the poor. It rejects service provision as an 
adequate mission or role for NGOs, given the limits of service provision for lasting 
poverty alleviation. NGOs are therefore most appropriately (or developmentally) in 
the role of catalysts. The theory of change asserts that by catalysing the formation, 
strengthening and linking of people’s organizations such organizations will proliferate 
into a people’s movement that can impact policies and political processes. NGOs 
cast themselves in a facilitating role with the mission of empowering poor households 
to act in their own interest to effect change first on the local but ultimately national 
level (see Section 2.3).  
 
ASSEFA’s approach to microfinance reflects the NGO model commitment to a 
broader mission (and role) than the efficient service provision of (potentially) poverty-
reducing financial services. In fact ASSEFA does not consider itself a microfinance 
organization. Its mission explicitly extends beyond microfinance provision and even 
poverty alleviation (whether through microfinance alone or in conjunction other 
activities) to empowerment, specifically through community-building towards Gram 
Swaraj (see Section 6.1.3). ASSEFA views the creation of people’s organizations not 
just as instrumental to microfinance then but as an integral part of its community-
building mission. Its choice of the SHG model was somewhat opportunistic, occurring 
as a product of its collaboration with the TNDCW. However its commitment to 
facilitating people’s organizations is clear. Many of its first SHGs were organized 
from its existing network of members with whom ASSEFA had a longstanding 
practice of forming various configurations of people’s organizations serving both men 
and women for credit and other purposes. ASSEFA mixes or bundles community-
building with poverty alleviation activities in part to address the difficulties of 
mobilizing a group of people with pressing short-term needs. Poverty alleviation 
activities, like microfinance, are a ‘platform’ for community-building, but the latter take 
priority over poverty alleviation. This implies a vision of empowerment beyond 
individual economic or personal improvement, towards a larger vision for social and 
political empowerment and change.  
 
The alternative model prescribes a style of management reflecting ‘NGO values’. 
NGO values call for participatory or bottom-up approaches and require a flexible, 
innovative, responsive and process-oriented management style (see Section 2.3). 
This is in contrast to a more mainstream style characterized by traditional top-down 
management, with its focus on hierarchy, standardization and instrumentality (see 
Section 2.2). In the context of microfinance, participatory development requires a 
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relationship with borrowers expanded beyond that of the mainstream microfinance 
models. Borrowers are not just customers but members and participants in the 
developmental process. ASSEFA structured SNFL as a member-owned and 
governed microfinance organization and has maintained processes of consultation 
with members that reflect its view of borrowers as members rather than customers. 
Further ASSEFA’s familial culture and intensive bundling of activities (discussed 
further below) promotes a level of group participation and identification that extends 
well beyond a transactional relationship (see sections 6.1.5 and 7.1.4). NGOs’ 
closeness to the people and alternative management style are often cited as 
constituting their core and distinctive strengths. However according to NGO critics 
these strengths can be threatened by organizational growth, contributing to mission 
drift. 
 
The mainstream microfinance models prescribe scaling up through “additive” 
organizational growth (Edwards & Hulme 1992). Organizational size and 
organizational impact (in terms of increased breadth of outreach) increase 
simultaneously. The alternative model suggests several alternative, “multiplicative” 
methods of scaling up (Edwards & Hulme 1992).  Multiplicative growth strategies 
increase impact by exerting deliberate influence, networking and training. Strategies 
include working with government, advocacy in the North, and linking people’s 
organizations with lobbying and advocacy (see Section 2.3). Such horizontal and 
diffusive growth strategies can increase impact while protecting NGOs core 
strengths. ASSEFA’s model of growth reflects this idea of growing ‘out’ rather than 
‘up.’ ASSEFA spins off autonomous organizations, many of them apex organizations 
for federated groups of people’s organizations (and often managed by members to a 
greater or lesser extent) (see Section 6.1.5). Spinning off new organizations (when 
people’s organizations) is an end (an expression of mission fulfillment) but also a 
means to grow while protecting core organizational characteristics of flexibility, 
innovativeness, and responsiveness. It maintains a degree of autonomy necessary 
for local managers and members to customize programs to local needs. ASSEFA as 
a whole retains its flatter structure and avoids the increased hierarchy and 
standardization often associated with organizational growth.  
 
In a sense, CRUSADE represents another aspect of ASSEFA’s horizontal versus 
vertical growth. In the case of CRUSADE (and other organizations started by former 
ASSEFA managers including Dhan Foundation, BASIX, and PRADAN) rather than 
building out through autonomous but affiliated organizations, ASSEFA has built out 
through a set of autonomous and unaffiliated organizations. ASSEFA refers to these 
spin-off organizations as its “children”, clearly taking some credit for their creation 
and implying a type of hierarchy with itself in a senior position relative to them. The 
extent to which ASSEFA’s children mirror its model varies, but regardless the 
extension of ASSEFA’s influence through these spin-off organizations grows 
ASSEFA’s brand at the very least in terms of its networks, prestige and reputation. 
 
One cannot assert, however, that power in ASSEFA is not centralized given 
Loganathan’s personal, position and resource power (see Section 6.1.4). 
Loganathan’s leadership style, at least on the surface, reflects NGO values of 
participatory, bottom-up development, including a language of anti-professionalism 
(in which he reinforces the people’s role and diminishes his own role as well as the 
value of experts generally) and flexibility (in the informal attitude toward planning and 
lack of clear processes for decision-making). How truly democratic decision-making 
is within ASSEFA, for instance between managers and members or between 
Loganathan and managers is obscured by procedural informality and flexibility (see 
Section 6.1.4).  
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Though somewhat of a contradiction, ASSEFA’s power culture relies on 
Loganathan’s centrality to reinforce the empowerment goals and participatory values 
underlying its mission. Loganathan’s leadership also connects ASSEFA and its 
members more deeply to an origin and development ideology inspired by Gandhian 
ideology (see Sections 6.1.1 and 3.2.4). Horizontal rather than vertical growth also 
sustains values and goals by maintaining Loganathan’s position and influence and 
ensuring no alternative power center can emerge (see Section 6.1.5).  
 
Horizontal growth maintains culture and mission resilience also in the context of 
ASSEFA’s autonomous but unaffiliated spin-offs, such as CRUSADE to the extent 
that these organizations are an outlet for dissenting views within ASSEFA. In the 
case of CRUSADE, Jothi left ASSEFA because he wanted to focus on the poor 
rather than the entire community in his poverty reduction and community-building 
efforts (see Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3). Jothi has also prioritized individual economic 
outcomes over community outcomes. CRUSADE’s diminished emphasis on Gram 
Swaraj shifts its own orientation in external relations relative to ASSEFA’s as 
CRUSADE intermediates between members and government offices (see Section 
7.2.1). Spin-off organizations are also an outlet for particularly ambitious or talented 
managers who might otherwise languish (or challenge) in light of the control and 
authority exerted by Loganathan.  
 
The NGO model does not prioritize the financial sustainability of microfinance and 
may view cost recovery strategies cautiously. It does however suggest a logic for 
cost-effective microfinance, one antithetical to the mainstream microfinance models. 
The logic of the NGO model favours bundling activities to increase the depth of 
impact (not to be conflated with depth of outreach) and suggests bundling increases 
the cost effectiveness of group formation by leveraging the social networks 
established through group formation for multiple purposes. ASSEFA, for example, 
prioritizes broadening rather than narrowing its offering of programs to deepen 
penetration and impact within their communities (rather than expanding it to new 
areas). Bundling is also advocated by the poverty-oriented approach but generally 
with a focus on educational programs attached to group meetings or outsourced 
poverty programs and still with a strong emphasis on doing so while pursuing (and 
subject to) achieving financial sustainability.  
 
As the NGO model does not assert financial sustainability (from cost recovery) as 
integral it engages in a broader discussion of resource mobilization that focuses 
largely on relationships with donors, whether private or government. In this context, 
the tension between social and financial performance exists in balancing the 
demands of the donor with organizational missions and values to avoid mission drift. 
Integration in the aid chain and increased dependence on official funds has been 
blamed for a decline in NGO performance, in part because it creates incentives that 
undermine NGO values of downward accountability and institutional learning (see 
Section 2.3.1). Increased upward accountability, loss of autonomy, and onerous 
reporting requirements can constrain social performance as systems and cultures 
adapt to the requirements, expectations, and timelines of donors.  
 
Beyond changing incentives, collaboration with government in particular creates 
tension and possibly conflict of interest for NGOs whose mission focuses on 
changing power structures (although partnership with government to influence it from 
within is a possible strategy for scaling up impact). ASSEFA has partnered with both 
government and private donors over the years. It has addressed the tensions in 
partnership by partnering pragmatically but selectively; demonstrating willingness to 
exit partnerships when it feels cooption or autonomy is threatened. In addition to the 
threat of cooption, ASSEFA faces threats to its legitimacy, particularly in the case of 
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government partnerships, from even the appearance of cooption. It must preserve its 
role as a counterbalance to the state without creating undue hostility that would 
threaten its viability (see Section 7.1.1).  
 
In its relationship with private donors, ASSEFA has taken an equally selective 
approach to protect is legitimacy, autonomy and mission. Private donors are long-
term relationships with like-minded organizations, although ASSEFA has partnered 
on a short-term basis with larger Northern NGOs in the past (see Section 7.1.2). 
More recently ASSEFA has emphasized reducing dependence on external funds. As 
discussed in Section 8.2, ASSEFA pursues SNFL’s financial sustainability to sustain 
operations and cross-subsidize non-credit activities. ASSEFA’s focus on self-reliance 
is pragmatic and ideological, reflecting its concern for self-reliance. In a sense 
ASSEFA, expresses the ideology of the alternative NGO with the sensibility of a 
social enterprise (Bebbington 1997).  
 
An important role for a catalytic NGO in alternative development is challenging power 
structures and mainstream development paradigms. They do so through a variety of 
mechanisms including empowering grassroots groups, direct advocacy and 
sometimes direct confrontation. While ASSEFA began by organizing and advocating 
for landless farmers, it does not apparently challenge power structures itself today 
through advocacy or organizing confrontational actions to protest oppressive power 
structures for instance. ASSEFA does facilitate the creation and strengthening of 
people’s organizations but there is little evidence this has produced any significant 
advocacy or protest activities by ASSEFA members. Rather ASSEFA and its 
members’ activities appear relatively self-contained and inward-focused. In this 
regard the NGO model does not appear to entirely reflect ASSEFA’s understanding 
of social performance. To explore this further it is helpful to consider ASSEFA’s self-
identification as a social movement. 
 
8.4. Beyond microfinance models: ASSEFA as a social movement? 
 
ASSEFA’s model of microfinance provision more fully reflects the alternative or NGO 
model rather than mainstream models of microfinance provision in terms of mission 
and identity, structure and growth, culture and values and its cautious engagement 
with external partners. While it borrows (and is also forced through the coercive and 
regulatory powers of the state) from mainstream models in the design and 
management of SNFL, its underlying ideology and mission of social change through 
community-building drives its negotiation between social and financial performance. 
Microfinance is useful as a means to achieving its broader goals and as a partial 
solution for the practical problems of resource mobilization. Financial performance is 
thus important but subordinate in ASSEFA’s microfinance model. I argue however 
that it is necessary to go beyond the alternative NGO model and explore the NGO-
social movement connection to fully understand the ASSEFA model. ASSEFA’s 
identification as a social movement is also central to its mission and model 
influencing culture, leadership and relationships with members. I will first discuss 
ASSEFA as a social movement (the connection between NGOs and movements) 
and then explore how this self-identification expands understanding of ASSEFA’s 
model of microfinance provision including its negotiation of social and financial 
performance management. 
 
During the fieldwork, ASSEFA resisted any discussion that characterized it as a MFO 
or even an NGO. Despite its assertion ASSEFA generally does not meet definitions 
of a social movement in the literature. Although definitions vary, social movements 
are commonly identified as action by a diffuse collective of people and/or networks to 
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promote a shared idea or social change. The collective action is generally associated 
with disagreement or contention. 
 
A point of disagreement is the role or appropriateness of formal organizations within 
social movements. The disagreement circulates around whether formal organizations 
are a “necessary prerequisite of effective political struggle or conservative 
impediments” (Crossley 2002, p. 91). Regardless, the idea of movements as diffuse 
automatically makes a distinction between movements and formal organizations, 
which are easily defined (Bebbington 2010). It is clear then that ASSEFA proper, a 
clearly defined and formal organization is not a social movement. However 
organizations are often part of the collectives considering themselves social 
movements (Ballard et al. 2005, p. 617). This provides scope to consider ASSEFA’s 
contention that it is at the center, facilitating and promoting a movement made up, 
ostensibly, of its over 150 affiliated organizations, informal people’s organizations 
(such as SHGs and farmers groups) and other related or like-minded organizations.  
 
The loose affiliation of CRUSADE (and other spin-off organizations) is in the style of 
a social movement with its diffuse collectives and uncertain boundaries. ASSEFA still 
describes these spin-off organizations as part of the ASSEFA network family, as its 
children, albeit children who may have left home. CRUSADE has taken a more 
distinctly poverty-oriented approach to microfinance provision. Like ASSEFA it 
focuses on building people’s organizations. Emerging concurrently with the state’s 
bank-linkage program it has been more exclusively defined by the SHG methodology 
than ASSEFA. However it targets the poor rather than the entire community and has 
focused on financial sustainability. BASIX on the other hand has a much more 
mainstream approach to microfinance provision. 
 
The centrality of direct confrontation with the state (or more symbolic institutions such 
as patriarchy) is another point of disagreement in social movement literature. Tarrow 
(1998 cited in Crossley 2002) insists protest is central to social movement action 
while others assert movement strategies extend from direct and adversarial action 
against the state to negotiation and collaborative behavior. In the center of this 
continuum are efforts to project “counter-hegemonic ideas in the public sphere” using 
the media, prominent individuals, or political parties (Ballard et al. 2005, p. 12,  
Bebbington 2010). Hence social movements do more than protest (Melucci 1986, 
1996 cited in Crossley 2002). What is not evident is what strategies ASSEFA 
employs (in the collaborative to adversarial continuum) to promote its ideas, an issue 
that will be discussed further below. The key point is the collective action is diffuse 
geographically and temporally but persists over time and is defined by a shared 
identity and set of goals (Bebbington 2010). Either way strategy movements are 
ultimately about challenging mainstream policies or elements of the social, political 
and economic systems (Ballard et al. 2005, p. 617). 
 
Bebbington (2010, p. 5) argues that alternative NGOs only become “interesting” if 
linked to social movements. It is through the broader mobilization of a social 
movement that an NGO’s localized impact becomes significant and influences 
broader social processes. This is analogous to Edwards and Hulme’s (1992) idea of 
scaling up impact by facilitating and linking grassroots organizations. Batliwala (1993 
cited in Townsend et al. 2004) argues that self-empowerment can be complete only if 
social movements emerge although success in doing so is limited. Thus links to 
social movements become a measure of NGO effectiveness (Bebbington et al. 2008, 
Bolnick 2008 cited in Bebbington 2010). Townsend et al. (2004, p. 874) highlights a 
less intentional connection between NGO work and movements citing NGO ability to 
“create associational spaces and networks that are…latent social movements.” 
Women’s groups are noted as a primary example. People may not consciously be 
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part of a movement, but as “new cultural codes and new forms of associational 
behaviour” are created the “new social spaces” become the “submerged networks” of 
a “latent social movement” (ibid.). 
 
The link between NGOs and social movements can occur in the opposite direction as 
well (Crossley 2002). NGOs can motivate social movements as discussed but can 
also emerge in response to social movements. McCarthy and Zald (1977) analogized 
formal NGOs (referred to as social movement organizations or SMOs) as the supply 
meeting a demand created by social movements. NGOs may emerge from social 
movements to provide leadership and coordination (Crossley 2002). This latter 
argument resonates with ASSEFA’s emergence from the Bhoodan land movement to 
provide leadership and support following the resettlement of landless laborers on 
donated Bhoodan lands. 
 
Moving past the question of whether ASSEFA and it’s affiliates constitute an on-
going social movement, ASSEFA’s self-identification as such helps explains some of 
logic of its operation, in particular its culture, relationship with members, and 
somewhat paradoxically its apparent inattention to the goal of explicitly confronting 
the state for structural changes in contradiction of the NGO model and social 
movement characteristics. More to the point, self-identification as a movement 
impacts its combination of social performance (understood as occurring primarily 
through community building) with financial performance (understood as occurring 
through increased autonomy or self-reliance).  
 
In terms of social performance, ASSEFA’s self-identification contributes to mission 
resilience in the face of global trends towards the mainstream microfinance model, 
particularly the financial systems model. Social movements with goals focused on 
changing individuals (rather than society) insulate organizations from pressures 
towards “goal transformation” and “organizational maintenance” (Zald & Ash-Garner 
1987, p. 127). Focusing inward on changing individuals invites less resistance from 
other institutions and depends less on external success. ASSEFA’s programs focus 
directly on changing members’ social and economic status rather than directly 
challenging the state.  
 
Loganathan’s strong position as leader-founder also can arguably be jointly credited 
for mission resilience (see Section 6.1.4). Although much of Loganathan’s leadership 
style is unclear we can assert his focus on mobilizing tasks rather than articulating 
tasks, that is reinforcing organizational goals and member commitment rather than 
relationships with other organizations. Loganathan’s focus is inward on reinforcing 
values and commitment rather than outward.  
 
ASSEFA’s mission and culture necessarily builds a relationship with members 
beyond service provider-customer. Members are engaged in the management and 
ownership of people’s organizations. But ASSEFA’s mission and movement culture 
further considers members as family and engages them in multiple activities, a type 
of layering of activities or intensive bundling. This is akin to a social movement with 
exclusive membership requirements (see Section 7.1.4). Exclusive membership 
requirements reinforce ASSEFA’s mission of community-building and further its 
movement vision of Gram Swaraj. It serves social performance as well as financial 
performance. ASSEFA draws on this intensive bundling through microfinance (SNFL 
and other credit-based efforts) and leverages the cost of social intermediation/group 
formation to raise funds that support programs and improve their financial 
sustainability. Funds are intentionally and primarily raised from members either 
directly or through their activities (with the exception of bank loans for SNFL’s on-
lending). 
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The overarching theme of ASSEFA’s self-identification as a social movement is its 
pursuit of autonomy and self-reliance. However, like alternative NGOs, social 
movements are generally defined as opposing power structures or processes in 
some way. Dinerstein (2012, p. 2) concludes, “Most definitions concur that a social 
movement is a collectivity of individuals of different kinds, formally organized, with 
specific goals and the use of antagonistic discourses and tactics for political ends.” 
Given its inward focus it is difficult to identify ASSEFA’s method (as either an 
alternative NGO or traditional social movement) of opposing power structures. It not 
only seeks financial autonomy but autonomy from government entanglement, that is, 
it does not seek to influence government through negotiation or other less 
adversarial means (with the exception of committee membership).   
 
This is certainly linked to the specifics of ASSEFA’s Gandhian ideology, which insists 
on principles of Ahisma with trusteeship as the solution (see Section 3.2.4). However 
it also connects ASSEFA to the social movement literature on a particular application 
of “antagonistic discourses” attributed to “hope movements.” Hope movements 
pursue a new way of ‘being’ now rather than advocate for it in the future and keep 
distance from the state. Likewise, ASSEFA doesn’t actively oppose or advocate the 
state for change but it seeks autonomy from and to articulate through its actions a 
different set of values regarding development than represented by the state and 
market (a middle way). ASSEFA reflects a point of view antagonistic and distrustful 
of state and market-based efforts to address poverty and inequality (the latter 
reflected in ASSEFA’s rejection of the mainstreaming of microfinance). It questions 
development agendas ‘subversively’ through perpetuation of ideology that diminishes 
the state rather than tries to reform it and advocates self-reliance almost as a form of 
opting out and as a way of promoting alternative ideology about economic and social 
system. It does so alongside a pragmatic ‘using’ of state resources for individual and 
organizational gain but not as a principle strategic thrust as demonstrated by its 
decline to partner or participate when the terms are not considered serviceable.103 
 
ASSEFA’s approach has pragmatic and strategic aspects for managing the tensions 
inherent for an alternative NGO in government and donor relationship. It also is, 
however, an expression of its self-identification as a social movement and increases 
mission resilience. It suggest an alternate logic in which both social and financial 
performance are pursued alongside opting out in a sense of broader relationships 
(with market or donors) that may enhance financial position according to either 
mainstream or alternate NGO logic. It also suggests a logic for social movements – 
logic of sustaining them through bundling of cost recovery programs with material 
benefit to sustain over a longer term its ability to pursue goals of social change. 
 
The impact of ASSEFA’s model on microfinance is to transform a strategy that began 
as an empowerment strategy, was coopted by a hegemonic development model 
based on neoliberal values of integrating poor households into capitalistic economic 
                                            
103 There is little literature addressing NGO-MFOs as social movements. One exception is 
SEWA, a prominent community-based MFO based in Gujarat (Bebbington 2010). Similar to 
ASSEFA, SEWA promoted a set of affiliated people’s organizations to meet a range of 
member needs. It also, like ASSEFA, originated as/from a social movement. However it is 
distinct from ASSEFA in that SEWA began as a labor union working on behalf of women in 
the informal sector and as such is a traditional social movement, petitioning the state for 
rights and benefits on behalf of its worker members. ASSEFA on the other hand as described 
here is not a traditional social movement given its focus on autonomy rather than 
confrontation with the state. Its ideology also carries with it a deeper critique of Western 
thinking than associated with labor unions.  
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system through financial inclusion and supporting small-scale economic activity and 
transforms it back into the service of goals of social change by using it to sustain 
more radical (and to some degree anti-capitalist) ideologies.  
 
8.5 Revisiting the relationship: analytical categories and conceptual framework 
 
In the preceding three sections, the analytical categories identified in the course of 
case study data analysis (see Section 4.3.5) facilitate an examination of each case 
study organization’s consistencies and differences with the logic of mainstream and 
alternative models of microfinance provision. Section 8.2 does so with reference to 
the mainstream models of microfinance; Section 8.3 does with reference to the 
alternative model of microfinance provision; Section 8.4 then draws conclusions 
based on the previous two sections’ analysis. Ultimately the analytical categories 
also provide scope for the articulation of a framework of microfinance provision not 
fully described by the models presented in and through the conceptual framework.  
 
The analytical categories in particular usefully highlight the relevance of origin and 
local context for understanding the case studies’ ideological positions with reference 
to the tensions described in the conceptual framework. Analysis of ASSEFA’s 
mission, organizational culture, structure and leadership, for instance, emphasizes 
the influence of its origin and identification as a Gandhian social movement on its 
framework of microfinance provision. The complex interaction of such culturally-
embedded ideology with the more Western ideologies primarily expressed in the 
tensions between social and financial performance as discussed in the NGO and 
microfinance literature and reflected in in the conceptual model is thus better 
understood through use of the analytical categories.  
 
The intersection of local and global ideologies have implications for social 
performance management and assessment (the latter to be discussed in further 
detail in Section 8.7). More broadly, it reinforces the relevance and need for 
alternative thinking about not only models of microfinance provision but also 
development management. 
 
8.6 Revisiting the relationship: systematic review and case studies 
 
Just as the fieldwork resulted in a broadened set of analytical categories, it also 
changed the relationship between the two stages of the research—the systematic 
review and the case studies. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the two stages were 
originally seen as progressive. Given the research’s focus on social performance 
management and assessment systems, it made sense to review available evidence 
on performance assessment prior to the fieldwork. The systematic review would 
provide a point of comparison with the case studies. Specifically, I intended to 
evaluate the case studies’ social performance systems in light of the broader set of 
impact assessments reviewed in the first stage of the research, including how and to 
what extent they incorporated the indicators and processes represented in the 
systematic review. The systematic review was also likely to inform case study 
selection.  
 
I found however that the systematic review represented only a small subset of NGO-
MFOs and narrowed the focus with regards to social performance management and 
assessment too much. Other selection criteria were used in case selection, as 
discussed in Section 4.3.2. The fieldwork further shifted the research towards a 
broader and more interpretive view of social performance management and 
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development management generally (see Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.5). Hence, while 
the scope of the two research stages overlap they are not directly comparable. The 
systematic review represents the dominant approach to social performance 
assessment, impact assessment designed to draw conclusions about microfinance 
broadly with the purpose of informing policy. The case studies, on the other hand, not 
only focus on social performance management as integrated and driven by NGO-
MFOs, but more to the point, they prove rich sources of evidence for the need to 
consider alternative approaches to social performance management and 
development management more generally. 
 
In light of the research’s shifting view the two stages of research could stand alone, 
commenting on two distinct although complimentary approaches to social 
performance assessment and management. Considered together, the systematic 
review makes more explicit the hegemony of the dominant view towards social 
performance assessment and development management in global discourse and 
presented in contrast to the case studies provides scope to discuss the limitations of 
the dominant view (see Section 5.3.4), which does not necessarily bear relevance to 
all NGO-MFOs, particularly those whose approach to development management is 
based on alternative frameworks, including locally embedded models, rather than on 
externally-dictated narratives driven by the goals and methods of microfinance’s 
institutional promoters. 
 
8.7 Social performance assessment 
 
Section 8.2 discusses how and to what extent the case studies align with mainstream 
models of microfinance provision.  Section 8.3 reflects on an alternative model for 
microfinance provision based on NGO literature, while Section 8.4 explores going 
beyond those models to incorporating social movements. The microfinance model 
describes the underlying organizational landscape that informs and orients choices 
about social and financial performance. This section makes this connection more 
explicit by discussing social performance assessment systems in terms of each 
model. 
 
The mainstream models of microfinance discussed in Section 8.2 (and Section 2.3) 
reflect ‘financial performance first’ (the financial systems) and ‘social performance 
first’ (poverty-oriented) approaches to microfinance provision. The financial first 
perspective favours focusing effort on sustainable service delivery (financial 
performance) with increasing financial inclusion (or breadth of outreach through 
organizational growth) as the primary contribution of microfinance. Building a 
sustainable model of microfinance—one that is scalable and replicable and thus can 
impact large numbers of poor households is itself (it argues) evidence of positive 
social performance. The social performance first approach cautions against the 
limitations and risks of not explicitly targeting or evaluating impact on the poor.  
 
In each case social performance assessment requires different indicators.  In the 
latter case, impact assessment requires indicators at the beneficiary level (at least 
including some estimation of depth of outreach), while financial performance first 
suggests the sufficiency of institutional indicators (particularly of breadth of outreach, 
repayment and financial sustainability) as evidence of social impact (see Section 
2.3.1). A lack of attention to non-institutional indicators of social impact by the 
financial performance first approach led to calls for more impact assessment, 
particularly practitioner-led impact assessment. Over time the focus broadened away 
from impact assessment toward integrated monitoring and evaluation of social 
performance (see Section 2.3.2). This extended differences in social performance 
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assessment beyond indicators, goals and methods and provided scope for 
incorporating NGO values in assessment (see Section 2.2).  
 
On a deeper level the social versus financial first debate reflects a normative debate 
about the scope of what microfinance can accomplish and the identity of 
microfinance organizations. As Lewis (2003) argues, microfinance is a paradigm 
shifting intervention for NGOs with the potential to change NGOs role (from 
catalysing empowerment and social change to service delivery). Rather than make 
up for deficiencies of the state and market microfinance engages and incorporates 
market principles into its operation (Bebbington 1997). In much the same way that 
aid chain participation forged close ties between NGOs and state actors, raising 
concerns of NGO cooption by the state, microfinance’s market orientation raised 
concerns of NGO cooption by the market that would leave little to distinguish it in 
methods and purpose from any commercially-oriented business. Both circumstances 
represent the hegemony (whether directly or indirectly through development trends 
enacted through state actors) of the economistic, rationalist values of neoliberalism. 
 
Mainstream views of development management and assessment favour results-
based management with quantifiable performance metrics that provide objective 
assessment of the outcomes and impacts of development efforts.  Scientific rigor is 
the measuring stick for judging the credibility and usefulness of assessment results 
for guiding future development investments. This reflects a faith in the scientific 
method’s ability to abstract solutions that can be applied in any context. It reflects 
management of and in development. Criticism of mainstream development 
management questions the ‘science’ of management and the reality of homogenous 
and neutral technocratic fixes, instead pointing to the political nature of knowledge 
and the complexity engendered by local physical, social, and political contexts. It 
suggests assessment processes that privilege local knowledge and produce 
descriptions and not just prescriptions (Gulrajani 2010). Given the subjective and 
contested nature of outcomes it is necessarily process-focused, an extension of 
management for development. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the NGO literature presents two opposing frameworks 
for understanding NGO social performance assessment systems which reflect the 
unease with more service provision-oriented NGO roles promoted by both 
microfinance and aid chain participation. The frameworks represent different views of 
the purpose of assessment processes and a fundamentally different understanding 
of NGO organizational role and values that reflect differences in development 
management views. Table 8.1 below reviews some of the characteristics of the 
‘technocratic’ approach to assessment—so called by the more interpretive approach 
that objects to its approach and underlying values.  
 
Advocates of the technocratic approach point to the need for objective conclusions 
on the efficacy of development projects to direct future investments and to hold 
organizations accountable for achieving results. Critics attribute rising popularity of 
this approach to NGOs’ integration into the aid chain and suggest it best serves the 
needs of donors, primarily holding NGOs’ accountable to them. Critics further assert 
the technocratic approach runs counter to the underlying values of NGOs and the 
realities of development work.  
 
The interpretive approach by contrast asserts accountability is owed primarily to an 
NGO’s intended beneficiaries and as such any assessment of impact should be 
formative and conducted through participatory processes resulting in a judgment 
negotiated through consultation with multiple stakeholders. It further emphasizes the 
complex and non-linear nature of development whose impacts are influenced by 
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multiple stakeholders and external factors over the long term. The two approaches 
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While the social performance first approach questions the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of relying exclusively on institutional indicators of financial inclusion for 
establishment of social performance it does not necessarily question the logic of 
microfinance or its bias towards quantitative methodology and results-based 
management (in simply establishing depth of outreach for instance). However to the 
extent it shifts towards practitioner-led assessment with formative goals, it has the 
capacity to incorporate management for development values. As noted in Section 
2.3.1, social performance can be managed in a technocratic and scientific fashion. In 
other words, social performance first can forge a middle way between assessment 
according to mainstream development management (and adopted largely by 
mainstream microfinance models) and an alternative or ‘Romantic’ management 
view (as interpreted by NGO values) to the extent it has capacity to incorporate a 
more formative purpose, learning goals and acknowledge the limitations of the 
scientific approach into the complex world of development.  
 
Social performance assessment is seldom pursued in a purely interpretive fashion 
(Chambers 1997, Hulme 2000).  In ASSEFA, however, we see at the very least a 
rejection of the values of technocratic (and mainstream) social performance 
assessment. The most striking finding about ASSEFA’s approach to social 
performance assessment is its lack of any systematic, formal or routine processes.  
That is not to say ASSEFA does not collect data but when done it is seldom with the 
focus of monitoring or evaluating progress on social goals. Assessment activities are 
designed to meet specific learning objectives and are done on an ad-hoc, as needed 
basis. Participatory processes are used as part of its model of people-led 
development, such as the farmer’s conference when a participatory process was 
used to develop project resolutions. ASSEFA’s approach prioritizes process, 
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flexibility, and participation. However, these principles are integrated into its model or 
operation overall and not in an explicitly or intentionally designed (outcome or impact 
focused) assessment system. Integration of values of flexibility and participation 
seem adequate evidence of social performance. This resonates with the idea of 
being and acting (as in hope movements) rather than changing (whether individuals 
or society/state) as the primary demonstration of change.  
 
The more formal assessment done by ASSEFA on an as needed basis is done for 
the benefit of an external audience, such as a donor. For instance, SNFL reports to 
MIX Market but ironically reports no social performance data even given its strong 
social focus, an indication perhaps of its view on the real usefulness of such 
reporting generally—to serve external audience demands (which it only needs to do 
in the case of SNFL to establish the confidence and credibility necessary primarily to 
obtain funding). Such an approach reflects values of an alternative development 
management but also leaves room for manoeuvre. ASSEFA can maintain flexibility to 
change objectives as needed and can also benefit from vagueness and uncertainty 
around the magnitude of its impact, for instance, relative to specific project goals 
over time. 
 
8.8 Conclusions and Implications for Indian microfinance  
 
The case studies illustrate the limitations of taking an NGO-MFO that has been quite 
successful in terms of growth and sustainability and trying to understand it in terms of 
the dominant way of thinking about microfinance, even given the more poverty-
oriented perspective. The case studies have a coherence and identity independent of 
the dominant framework and this can be at least partially explained by the debate 
that exists in development management between the scientific view in which the 
mainstream microfinance model is embedded, and an alternative (and Romantic) 
view of development management.  
 
In many ways the case studies provide the antithesis of the mainstream model of 
microfinance. ASSEFA and CRUSADE reflect core aspects of the alternative view. 
They mirror the ‘social performance first’ prioritization of social performance over 
financial performance, although their approach to social performance assessment 
itself is arguably sparse. Both case study organizations clearly and intentionally 
manage for social performance subject to the constraints of financial performance. 
They also both pursue empowerment as the means and end of mission achievement 
and reject service delivery, particularly when pursued in partnership with government, 
as a sufficiently ambitious or ideologically-authentic role. ASSEFA’s mission of 
empowerment through Gram Swaraj dictates a participatory, bottom-up approach 
with an emphasis on process and flexibility and social performance assessment is 
likewise focused downward on accountability to members, participation and learning. 
CRUSADE similarily reflects NGO values through an empowerment mission focused 
on building and strengthening people’s organizations. Thus while ASSEFA and 
CRUSADE clearly do not fit the dominant models of microfinance provision, they 
map in many respects to the alternative or NGO model of microfinance. CRUSADE 
may indeed be best understood through the alternative model. It fits well the 
characterization of the small alternative NGO-MFO that rejects the logic of 
commercialization, choosing social performance over financial performance, and is 
restricted in size by access to capital but also by the personalized nature of 
management and the small geographic area it can support.  
 
CRUSADE reflects a stereotype of what one might expect to find among lower-profile, 
less researched NGO-MFOs. It represents one half of the dichotomy associated with 
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the social and financial performance tension, wherein the choice is between scaling 
and specializing to become a large commercially-oriented and professionally-
managed MFI or remaining geographically small and resource constrained in order to 
maintain close grassroots connections and an integrated approach focused on 
empowerment and social change. ASSEFA, however, is more anomalous and does 
not fit the dominant or alternative microfinance moulds. ASSEFA has scaled up and 
has pursued financial sustainability while maintaining a strong sense of its social 
mission. It has done so through an organizational identity that rejects the 
commercially-oriented logic of mainstream microfinance but also rejects the poverty-
oriented approach’s logic of social performance which asserts the importance of 
targeting and of formal and systematic social performance assessment, at the least 
constituting some type of assessment of client poverty level and extending to 
integrated and routine monitoring and evaluation of progress on social goals as a 
means to protect against mission drift.  
 
What ultimately protects ASSEFA from mission drift is the organizational qualities 
reinforcing its self-identification as a social movement (and not a microfinance or 
NGO organization). ASSEFA has formed the culture of a social movement—reflected 
in its mission, structure, relationship with members, an approach to financial 
performance focused primarily on autonomy and reinforced by Loganathan’s key 
leadership and connection with an iconic past. Autonomy minimizes ASSEFA’s 
interaction with external parties, particularly government and donors, which are one 
of the primary drivers of mission drift among NGOs. Rather than being coopted (or 
suffering mission drift) in the course of microfinance provision, ASSEFA has in a 
sense coopted microfinance and its momentum for its own purposes. Its model 
enhances room for manoeuvre relative to external pressure from third parties 
(through autonomy) and in its own internal processes (through informality) but still 
limits its room to manoeuvre to the extent that it creates resource constraints limiting 
potential for financial performance and impacting at least the quantity if not the 
quality of future social performance.  
 
What is particularly interesting about ASSEFA’s example is its suggestion of a 
separate logic of microfinance being used by Indian microfinance organizations. Its 
model is embedded within a contextually-specific Gandhian framework rather than 
conforming to externally-defined approaches. ASSEFA thus reflects a preferencing of 
embeddedness, lived realities and local knowledge over the professionalism and 
technocratic expertise that embody abstract principles, connecting with a non-
managerial and Romantic development management. Ultimately this approach builds 
capacity for flexibility, improvisation and acceptance of contingencies and 
uncertainties, a “requirement” of Romantic development management (Gulrajani 
2010, p. 143). This is evidenced in participatory processes that engage various 
stakeholders, such as resolution setting during the Farmer’s Conference. Planning 
appears primarily to be a process for articulating the consensus about strategies and 
goals achieved through consultative processes and not about performance. Put 
another way, planning processes are not primarily about controlling outcomes or 
establishing a basis for future performance accountability in the way results-based 
management would require. Projects have goals and zonal managers make annual 
plans, but they each have their own metrics for defining and assessing their success 
against those plans. As such, performance assessment is informal and personal and 
not designed toward aggregating and comparing performance.  
 
Recognizing experienced realities over abstract principles further suggests 
organizations that are smaller, decentralized and more democratic (and less 
bureaucratic). Although not a small organization, ASSEFA’s structure builds in 
capacity for flexibility and democratic planning and decision-making. However power 
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and authority within ASSEFA are clearly centralized and uncertainty remains around 
whether, for instance, members can speak freely and how pluralistic decision-making 
processes ultimately are. It is also unclear the extent to which ASSEFA’s 
organizational culture integrates reflexivity about its own limitations, or the way in 
which it may reinforce or sustain underdevelopment, the third “requirement” of a 
Romantic development management (Gulrajani 2010, p. 143). This was evidenced 
by key informants’ unwillingness to consider whether their inclusive Gandhian-based 
approach could unintentionally reinforce inequalities based on gender and class. 
Thus ASSEFA does not fully fit the Romantic development management mould. 
ASSEFA’s divergence is explained perhaps by referencing back to its Gandhian 
framework wherein the virtues of inclusivity and Gram Swaraj are a given. Likewise, 
Gandhian principles of trusteeship may explain and justify the concentration of power 
and authority, in a sense substituting bureaucratic control for personal control by 
trustees (most importantly Loganathan), who as trustees are fulfilling their obligation 
to selfless service in the interests of the broader community. ASSEFA’s model for 
development management then, as with microfinance provision more narrowly, is 
perhaps best seen as an embedded socio-political practice. 
 
ASSEFA’s model appears to have protected it from the worst outcomes of the 
Andhra Pradesh crisis. Arguably the crisis was at least precipitated by over-rapid 
growth leading to saturation, multiple lending and borrower over indebtedness, 
although the proximate cause was regulation by the Andhra Pradesh state 
government that forestalled repayments and sent MFIs into financial crisis. In Tamil 
Nadu slower growth and less intensive competition between MFIs and the state SHG 
bank-linkage program most certainly prevented the same level of escalation seen in 
Andhra Pradesh. But as Marr and Tubaro (2011) suggest, organizational 
characteristics like structure and governance, may also have played a role in 
protecting MFIs and the Tamil Nadu sector as a whole from escalating to a crisis 
similar to Andhra Pradesh. Marr and Tubaro (ibid.) point to the number of Tamil 
Nadu-based MFOs who share governance with an affiliated NGO committed to its 
social mission. ASSEFA has just such a relationship with SNFL. Tamil Nadu, and 
ASSEFA, suffered mostly from the aftermath of the crisis, specifically tightening of 
available credit from domestic banks, the primary lenders to MFIs and SNFL (through 
priority sector lending). ASSEFA model provided some limited assistance with that 
problem as well. ASSEFA’s strategy of building a family of self-sufficient affiliated 
organizations helped to support SNFL during the liquidity contraction: other ASSEFA 
organizations contributed funds to ASSEFA so that it could keep lending while 
rebuilding the confidence of banks in its credit-worthiness. 
 
Speaking more broadly the crisis appears to have validated the assertions and 
viability of less prominent microfinance models, like ASSEFA’s. For instance, it 
appears to have confirmed the poverty-oriented approach’s assertion that borrower 
sustainability is not adequately measured by repayment rates and social benefit by 
increasing breadth of outreach or financial inclusion. The crisis also seems to confirm 
the importance of some type of monitoring and evaluation of social performance to 
avoid mission drift. Perhaps more poignantly however, the crisis appears to have 
discredited to some degree the mainstream model/financial systems approach. The 
aggressive pursuit of growth for financial sustainability and commercialization can be 
self-defeating and produce neither positive social impact nor organizational self-
reliance (via stable, commercially-viable financial institutions that deepen the 
market). It suggests the model is at least unstable without some type of checks on 
the behaviors leading to the crisis. Meanwhile alternative models, like ASSEFA have 
while achieving more modest growth rates have produced, in the long-term, more 
stable performance on both financial and social fronts. In the few years since the 
crisis there has been increased concern with social performance and talk of 
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standards of “responsible finance” to protect against future problems by the financial 
systems camp. Codes of conduct usefully create standardized measures of 
responsible behavior against which lenders can evaluate MFIs and as such can 
usefully rebuild confidence and lending for the sector. However, it is type of 
accountability to and for external stakeholders still operate form a managerial and 
technocratic approach.  
 
8.9 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 
My research was case study-based to provide insight into how NGO-MFOs negotiate 
between managing for client and organizational self-reliance. The focus of the 
research was developing an in-depth understanding of the issues from the point of 
view of the NGO-MFO. As such the research chose depth rather than breadth, 
requiring a case study approach. I was only able to include two case studies in the 
fieldwork and therefore cannot assert that the case studies are representative of 
NGO-MFOs generally or in Tamil Nadu specifically. I also cannot address the size of 
the community to which ASSEFA belongs, that is the degree to which other relatively 
‘hidden’ NGO-MFOs bear similarities with ASSEFA. 
 
The case study organization were chosen on the basis of potential for learning and I 
argue they do provide useful examples of NGO-MFOs with strong social orientations 
which are not well represented in existing research. By choosing case study 
organizations that are less easily accessed (even somewhat secretive) there is 
greater potential for learning and for thickening understanding of NGO-MFO 
management of social/financial tensions.  
 
Breadth was also sacrificed by choosing two closely related case study organizations 
but this ultimately was consistent with the research’s focus on depth. CRUSADE was 
interesting as case study in itself but also deepened understanding of ASSEFA. 
 
Addressing some of the above limitations, for instance through further triangulation of 
the findings with other stakeholders (and other NGO-MFOs in Tamil Nadu) external 
to ASSEFA and CRUSADE, is an area of possible further research.  
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APPENDICES: Systematic Review 
 
Appendix 1: Original proposed search terms 
 
Set: Search Terms: 
1-Subject India AND 
Rural, small farmers, marginal farmers, 
labourers/labourers 
Poor/poverty, disadvantaged, scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes, backward 
castes, women, dalits, adivasi 








Livelihood and promotion 
Microenterprise and promotion 
3-Study type Impact, outcome, evaluation, survey, 
assessment, review, case study, 





Appendix 2: Pre-review testing/scoping of search terms* 
 
Search string Number 
of hits 
Change from previous 
1. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR (livelihood* and 
promotion) OR (microenterprise* and 
promotion)) 
1,207 n/a 
2. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
micro-financ* OR credit OR microcredit 
OR micro-credit OR loan* OR saving* OR 
insurance OR (livelihood* and promotion) 
OR (microenterprise* and promotion)) 
1,207 Hyphenated variants for 
micro-financ* and micro-
credit added.  
Not useful 
3. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR micro-
loan* OR microloan* OR saving* OR 
insurance OR (livelihood* and promotion) 
OR (microenterprise* and promotion)) 
1,207 Include micro-loan* and 
microloan* variants 
Not useful 
4. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR microsaving* OR micro-
saving* OR insurance OR (livelihood* and 
promotion) OR (microenterprise* and 
promotion)) 
1,207 Include micro-saving* and 
microsaving* variants 
Not useful 
5. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR microinsurance 
OR micro-insurance OR (livelihood* and 
promotion) OR (microenterprise* and 
promotion)) 




6. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
(microenterprise* and promotion)) 
1,354 (Livelihood* and promotion) 
revised to livelihood* to 
pick up variations on idea 
of promotion; didn’t add 
excessive number of 
results and some may be 
relevant 
7. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise*) 
1,358 (microenterprise* and 
promotion) revised to 
microenterprise* to pick up 
variations on idea of 
promotion; marginally 
useful 
8. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 




9. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic = (rural or farmer* or caste* or dalit* 
or adivasi* or tribe* or women or poor) 
574 Added terms based on 
subjects to eliminate 
irrelevant results 
 
(rural or farmer* or caste* 
or dalit* or adivasi* or tribe* 
or women or poor) 
10. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic = (laborer* or labourer*) 
11 Tested additional subject 
term: laborer*/labourer*; all 
results either were not 
relevant or had another 
subject-related term (such 
as women or poor) 
 
11. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic=(disadvantaged) 
11 Tested additional subject 
term: disadvantaged; all 
results either were not 
relevant or had another 
subject-related term (such 
as women or poor) 
 
12. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic=(borrower* or microborrower* or 
micro-borrower*) 
18 Tested additional subject 
terms: (borrower* or 
microborrower* or micro-
borrower*); not useful in 
this database but results 
suggest borrower* could in 
another database  
13. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic=(self-help or self help” or SHG*) 
25 Tested additional subject 
terms: (self-help or self 
help” or SHG*); useful; 
most relevant results had 
other subject terms 
(women), but picked up 
one important result that 
did not; results suggest 
women* 
14. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
AND 
Topic = (rural or farmer* or caste* or dalit* 
or adivasi* or tribe* or women* or poor or 
borrower* or self-help or “self help” or 
SHG*) 
579 Added useful subject terms 
tested above 
 
Still significant number of 
irrelevant results 
15. Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* OR 
credit OR microcredit OR loan* OR 
saving* OR insurance OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-enterprise*) 
278 Added study type terms to 
eliminate irrelevant results: 
 
(impact* or outcome* or 
evaluat* or assess* or 
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AND 
Topic = (rural or farmer* or caste* or dalit* 
or adivasi* or tribe* or women* or poor or 
borrower* or self-help or “self help” or 
SHG*) 
AND 
Topic=(impact* or outcome* or evaluat* 
or assess* or survey* or “case stud*” or 
ethnograph* or “action research”) 
survey* or “case stud*” or 
ethnograph* or “action 
research”) 
 
Still appear to be fairly 
significant number of 
irrelevant results, but 
narrowed to manageable 
number 
 





*Conducted in ISI Web of Knowledge; Timespan: 1991-2010; Citation Databases: 




Appendix 3: Inclusion/screening checklist 
 
 Criteria 
Intervention Retail financial services including any credit, insurance, savings or 
other financial services; 
Offered in rural India; 
Including studies of non-financial services (such as BDS) bundled 
with financial services; 
Offered by institutional providers including public/commercial banks, 
NGO/commercial MFIs, NGO/public facilitators, and credit 
cooperatives; exclude unregulated or entirely self-managed 
Subject Individuals and/or households (and their enterprises), SHG/SAGs, 
and/or communities that are users or potential users of above 
intervention; 
Providers and impacts on providers excluded except in cases such 
as SHGs where users are also involved in provision 
Outcomes At least one of the following outcomes is reported: 
Economic/money metrics: Poverty status, consumption, income, 
assets, vulnerability, savings, credit (use, repayment, source, size), 
enterprise creation, enterprise performance (growth, revenues, 
profits),  
Social metrics: health and/or nutritional status, education (enrolment, 
literacy), social and cultural resources (e.g. networks/social capital) 
and empowerment (psycho-social, relational, and behavioural) 
Methodology Quantitative studies include controlled trials, action research, impact 
evaluations, social survey datasets, before/after studies, and 
observational research;  
Quantitative studies apply some method of comparison, whether 
experimental, quasi-experimental, pipeline, or before/after designs 
(including recall, self-attribution, panel, or longitudinal data) 
Quantitative studies that do not use comparison group but look at 
impact heterogeneity to try to infer something about impact 
Qualitative studies, including case studies and ethnographic 
research that express intent to make inferences about impact, are 





Appendix 4: Coding/tagging for preliminary screening 
(based on title/abstract review) 
 
Code/Tag Definition 
0-EXCLUDED: Does not meet all criteria 
1-INCLUDED:  Appears to meet all criteria 
2-INCONCLUSIVE: Unclear if meets criteria/requires further screening 




Appendix 5: Coding/tagging for secondary screening 





On full review discover more than one paper based on the 
same study; paper(s) reporting relevant results reviewed; 






Insufficient information in full paper to understand the 
methodology used and whether it meets the methodological 
criteria; paper excluded 
 
5-TOO OLD:  
 
Paper publication date met criteria, but study data pre-1991; 
paper excluded 
 
6-DOES NOT MEET 
CRITERIA:  
 
On full review paper does not meet the one or more criteria; 



























Topic = (India) AND 
Topic = (financ* OR microfinanc* 
OR credit OR microcredit OR 
loan* OR saving* OR insurance 
OR livelihood* OR 
microenterprise* OR micro-
enterprise*) AND 
Topic = (rural or farmer* or caste* 
or dalit* or adivasi* or tribe* or 
women* or poor or borrower* or 
self-help or “self help” or SHG*) 
AND 
Topic=(impact* or outcome* or 
evaluat* or assess* or survey* or 











































(Applied to sites’ 




26/8/2010 3ie* India 22 
26/8/2010 IFMR* Searched all publications listed 
under Centre for Microfinance: 
Working Paper Series & Case 
Studies 
NA 
26/8/2010 APMAS; EDA Rural 
Systems 
Searched all publications listed 
online 
NA 
26/8/2010 NABARD Document type: Evaluation 
Studies 
28 
 26/8/2010 CYSD; SHARE; 
MYRADA; PRADAN 
Searched all publications listed 
online 
NA 
26/8/2010 J-PAL* Themes: Finance & Microfinance 
Country: India 
13 




Document Type: Evaluation 
Major Subject: Women in 
Development 












26/8/2010 World Bank* Country: India 
Document Types:  
Impact evaluation report;  
Departmental working paper; 
Journal article;  
Policy research working paper;  
Poverty and social policy working 
paper;  
Publication;  
WBI working paper;  
Working paper;  
















Searched indexes of 





26/8/2010 The Mix Market* Searched all other publications 
listed online (www.themix.org) 




Searched all publications listed 
online 
NA 





Country: India 299 
*Also only English, 1991 and later; +Abstracts on website 
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Clarity of research 
question 
o Present when the research question is 
clear and addressed by the methods & 
result 
o Not present when any problems with 
above 
Researcher bias o Not present when interests of study 
authors are declared and no potential 
bias 
o Present when above is not clear or 








o Local  
Study coverage o National 
o State 




Study design o Before/after (based on recall or self-
attribution) 
o Before/after (based on 
longitudinal/panel data) 
o With/without 
o With/without & before/after 
o Pipeline 
o RCT 
Analysis o Tabulation 
o Multivariate 
o IV/PSM/DID 
Areas of bias 
(selection bias, 
attrition bias etc) 
o Note areas where evidence of (or 
unclear) attrition bias, selection bias 
(observable/unobservable 








Appendix 8: Tabulation of study ranking 
 
  1 2 3 
  Tabulation Multivariate IV/PSM/DID 
1 Before/after  
(based on recall or self-
attribution) 2 3 4 
2 Before/after  
(based on 
longitudinal/panel data) 3 4 5 
3 With/without  
(may incorporate some 
recall/self-attribution) 4 5 6 
4      With/without & before/after 5 6 7 
5      Pipeline 6 7 8 





Appendix 9: Questions included with introductory email 
(assessing potential for learning): 
 
1) How does your organization’s mission reflect its orientation toward social or 
financial goals? 
 
2) Has your organization’s mission changed in the past five years? 
 
3) Is your mission likely to change in the next five years? 
 
4) What were/are the drivers of the mission change? 
 
5) What are the constraints on implementation of social aspects of your mission? 
 
6) How does your organization measure progress on social aspects of your mission? 
 
7) What has influenced the way you measure social performance? 
 
8) Has the way you measure social performance changed in the past five years? 
 
9) Is the way you measure social performance likely to change in the next five years? 
 
10) How are the results of social performance measurement used by your 
organization? 
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Appendix 10: Interview guide 
(dated 5 Nov 2012): 
 
1) Could you tell me about the beginnings of your organization? 
a. Who, what, when, where, why 
 
2) What have been significant changes or milestones for the organization? 
a. Governance structure/legal form 
b. Management/leadership 
c. External relations/partners 
d. Targeting (population/location), products/services (e.g. type, design, 
delivery) 
 





4) What is your organization’s mission? 
a. Has it changed? 
b. Seem likely to change in the future? 
c. What were/are the drivers of the mission change? 
 
5) How do you assess progress on your mission? 
a. Who, what, when, where of any data collection 
b. How has the way you measure social performance changed/evolved? 
c. What motivated the changes? 
d. Are changes in the way you assess progress on social goals likely in 
the future? 
e. Who, what, when, where of any reporting 
f. How useful/impactful has assessment/accounting been and to what 
end? 
 
6) What guidelines for monitoring and evaluating have you found useful (if any)? 
a. If so, how? 
 
7) Have you found the literature on social performance useful?  
a. If so, how? 
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Appendix 11: Data collection summary: contacts outside ASSEFA and 
CRUSADE 
 
Data collection summary 
Month/
Year Location  Organization  Respondent(s) 
Feb-13 Chennai Equitas Varath, Chief products manager 
  Pondicherry 
Pondicherry 
U. Dr. Daniel Lazar, Reader 
Mar-13 Chennai Malar Thomas Franco, Founder 
  Delhi Sa-Dhan 
Matthew Titus,Executive director;  
Kolandavel Naratarajan, Program 
manager 
  Chennai IFMR 
Nikhil Dugal, Policy outreach associate 
&  
Surabhi Agrawal, Research associate 
  Chennai IIT Madras K Kalpana, Assistant Professor 
Apr-13 Chennai TNCDW 
J. Ganesh Kanna, Assistant 
Coordinator,  
Micro credit, TNCDW 
  Chennai Repco Bank 
A.G. Venkatachalm, Project director, 
Repco Foundation for Micro Credit; 
T.E. Thiruvengadam, Executive director 
Repco MSME; 
2 branch visits (offices and groups) 
  Kancheepuram Repco Bank 1 branch visit (office and groups) 
  Chennai Hand in Hand 
Dr. Kalpana Sankar, Chairperson and 
managing trustee &  
Dr. N Jeyaseelan, Group CEO 
  Kancheepuram Hand in Hand 
Abdul Gaffoor, Additional COO-SHG & 
V. Badrinarayanan, COO-SHG & 
Microfinance 
  Kancheepuram 
Mahalir 
Thittam 
K. Vijayasamkari, Mohan Babu, & 
K. Rajkumar, Assistant project officers 
(3) 
  Chennai NABARD 
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